Metallgesellschaft Case Study

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Metallgesellschaft (MG) took 1.8 billion dollars in losses not because their underlying positions and rationale were unsound, but because they were unable to roll over their stack hedge positions in the way that they anticipated and because they underestimated the amount of cash needed to fund their positions. The basic strategy employed by MG, or more specifically, Arthur Benson, who crafted MG’s derivatives strategy, was to sell contracts on petroleum and to hedge this exposure with a stack hedge. He had successfully implemented this strategy just a few years earlier at another firm. This stack hedge was then rolled forward upon expiration. MG sold forward contracts to its customers, selling them a fixed amount of gasoline at a fixed …show more content…

The futures contracts, if the value fluctuated enough, would result in margin calls for MG during which they would have to contribute additional capital in order to cover their losses on their futures positions. In theory, as a result of their hedging strategy, these losses on their futures positions would be offset by their gains on the forward positions with their customers. The problem arose because the gains on the forward contracts were realized over the long term and the increased cash requirements associated with the futures contracts occurred immediately. Futures contracts are settled daily and forward contracts are settled upon delivery. One of the reasons why the losses on these futures contracts put MG into financial hardship was because of this cash flow timing …show more content…

Rather than riding out the short-term losses, which weren’t really losses, but rather negative cash flows, MG’s management panicked. In early 1994, a group of German banks issued a bailout of about $1.9 billion in order to save MG. MG used the money to close its hedge positions. The obligations to MG’s customers remained, completely unhedged after the bailout. In effect, MG’s management made a critical mistake. They saw the hedging activities as the problem and misunderstood the nature of their losses. In total, MG lost about $1.8 billion. Unfortunately for MG, if they had held onto the derivative positions, they could have seen huge gains in 1994 as oil prices soared. The firm did not go bankrupt, but did leave the US oil markets completely in 1996. Ultimately, Arthur Benson, the trader constructed MG’s hedging strategy, was fired, even though the board approved his strategy. He later sued MG for failing to implement his strategy properly and attempting to blame him for their actions. Five members of the MG board were fired and 7,500 jobs were cut to reduce costs, but in the end MG survived and was able to return the bailout money within a couple of

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