Principal Control Agents

In contrast, I’m afraid to tell you that your theory of Principal Agent control is not without it’s faults. You narrow the field down to a single question “Do Principals Control Agents?” When there are many other questions that need to be asked and answer. One such question is whether or not bureaucrats are effective in the first place. In “Assessing the Assumptions: A Critical Analysis of Agency Theory” Worsham, Eisner, and Ringquist discuss some criticisms and complexities of the Principal Agent model. The theory is not as simple as many wish it to be, and has many factors to consider when assessing it. The authors state that political control cannot be simply boiled down to individual holding power over another individual. This is used to

You entirely fail to discuss this. In the article titled “Bureaucratic Behavior” Wise addresses this. He asserts that there are four possible motivations of public bureaucrats. The first being the traditional weberian bureaucrat as discussed in the last paragraph. The Weberian bureaucrat is unbiased and policy neutral. These bureaucrats react directly to their principal’s controls and do not shirk. The second type of bureaucrat is the representative bureaucracy. These bureaucrats advocate for the interest of the agency they serve. There’s debate on whether or not this should be allowed. They can be seen as good when they’re advocating for something that you’d like to see more of but also see as bad when you don’t like that particular agency. The third type of bureaucrat is the public choice motivated bureaucrat. They are self interested and only motivated by money and incentives. They are also budget maximizers for their agency. While they seem rare in reality, this is the stereotypical image of the bureaucrat. The last type of bureaucrat is the public service model. They want to help serve the public. They’re similar to the representative bureaucracy, although they’re goal is to help people in general. They also have higher respect for public goods. The problem with the motivation of bureaucrats is also seen in Brehm and Gates article.

Dilullo examined the why certain agents act as “principals agents” or agents acting exactly as the principal wants them to. He wonders why these agents go above and beyond what their duty requires without thanks. He attributes their resolution to the job to the culture of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. It starts with good selection and training of prison guards. By only allowing the type of people willing to put in the extra effort into the guard job, it is easier to replicate the culture through the prison guard system. He also finds that importance of symbols to be significant in adding to that culture. He says the symbol of the guard patch instills pride and resolution to the job instills the “power of the patch” into guards. He also finds competition between prison guards to do a good job results in a competitive yet beneficial culture in the prison guard