19th Century Monomania

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The intervention of experts in the legal arena is not one that is foreign; in fact, the history of experts as advisors could be traced back to Middle Ages where their expertise was required in highly-technical cases where the judge and jury were not equipped with the essential knowledge. However, their roles have significantly transformed when the “adversarial revolution” took place in the nineteenth century, and in place of an advisor was the role of the partisan witness. The central theme of this essay revolves around the incompatibility between advocacy and science, as propounded by Smith. In this essay, the issues and objections surrounding the role of expert witnesses, focusing particularly on the psychiatric and toxicological expertise, …show more content…

They argue that elusive insanity does not manifest itself through conventional and recognizable signs, and it is hence undetectable by the untrained eye, propelling a need for expert witnesses. This strategy was evident as the Esquirol circle proposed the concept of “monomania” in the courtrooms in 1820s. The Esquirol circle took the assessments of insanity beyond of the sphere of common sense and construed them niche expertise, necessitating the need for their intervention. This technique was useful as they presented monomania as a form of elusive insanity. As Goldstein remarked, the success of this strategy is manifested in the fact that advocates “accepted it prematurely” and was hence free from significant scientific debate for decades. Later in the nineteenth-century, the concept of “hereditary degeneracy” was invoked, standing in lieu of monomania. Goldstein regarded this as a “tactical” move by psychiatrists to make themselves relevant “before the criminal justice system and the …show more content…

Essentially, under this technique, experts present their scientific theories through the means of model and demonstration. This technique, designed to “lend transparency to science” , was instead abused by opportunistic experts as exemplified in the Buchanan trial. The defense attorney, in this case, used a human brain and trickery to impeach the credibility of the opposing expert witness before the jury. The former hinged on the latter’s failure to identify a real brain from a model at his advantage. Laypersons, albeit lacking the capacity to comprehend complex composition of the testimony, could grasp an expert who failed to distinguish a real brain from a model. As Essig explained, if the credibility of a witness could be undermined on a straightforward point, his credibility will no doubt be impeached when complex issues are disputed. In addition, in the same trial, Essig noted that the pharmacist managed to paint a picture in the jury’s mind through a simple demonstration of a solubility test. Manifestly, this technique is effective as it spawns a significant “rhetorical impact”. Evidently, courtroom scientific demonstrations were designed for experts to convey perplexing scientific theories to the jury, allowing laypersons to “see for themselves” the truth of specific scientific assertions. However, in reality, it allows experts to use the courtroom as a stage for their perfectly

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