Long Union Vs Nsc-68

The Cold War was a period of intense geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, characterized by ideological, political, and military competition. Central to the U.S. response to the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union were two pivotal documents: the Long Telegram and NSC-68. These documents outlined contrasting assessments of the Soviet Union and proposed divergent strategies for handling the perceived threat. This paper aims to analyze the key insights of the Long Telegram and NSC-68, highlighting their differing perspectives on the Soviet Union and the recommended U.S. responses. Authored by George F. Kennan in 1946, the Long Telegram provided a comprehensive analysis of Soviet foreign policy and ideology. Kennan argued that

Cold War strategy following the outbreak of the Korean War. Unlike the Long Telegram, NSC-68 portrayed the Soviet Union as a monolithic entity driven by aggressive expansionist aims and possessing significant military capabilities. The document warned of the existential threat posed by Soviet communism and called for a dramatic escalation of U.S. military spending and global engagement. NSC-68 advocated for a policy of military containment backed by a massive buildup of conventional and nuclear forces to deter Soviet aggression. It emphasized the need for collective defense arrangements, including the establishment of NATO, to counter the Soviet threat. The Long Telegram and NSC-68 offered contrasting assessments of the Soviet Union and proposed divergent strategies for addressing the perceived threat. While both documents recognized the expansionist nature of Soviet communism, they differed in their characterization of Soviet intentions and capabilities. The Long Telegram portrayed the Soviet Union as primarily opportunistic and vulnerable to containment measures, whereas NSC-68 depicted it as an implacable adversary bent on global