Morally Insane: Understanding Psychopathy as a Form of Insanity

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1 Introduction

Neuroscience is revealing more and more about the neural underpinnings of our perception of the world and our behaviour in it. As the explanatory endeavour touches upon concepts such as 'person', 'responsibility' and 'free will', friction arises between the established ways of describing and judging persons and actions, and what neuroscience purports to tell us about the real nature of these things. The heat is up, and the rising conflict is perhaps best felt in the courtroom, where the institutionalised common morality is being confronted with new ways of seeing old problems. Some expect a revolution, others see nothing new. In the following, I will investigate the claims made for both sides of the debate, starting with an understanding of morality as a world of knowledge in which most of us effortlessly partake, and which is imbued with significance and value. Seeing morality as a kind of knowledge is motivated in part by the recognition that some individuals seem to lack 'moral knowledge' altogether: these persons may have some superficial knowledge of ethical concepts, but fall completely outside the world of moral values most of us take for granted (and which is the basis for even the most relativistic dismissal of universal moral principles). Thus psychopaths, as these persons are colloquially (and clinically) known, will herein serve the function of providing an illuminating exception to the rule of moral knowledge. In light of recent findings about the possible neural substrates of psychopathy and the failure of psychopathic individuals in qualifying for traditional exculpating insanity, these individuals will also provide a suitably difficult case for the competing views of traditional criminal responsibil...

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