Difference Between Killing And Killing To Die

The widely debated argument of whether or not there is a morally relevant distinction between killing one and letting one die. It seems apparent through common sense that killing another human being would be worse. Although we may feel guilty, we do not think of ourselves as murderers when we fail to give money to the homeless man on the street. We also don’t see ourselves as accessories to murder if we choose not to be organ-donors or fail to donate blood. While we are not killing people, it is common sense that apprises us that our duty to provide aid for others is limited. (Rachels, 2001) I argue that while common sense tells us that killing is worse than letting die, it is often the distinction between killing and letting die its the moral significance as well as outside factors that allow for an accurate determination of whether one is definitively worse than the other.

The fundamental or general distinction between doing something and letting something happen is action vs. inaction (an omission of action), where action involves involvement and inaction an absence of involvement. (Cartwright, 1996) Thus with this distinction, killing is being involved in a circumstance in which you have caused someone to die and letting die is failing to act and get involved if you have power to prevent the death. However, this definition can be argued. Suppose I am hanging from a rope half way down a cliff face and you are attempting to pull me back to safe ground. As you feel yourself being dragged closer to the edge of the cliff due to my weight and the pull of gravity, you take your hands off the rope to save yourself but in turn resulting in my death. In this example, while you have acted by letting go of the rope, you have surely let m...

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...expect to see little moral distinction if we are comparing two cases where one falls under killing and the other as letting die. (McMahan, 1993) This occurs in Tooley’s example where there is no sign of moral difference between pressing the button and not pressing the button.

The moral significance of killing and letting die may have weight in cases and not in others attributes to the ‘many factors that contribute to the determination of the rightness or wrongness of an act’. (Cartwright, 1996) This applies to Rachels’ case where the both Jones and Smith were driven by the same dreadful motive and consequence that the difference of action and inaction considered invalid as a moral distinction. These factors that affect the distinction are largely variable. Thus the moral distinction between killing and letting die can be preceded by other factors. (Cartwright, 1996)