Amartya Sen's What is Equality?

I take up the "What is equality?" controversy begun by Amartya Sen in 1979 by critically considering utility (J. S. Mill), primary goods (John Rawls), property rights (John Roemer) and basic capabilities in terms of what is to be distributed according to principles and theories of social justice. I then consider the four most general principles designed to answer issues raised by the Equality of Welfare principle, Equality of Opportunity for Welfare principle, Equality of Resources principle and Equality of Opportunity for Resources principle. I consider each with respect to the more general normative principle that whatever theory of social or distributive justice we accept should be as ambition sensitive and endowment insensitive as feasible in real world circumstances. In this context I take up the problems of expensive tastes, expensive disabilities, lowered or manipulated preferences or ‘needs,’ and differential needs versus differential talents and abilities. I argue that the best solution is to adopt a modified version of Rawls’ theory which takes primary social goods as that which is to be distributed but which demands a Basic Rights principle that insures basic subsistent rights (as well as basic security rights) as the most fundamental principle of morality (and social justice), and then demands that Rawls’ Difference Principle be applied lexically to the ‘material’ goods of income, wealth, and leisure time, but done so that the social basis of self-respect is never undermined.

Since Amartya Sen’s article "What is Equality?" was published in 1980 (Sen 1980a) the question of what is to be distributed according to theories and principles of social justice has been at the fore of much thinking and debate in the field o...

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... and others – are relevant to moral, social, and political philosophy and theory see Jon Elster 1978, 1979, 1983, and 1985.

(6) These provisions are all contained within the theory of social justice I put forward in Peffer 1990 and 1995. In Political Liberalism Rawls explicitly accepts three of the four modifications I make of his theory, holding out only on my principle in favor of social and economic democracy (Rawls 1993, p. 7). For my response to Rawls’ reason for not accepting this modification of his theory see Peffer 1995.

(7) See Schweickart 1980, 1992, and 1993; Nove 1983; Buchanan 1982 and 1985; Levine 1984 and 1989; Arneson 1987; D. Miller 1989; Peffer 1990, 1991, and 1995; Albert and Hahnel 1991a and 1991b; Avineri 1992; Van Parijs 1992b; Weiskipf 1992a and 1992b; Bowles, Gintis, and Gustaffson 1993; Bardham and Roemer (ed.) 1993; and Roemer 1994.