This essay will address the question of whether computers can think, possess intelligence or mental states. It will proceed from two angles. Firstly it is required to define what constitutes “thinking.” An investigation into this debate however demonstrate that the very definition of thought is contested ground. Secondly, it is required for a reflection on what form artificial intelligence should take, be it a notion of “simulated intelligence,” the weak AI hypothesis, or “actual thinking,” the strong AI hypothesis. (Russell, Norvig p 1020) The first angle informs us of the theoretical pursuit of what it means for something to think, whereas the second seeks to probe how it could demonstrated that thinking is occurring. As a result we have two fissures: on one hand, a disagreement of what constitutes thinking and on the other a question of the methodological approaches to AI. However, this essay will argue that both proponents of the possibility of AI and its detractors, are guilty of an anthropomorphic conception of thought. This is the idea that implicit in the question of whether computers can think, we are really asking whether they can think like us. As a result this debate can be characterised being concerned with narrow human understanding of the concept of thought. This I will argue that this flaw characterises the various philosophical theories of artificial intelligence.
On one hand functionalists, such as Fodor and Putnam, argue that “the psychology of a system depends” not on the physical architecture of a system, neurons in the mind brain or the wires in a computer, but instead how it is “put together.” (Fodor 1981 p 114) As they characterise mental states as functional states – inputs of stimuli and outputs of behav...
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...he Philosophy of Mind' in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Computing. Floridi, Ludiano. (Ed.) Blackwell, pp 135-153
Russell, Stuart J. and Norvig, Peter. (2010) Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (3rd ed.) Upper Saddle River. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Searle, John. (1980) 'Minds, Brains and Programs'. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3) , pp 417-457
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Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1980) Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol 1. Oxford: Blackwell.
In this paper I will evaluate and present A.M. Turing’s test for machine intelligence and describe how the test works. I will explain how the Turing test is a good way to answer if machines can think. I will also discuss Objection (4) the argument from Consciousness and Objection (6) Lady Lovelace’s Objection and how Turing responded to both of the objections. And lastly, I will give my opinion on about the Turing test and if the test is a good way to answer if a machine can think.
Passer, M., Smith, R., Holt, N., Bremner, A., Sutherland, E., & Vliek, M. (2009). Psychology; Science of Mind and Behaviour. (European Edition). New York.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is one of the newest fields in Science and Engineering. Work started in earnest soon after World War II, and the name itself was coined in 1956 by John McCarthy. Artificial Intelligence is an art of creating machines that perform functions that require intelligence when performed by people [Kurzweil, 1990]. It encompasses a huge variety of subfields, ranging from general (learning and perception) to the specific, such as playing chess, proving mathematical theorems, writing poetry, driving a car on the crowded street, and diagnosing diseases. Artificial Intelligence is relevant to any intellectual task; it is truly a Universal field. In future, intelligent machines will replace or enhance human’s capabilities in
Oppy, Graham, Dowe, David, The Turing Test, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2003 Edition), Mar. 10, 2005 .
To commence, functionalists are preoccupied with making mental states distinct, partly on the basis of causal relations to other mental states. Functionalism involves the conviction that psychological or mental terms can be done away to a certain extent. Functionalists treat terms related to mental states as functional characterizations which differ from input and output terms. Therefore, when the theory is broken down, mental states are associated with the states of the Turing-machine, which on its own is defined as a machine table that mentions inputs and outputs that are not explored in the mind (Block, pg. 212). Additionally, functionalism empathizes that characterization of mental states ought to include descriptions of inputs and outputs in both it...
Gross, R (2010). Psychology: The science of mind and behaviour. 6th ed. London: Hodder Education. p188.
For years philosophers have enquired into the nature of the mind, and specifically the mysteries of intelligence and consciousness. (O’Brien 2017) One of these mysteries is how a material object, the brain, can produce thoughts and rational reasoning. The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) was devised in response to this problem, and suggests that the brain is quite literally a computer, and that thinking is essentially computation. (BOOK) This idea was first theorised by philosopher Hilary Putnam, but was later developed by Jerry Fodor, and continues to be further investigated today as cognitive science, modern computers, and artificial intelligence continue to advance. [REF] Computer processing machines ‘think’ by recognising information
Myers, G. D., (2010). Psychology (9th ed.) In T. Kuehn & P. Twickler (Eds.), The Biology of Mind. (p.65) New York, NY: Worth Publishers.
In the first three chapters of Kinds of Minds, Dennett introduces a variety of perspectives on what the mind is. From Cartesianism to Functionalism, Dennett outlines the evolution of thought about thought and the mind and explains his own perspective along the way. Cartesianism, as proposed by Descartes, proposes that the mind is who we are and characterizes the mind as a non physical substance that was completely separate from, and in control of, the physical body. In the strictest sense, Functionalism can be defined from Alan Turing’s perspective that a mind can be defined by what it can do. So from the Turing test, if an AI can fool a human into thinking it is also human, it must be at least as intelligent as the human. Using a plethora of anecdotes and examples, Dennett makes his position clear as he denounces Cartesianism and advocates for a functionalist based perspective in his own evolving definition of the mind.
Since antiquity the human mind has been intrigued by artificial intelligence hence, such rapid growth of computer science has raised many issues concerning the isolation of the human mind.
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Lycan, W. G. (1980) Reply to: "Minds, brains, and programs", The B.B.S. 3, p. 431.
The traditional notion that seeks to compare human minds, with all its intricacies and biochemical functions, to that of artificially programmed digital computers, is self-defeating and it should be discredited in dialogs regarding the theory of artificial intelligence. This traditional notion is akin to comparing, in crude terms, cars and aeroplanes or ice cream and cream cheese. Human mental states are caused by various behaviours of elements in the brain, and these behaviours in are adjudged by the biochemical composition of our brains, which are responsible for our thoughts and functions. When we discuss mental states of systems it is important to distinguish between human brains and that of any natural or artificial organisms which is said to have central processing systems (i.e. brains of chimpanzees, microchips etc.). Although various similarities may exist between those systems in terms of functions and behaviourism, the intrinsic intentionality within those systems differ extensively. Although it may not be possible to prove that whether or not mental states exist at all in systems other than our own, in this paper I will strive to present arguments that a machine that computes and responds to inputs does indeed have a state of mind, but one that does not necessarily result in a form of mentality. This paper will discuss how the states and intentionality of digital computers are different from the states of human brains and yet they are indeed states of a mind resulting from various functions in their central processing systems.
Crevier, D. (1999). AI: The tumultuous history of the search for Artificial Intelligence. Basic Books: New York.
Artificial Intelligence “is the ability of a human-made machine to emulate or simulate human methods for the deductive and inductive acquisition and application of knowledge and reason” (Bock, 182). The early years of artificial intelligence were seen through robots as they exemplified the advances and potential, while today AI has been integrated society through technology. The beginning of the thought of artificial intelligence happened concurrently with the rise of computers and the dotcom boom. For many, the utilization of computers in the world was the most advanced role they could ever see machines taking. However, life has drastically changed from the 1950s. This essay will explore the history of artificial intelligence, discuss the