Strategic Voting

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2. Voting fails to correspond to rational models – biases and strategic voting

In the line of economic rationality, political analysis has tried to apply the market’s economic model to election processes. It soon became obvious that we are far from the ideal of rational voters: according to the rational choice theory, if people voted for who they wanted most, utility would be maximised1. But we humans push that rationality to a whole other level and try anticipating others’ behavior using what we call strategic voting. Voters seem to vote thinking they could change something, while our individual vote can rarely, if ever, tilt the balance: that is why we rarely vote for small parties. With strategic voting, our votes depend on the logical connections we make between our preferences, beliefs, and what we believe to be others’ preferences and beliefs – voting becomes a Bayesian game. Baron (2008)1 also explains that strategic voting is the ultimate proof that we do not vote according to our moral values.
Strategic voting may lead to consequences contrary to our own interest. According to Duverger’s law, small parties tend to be eliminated through two occurings: fusion and elimination. Elimination refers to the tendency of voters to eliminate small parties, believing they have no chance of winning, and fusion is a consequence to that: small …show more content…

Fey demonstrates mathematically the possibility of a non Duvergian equilibrium (three party system), reminding that they remain unstable and that they would require close-to-perfect information. These voting equilibria build themselves upon preelection polls. They serve to inform the electorate about the viability of the candidates in the Bayesian game previously mentioned. Voters seem to make their decisions solely on their anticipations and inferences they can make about easily accessible information such as party

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