The basic premise of Harry G. Frankfurt’s, Alternate Possibilities and Morality argues against the idea of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, which states, that a person is only morally responsible for his or her said action if they could have done otherwise. Although many can agree that this constitutes for an astounding contradiction to the development of morality and choice, I do not believe that Frankfurt’s response constitutes as a genuine counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. According to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities the issues that arise is whether there is a presence of freewill and the effect that freewill plays on morality. This idea of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities complements the definition because according to Webster’s dictionary the definition states, ‘freewill is the freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention.’ According to this definition and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities it is agreed upon that freewill is a factor that must be taken into consideration when discussing the value of the actions committed by the individual. Human actions are the primary motives for wanting this concept of free will, and determining its validity as part of the issue of values and the morality of the individual.
The dilemma of determinism is an issue that has led to widespread debate over whether or not people have free will. The dilemma of determinism follows as such; (A) if determinism is true, we are not responsible, since our choices are determined by factors we can’t control, (B) Indeterminism is true, we are not responsible, since every choice happens by chance, (C) But either determinism or indeterminism is true, (D) Therefore, we are not morally responsible for what we do. Simply, the dilemma states that we cannot be free and therefore are not responsible for our choices. This dilemma has been approached by some people called compatibilists who believe that we can be responsible for our choices even though the choice was determined in advance.
Incompatibilists debate the opposite and say free will does not coexist with the idea of determinism and they are incompatible. The claim they address is that there is no possibility that there is true determinism and free will. Robert Kane analyzes both sides in his attempt to show the differences between each side and to draw possible conclusions to the question and existence of free will. The compatibilist and incompatiblists agree that there are other worlds where there is free will but disagree on the fact that determinism is true. Compatibilism is the idea that there is a connection between ones free will and the actions we take.
Furthermore in advocating that one treat others in differently when there are no factual differences is unjustifiable and makes this an arbitrary doctrine. Since there is no relevant factual difference between oneself and others, thus no real logic or reason, then the needs of others are equally important, which goes against the main principle of conduct for ethical egoism. Yet still the theory would not see the need to regard other individuals who may be affected by one’s actions, which again fails the minimum
Nevertheless, society and cultures should not be relied on to indicate moral and immoral behavior because it is questionable to believe that our actions become moral just for the reason that our culture or society accepts them as normal. Despite the differences between The Divine Command Theory and Cultural Relativism, they both are theories that just fall short of their
However, the rebuttal to that is that a person's actions are not products of chance, but of choice. Because of this, we can see how we can be held morally responsible. Indeterminism states that at least some events, mostly human actions, are not completely caused. The main argument for indeterminism is that it is a rejection of causation, there is no explanation, and without explanation, there can be no responsibility. However, indeterminism is not a complete rejection of causation, and therefore it is impossible to eliminate explanation and responsibility based on that statement.
In other words for something to be considered free will the agent must cause it and not be under any constraint. This appears to severely limit what we would be able to define as freewill. Even Chisholm notes that it is difficult to find an event that could be caused by an agent while also not being caused by any previous event. However, to say that the agent caused the event is just another way to detail the event causation and does not add anything of value to the to the description of that specific causal event or resulting events. In the opinion of Chisholm this is quite frankly a mistake.
I think that we have to look at the foundations first. And we have to look at the foundations that we know and if they’re where some reasons to doubt, then I will have to doubt the principles. And I think that knowledge does not depend upon things of whose existence I don’t have knowledge yet. So how can we say that if there isn’t enough evidence to support a claim, why is it considered wrong? I find it illogical because just because there still isn’t enough evidence, doesn’t mean its wrong, its just not considered right or wrong.
Similarly in the case of adopting subjectivism, as long as the person committing the action thought this action was morally permissible then that statement could not be made. If we adopted ethical nihilism, statements like this would not be able to have any truth value. Since ethical nihilism states that there are no correct answers whatsoever we could not state that something was wrong and give it a truth factor. In order to do this there must be some correct alternative but nihilism states there is no such
Simply, moral terms therefore do not describe some objective state of affairs - but are reflections of personal taste and preference. Hence the statement above, which refers to both `doing good' and `doing bad' are not universal imperatives - but reflections of the specific intentions and desires of the contract and the individuals involved. Furthermore this raises the issue, as to whether one can do good or harm anyone who was done so to ... ... middle of paper ... ...ng surprising here: it is tough making it alone and so there are good reasons why humans will do better if they do co-operate with others. But does this prove that co-operation is just another form of selfishness that we care only about our own interests and we co-operate in order to further those interests? In effect an answer to this depends entirely upon the individual; such an ambiguous statement undoubtedly entails a great difference in answers and interpretation.