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Introduction

“The Battle of the Atlantic was the dominating factor all throughout the war. Never for one moment could we forget that everything that happened elsewhere, on land, at sea or in the air, depended upon its outcome… dominating all our power to carry on the war, or even keep ourselves alive, lay on mastery of the ocean routes and free approach and entry to our ports.” The Battle of the Atlantic (BOTA) was World War Two’s (WW2) longest campaign, beginning on 03 September 1939, with the sinking of the passenger liner SS Athenia, and extending until the end of the war, it centred around the ability of the allies merchant shipping to land food, supplies and equipment to the British mainland and later Russia, in order to provide the continuing resources to prosecute the war with Germany . When Winston Churchill commented that “…the only thing that ever really frightened me was the U-Boat peril” , he had identified the threat posed by the Kriegsmarine U-Boat (Unterseeboot ) force under Commodore Donitz as being of significant strategic importance, despite its small size. Much of the task of defending British territorial waters against this menace, and ensuring the safe passage of merchant shipping, fell to Royal Air Force Coastal Command (RAFCC), with varying levels of success throughout the war. Of the 733 U-Boats sunk during the BOTA, 303 were sunk by aircraft, 195 by RAFCC .

This essay takes the reader through the various phases of the BOTA, providing analysis of the effectiveness of RAFCC, by critical evaluation of whether the tactical and strategic goals of the Battle were ultimately achieved. These being; tactically, the ability to find and sink U-Boats, versus the amount and volume of allied merchant ...

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... occurred during the main 1940-41 Atlantic campaign, with the majority sank after the campaign had already largely been won. However, as Milner{REF} explains, following the loss of several key U-Boat commanders to the allies and through the use of improved organisational structures, new technology, strategy and doctrine, the effectiveness of the U-Boat threat declined, despite a four-fold increase in the number of U-Boats available{REF}. Analysis would suggest the deterrence of the improved convoy defence techniques, rather than the capability to actually sink U-Boats made the difference between success and failure, and this marks the start of the British fight back, resulting in Donitz redeploying his U-Boats out of their traditional hunting grounds , notwithstanding the 325 ships (1.5M tons) sunk during April-December 1941, for the sinking of only 28 U-Boats .

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