Partisanship and Electoral Incentives

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Tufte (1978) and Hibbs (1987) both argue that there are two principle political influences on macroeconomic policy: partisanship and electoral incentives. However, they differ with regard to the emphasis they place on each influence. While Tufte emphasizes the influence of electoral incentives, Hibbs argues in favor of the influence of partisanship. Franzese’s (2002) review of electoral and partisan influences on macroeconomic outcomes suggests that there is more empirical evidence supporting Hibbs’ assertion. However, he also suggests that there is considerable room for an analysis of “context-conditional electoral and partisan cycles” (Franzese, 2002, p. 369). Bearing this in mind, I argue that incumbent politicians can switch between partisanship and electoral incentives when confronted with specific domestic conditions. In particular, I argue that incumbents will rationally choose to pursue an electorally oriented economic policy rather than a partisan policy under conditions of party weakness. More specifically, assuming that incumbents seek reelection as both Tufte and Hibbs suggest they do, they seek to use their status to influence the outcome of the election. Tufte argues that politicians will do so using “electioneering” methods while Hibbs finds evidence that incumbents follow policies that are in line with their party’s core beliefs. In a situation in which an incumbent believes his or her party’s core constituency to be too weak or fragmented to enable reelection, I argue that the incumbent will abandon a partisan policy in favor of Tuftian electioneering. Moreover, I consider within the US context, midterm elections as one signal an incumbent might consider when pursuing a partisan or electoral policy. I will first b...

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... monetary policy instruments that are able to target specific groups of margin voters. An incumbent’s party’s poor performance during midterm elections may be a signal that the incumbent’s constituency is dissatisfied or too weak to provide sufficient support for reelection. This claim might be empirically evaluated by first searching for instances in which incumbents have switched strategies by looking at evidence of inflation and policies characteristic of electorally-oriented policies.

Works Cited
Franzese, R. J., Jr. (2002). Electoral and partisan cycles in economic policies and outcomes. Annual Review of Political Science, 5, 369–421.

Hibbs, D. A., Jr. (1987). The American political economy: Macroeconomics and electoral politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Tufte, E. R. (1978). Political control of the economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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