euthenasia

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Kant, Velleman and Thomson put together a series of arguments over whether or not it is morally right to offer terminally ill patients the option of being helped to die by their doctors or care takers and how. From Kant’s perspective, morality is about the relationship between motives and action. This knowledge of morals comes from reasoning about what could be a law for human action. According to Kant, actions are done for a reason, reasons in turn are general and apply to all rational creatures. However reasons do not necessitate us, reason only commands us. A command or imperative suggests what we ought to do, but it is also something which we can fail to do. Kant views this as the gap between recognizing something is right and actually doing it. Kant declares that he is an Autonomist, and “Autonomy is […] the ground of a human and of every rational nature.” (Kant, 4:436). While both Thomson and Velleman agree that the autonomy of the people should treated with respect, they both interpret this to have conclusions that not only differ from Kant’s view, but have very different consequences from each other’s as well. On one hand Velleman argues that respect of people’s autonomy does not force us to make euthanasia a protected option that it is formally provided and on which the patient has exclusive authority. While on the other side of the argument Thomson claims that the respect of people’s autonomy requires us to do so. After briefly laying out each argument, I will defend Thomson’s argument by objecting that Velleman’s point of view on giving a patient the right to die is not giving the patient a new option so much as merely restoring an option lost to them by the state of their condition.
The argument of Kant...

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...nuing to follow this logic, one could extend this to suggest that by giving an incapacitated patient a right to die we are not giving him a new option whatsoever. Under this circumstance it rationally appears that we are restoring a previously held right to an option lost to them by the state of their condition. After all, if Velleman truly stands by his own logic that “Our ability to justify our choices to the people around us is what enables us to sustain the role of rational agent in our dealings with them; and it is therefore essential to our remaining, in their eyes, and eligible partner in cooperation and conversation, or an appropriate object of respect” (Velleman, pg. 11), than as a rational agent he must follow his own logic as we have laid out in our objection and thus personifying why I am more inclined to side with Thomson’s side of the argument.

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