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World history chapter 20 scientific revolution
The mind body problem in simple words
Discuss the scientific revolution
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No one can deny that science has evolved rapidly throughout history. One question, however, has not been able to be answered, even though it has been asked from times as far back as Plato. Do humans have minds; a separate entity from the physical brain that allows us to think? Or is there only a brain, controlling everything including choices and emotions? Thoughts have no physical properties, so how is it that they reside in a physical container such as the brain? These questions all describe the “mind-body problem.”
In the article, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” author Thomas Nagel provides his own view on the mind-body problem. He begins by stating that consciousness is the reason why the mind-body problem is so controversial and difficult to solve. The reductionist (i.e. materialist) believes that every human’s mental states are simply the results of the physical components and chemical reactions of the brain. Nagel claims that every reductionist has a favorite analogy to the mind-body problem, but these examples are unrelated. They refer to matters in which scientists have substantial understanding, where as conscious phenomenon is not very well understood (305). This is why, without consciousness, the mind-body problem would not be nearly as interesting or debatable (306).
The author continues to say that consciousness is widespread between humans, animals, and perhaps even life forms on other planets. If an individual has the ability to be conscious, then it must have its own viewpoint. There must be something it is like for a person to be a person, and an animal to be an animal. This “something” Nagel describes as “the subjective character of experience”. He believes that while reductionists are analyz...
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...ctive and objective experiences are. The analogy of the bat is an exceptional case, because no human has any idea of the bat’s perception of the world. The mind-body problem is directly linked to this idea. One might attempt to explain his perception, but he is unable to completely communicate his subjective experience. The analogy of the butterfly is an interesting one; the answer may seem obvious, and so the rest of the problem is ignored. The mind-body problem can’t be solved until scientists learn more about consciousness and mental states. Physicalism (i.e. materialism) cannot be the answer according to what we know now, but could be proven true in the future.
Works Cited
Nagel, Thomas. “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophy: The Quest for Truth. Ed. Louis P. Pojman and Lewis Vaughn. 7th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 305-312. Print.
I will begin by setting the parameters of this discussion by emphasizing what Nagel defines to be death. Nagel writes that “death is the unequivocal and permanent end of our existence…. un-supplemented by any form of conscious survival” (1). In accordance with Nagel’s definition of death, I will take for granted in this discussion that death does not depend on corporeal
The doctrine of physicalism is a widely discussed philosophical issue in which the mind-body problem is heavily explored. This controversial topic has left philosophers questioning the relationship between mind and matter, and more specifically, consciousness and the brain. There are a number of arguments supporting either side, but two that are rather compelling are Nagel’s What is it like to be a bat? and Jackson’s What Mary didn’t know. These two objections of physicalism use the subjective aspect of experience to suggest that the mind exists as something separate from the brain. Although both of these objections are a challenge physicalism, Nagel’s argument poses more of a threat to it because of his specific use of bats rather than humans. In this paper, I will be discussing how Nagel’s objection is more damaging to the doctrine of physicalism than Jackson’s.
Richard Taylor explained why the body and the mind are one, and why they are not two separate substances. In the article “The Mind as a Function of the Body”, Taylor divides his article in a number of sections and explains clearly why dualism, or the theory that the mind and the body are separate is not conceivable. In one of these sections it is explained in detail the origin of why some philosophers and people believe in dualist metaphysics. As stated by Taylor “when we form an idea of a body or a physical object, what is most likely to come to mind is not some person or animal but something much simpler, such as a stone or a marble”(133). The human has the tendency to believe a physical object as simple, and not containing anything complex. A problem with believing this is that unlike a stone or a marble a human (or an animal) has a brain and the body is composed of living cells (excluding dead skin cells, hair, and nails which are dead cells). The f...
The mind-body problem can be a difficult issue to discuss due to the many opinions and issues that linger. The main issue behind the mind-body problem is the question regarding if us humans are only made up of matter, or a combination of both matter and mind. If we consist of both, how can we justify the interaction between the two? A significant philosophical issue that has been depicted by many, there are many prominent stances on the mind-body problem. I believe property dualism is a strong philosophical position on the mind-body issue, which can be defended through the knowledge argument against physicalism, also refuted through the problems of interaction.
In Searle’s first argument against the distinction between the mental and physical, he assumes this mistaken assumption is largely due to one’s common-sense supposition that there indeed is a distinction between the mental and physical at some deep metaphysical level. Searle confronts this assumption with the simple fact that he believes Consciousness it is a systematic biological phenomenon, much like digestion, and as such, concludes, that consciousness is a feature of the brain as such such is part of the physical world. However, I agree with Searle in the sense that the through simple reduction there incidentally will be a metaphysical distinction between mental and physical, however I disagree with the way in which he counters this.
There is a great question on whether or not our conscious thoughts are something greater than a physical state: this question has two responses which state that yes, consciousness state and brain state are two separate states (dualism) and no, brain state and conscious state is one in the same (physicalism). I will be arguing that brain state and conscious state are the same by presenting scientific evidence and theories that support a physicalist view. This evidence will clearly state why the physical stance is supported while the dualist stance is not.
Physicalism is the view that everything in the world, including mental states, can be explained in terms of physical phenomena. Thomas Nagel argues against this view in “What is it like to be a bat?”, claiming that physicalism is unable to, given our current concepts, capture the subjective nature of mental states. Nagel says, “Fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like for that organism. We may call this the subjective character of experience” (Nagel 436). Nagel argues that as much as we may study bat biology and imagine what it is to have wings and hang upside down, we cannot have bat experiences.
Fodor begins his article on the mind-body problem with a review of the current theories of dualism and materialism. According to dualism, the mind and body are two separate entities with the body being physical and the mind being nonphysical. If this is the case, though, then there can be no interaction between the two. The mind could not influence anything physical without violating the laws of physics. The materialist theory, on the other hand, states that the mind is not distinct from the physical. In fact, supporters of the materialist theory believe that behavior does not have mental causes. When the materialist theory is split into logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory, the foundation of functionalism begins to form. Logical behaviorism states that every mental feeling has the same meaning as an if-then statement. For example, instead of saying "Dr. Lux is hungry," one would say "If there was a quart of macadamia brittle nut in the freezer, Dr. Lux would eat it." The central-state identity theory states that a certain mental state equals a certain neurophysiological state. The theory works in a way similar to Berkeley’s representation of objects. Both mental states and objects are a certain collection of perceptions that together identify the particular state or object.
In today’s society, the mind is a set of cognitive elements which enables an individual’s consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory. In addition, without our minds and/or conscious experiences, a person would not be able to understand what makes them who they are. Similarly, in Thomas Nagel’s essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat,” Nagel claims that even though there is something it is like to be an organism, humans are not capable of fully knowing what it is like to be a bat. In addition, Nagel supports his claims through the importance of an organism’s conscious experiences, memories, and knowledge which allow an individual to identify themselves. Therefore, in this paper I will discuss Nagel’s argument which I believe
The one instant I can pinpoint as the genesis of my interest in biomedical science was the winter of sixth grade, when I picked up a book on creativity and the brain. I found it fascinating, but what really struck me was that here was a several hundred page book that mostly talked about how little we knew about its topic. It made me think. This was supposed to be a book about how much we’ve learned, and what it’s saying is that the progress we’ve made is only in finding out how little we know. This didn’t upset me; it made me curious. Because, of all the things that we should know about, surely our own minds and our own bodies are paramount among them, and yet we still have so much to learn. I’ve since learned that this phenomenon is not restricted to the biological – gravity is one of the most important things in our lives, yet we do not know its cause. But the biomedical questions continue to fascinate me, perhaps because the answers are so vital. Sure, cosmology is intriguing, but what about a cure for cancer, or even the common cold? What about a way of repairing or bypass...
Johnstone, M., Primmer, J. (2014). [Lecture]. The Mind-Body Problem. PHILOS 1E03, Problems of Philosophy. Hamilton, ON, Canada: McMaster University.
The 'mind-body' problem has troubled philosophers for centuries. This is because no human being has been able to sufficiently explain how the mind actually works and how this mind relates to the body - most importantly to the brain. If this were not true then there would not be such heated debates on the subject. No one objects to the notion that the Earth revolves around the sun because it is empirical fact. However, there is no current explanation on the mind that can be accepted as fact. In 'What is it like to be a bat?', Thomas Nagel does not attempt to solve this 'problem'. Instead, he attempts to reject the reductionist views with his argument on subjectivity. He examines the difficulties of the mind-body problem by investigating the conscious experience of an organism, which is usually ignored by the reductionists. Unfortunately, his arguments contain some flaws but they do shed some light as to why the physicalist view may never be able to solve the mind-body problem.
While the great philosophical distinction between mind and body in western thought can be traced to the Greeks, it is to the influential work of René Descartes, French mathematician, philosopher, and physiologist, that we owe the first systematic account of the mind/body relationship. As the 19th century progressed, the problem of the relationship of mind to brain became ever more pressing.
He removes himself from a subjective viewpoint and helps us translate all that we cherish to true meaning. Nagel breaks down the subjective and objective to help us realize what is not actually important and vice versa. Life is meaningful if it is objectively meaningful. He argues that since there is no objective metric of meaningfulness, life is not objectively meaningful. If there are no objective standards in the universe, Nagel, therefore, concludes that life is ultimately meaningless (Nagel 755-62). Nagel also strongly believed that there were certain experiences and characteristics that were beyond human understanding. In his publication “What is it Like to Be a Bat” he tries to express that all though we can imagine what it would be like for us to be a bat we could never think like or be precise about what its really like because we aren’t bats. For example we can try to imagine flying around blind searching for bugs to eat but will never have the same senses or perception as a bat. Another example is that of mans best friend. You can crawl on all fours, eat dog food, and imitate barking to the best of our ability. Unfortunately we have human senses and comprehend as human beings due to years of conditioning. He observed that we can describe any number of phenomenon associated with thinking beings but in any of them consciousness seems to be something that may be there or not. In the same way
In philosophy, the majority of studies relate to the mind. Whether it is the main subject or just a helpful side topic to move the main subject along, this term is used often. Defining the term mind is difficult, and is a topic that is popularly studied and debated among philosophers. These qualified and knowledgeable people try to determine whether or not the mind is who people are or if they are their body or a combination. Although they have learned many helpful truths and defined other useful terms, the debate is still evident in the philosophical community today. Learning about how the mind relates to the body, and whether the mind and the brain are the same thing are other ways to look at the many options of how to discern