The Bodily Continuity Theory: The Problem Of Personal Identity

Who are we? Most individuals would answer that we are human beings. But consider taking this concept one step further by asking the following: What makes us human beings? What makes each individual person that same person over a period of time? When do we, as human beings, begin to exist and cease to exist? These questions give rise to the problem of personal identity, which is centered on the idea of essential properties. An essential property of any specific thing makes that thing what it is, and if an essential property is changed or is taken away, that specific thing no longer exists. The problem of personal identity asks the following: What are the “essential” properties of human beings? Numerous philosophers have attempted to answer the question of personal identity, contributing to one of three core theories studied in class: Plato’s/Descartes’ Soul Theory, the Psychological Continuity Theory, and the Bodily Continuity Theory. For the purpose of this paper, I claim that the best rationale regarding

This view creates the best probability of there being an afterlife, and is thus supported by many religious followers who hope for the possibility of life after death. However, there are internal and existential flaws in the Soul Theory. Even if our essential characteristic as human beings is our soul, there is no explanation as to how the soul controls our physical body, known as the Pairing Problem mentioned by Jaegwon Kim. The soul is defined as immaterial, which means it can take up no physical space, and is essentially nowhere. Since the soul cannot be located, there is no existential proof of a soul, which gives the Soul Theory less merit than the Psychological Continuity Theory in which our psychology exists in our physical