On the date of December 8, 1953, in New York, President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave his speech, Atoms for Peace. 1 This speech was addressed to the United Nations Assembly. 2 To this large audience of well-established political leaders, Eisenhower addressed the root of the most pressing fear to envelop the Cold War. This fear was of a possible atomic annihilation that would have resulted from the tensions held between the United States and the U.S.S.R. The root of this fear that was addressed was the continued advancement and storage of atomic and nuclear weapons. Eisenhower presented this speech with the hope that he might have been able to turn the United States away from a possible war with the Soviets. Shawn J. Parry-Giles of the University …show more content…
For a speech to contain ethos, an established credibility and ethical appeal must be portrayed by the speaker. The portrayal of ethics is an essential element to a speaker’s relatability and helps to better establish a connection with the audience. In the Atoms for Peace speech, Eisenhower successfully portrayed the ethical appeal of ethos. This was not a seemingly difficult task for Eisenhower to maneuver, with the topics of discussion having been atomic warfare and the wellbeing of mankind, two topics that are in blatant relation to ethical values. Eisenhower used these topics of discussion to express his ethical code to the audience in which he motioned to have been in favor of all progressions of mankind so long as those advancements were of pacifistic assessments. The second part of ethos is credibility. This aspect of ethos is significant because a speaker’s credibility affects the audience’s response to the speaker. Eisenhower’s credibility concerning the topics of discussion within Atoms for Peace originated from his extensive military background in initiating psychological warfare negotiations. 12 Within the Atoms for Peace, Eisenhower skillfully portrayed egos throughout the …show more content…
Of these devices used were the anastrophe, alliteration, anaphora, and hypophora. In anastrophe, a sentence is carried out by abandoning the usual placement of words. An example of this found within the speech is, “...if there is to be advanced any proposal designed to ease even the smallest measure of tensions of today’s world…” 13 Alliteration is the repetition of the initial sound of words in a series. An example of alliteration found within this speech is “...atomic attack…” 14 An anaphora is the repeated use of a single word or group of words. An example of this devise found within this speech is “But for me to say that the defense capabilities of the United States are such..., for me to say that the retaliation capabilities of the United States…” 15 A hypophora is a question given that is shortly followed by an answer. This device is found in the speech when Eisenhower said, “Could anyone wish his name to be coupled by history with such human degradation and destruction? Occasional pages of history do record the faces of the “great destroyers,” but the whole book of history reveals mankind’s never-ending quest for peace…”
An example would be “Looking back at our history…” Since, it emphasizes the importance of our history. Antithesis was also used in the speech, which are opposing terms to help show differences between phases. For example, “We are divided, we are weak, we decline, yet when we are united, we are strong…” An allusion was obtained by stating the Declaration of Independence which shows the reference of history in our nation. Chiasmus is a verbal pattern when two clauses are balanced by reverse use of language. For instance, “If you want to go fast,go alone,but if you want to go far, go
This essay will evaluate Eisenhower’s moral judgement and ethical decision-making using three (of seven) ethical principles author Don Snider contends are applicable to all Army professionals. After evaluating Eisenhower’s integration of duty, loyalty and subordination, this analysis concludes that Eisenhower used appropriate ethical and moral judgement in his decision authorized the deal as Allied Commander. The first principle
Ethos, or credibility, Reagan touches the people of the United States because he expresses grief and sorrow in his speech. After the disaster, Reagan uses tone effectively to commemorate the deaths of the crew. “They had a special grace” or “your loved ones were loving and brave”(3) are examples of how Reagan sympathizes with the mourning families. This tone not only allows the families to grieve their losses, it also provides them with the opportunity to feel proud about their children’s accomplishments. Furthermore, Reagan uses tone to carry the people’s afflictions after the Challenger crash and change it into confidence.
Sherwin, M. (1973). The atomic bomb and the origins of the cold war. American Historical Review, 78: 1-7.
This is the day Albert Einstein signed the letter that prompted the U.S.’s exploration into nuclear weaponry. Frankly put, he messed up. That letter led to the laughter of civilians at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. America is an experimental country - the first wholly democratic country – and it backfires sometimes. The Creed is warped to fit a definition of a moment and the wrong course of action is pursued. Einstein didn’t sign that latter with the intention of giving the world heartache and terror. He signed it to preserves the peace and it was hopelessly misconstrued. The only peace he can make with that decision is that it is one of those undervalued days in
In his “Challenger Explosion” speech, Pres. Ronald Reagan comforts the nation in the aftermath of NASA’s Challenger Space Shuttle exploded shortly after takeoff killing all seven astronauts. In this speech, he used rhetorical devices, such as alliteration, allusion, anaphora, and euphemism to relay his feelings of sadness and grief.
... in American history’, there is much evidence to suggest otherwise. Nevertheless, Strickland’s study does offer a valuable guide to the development of ideas, organizations and associations the formed by atomic scientists immediately after the World War II. It, however, not does include an extensive analysis of the Manhattan Project scientists’ wartime messages, nor does it investigate the tenets behind them. Correspondingly, Robert Gilpin’s study extensively covers the scientists’ role in atomic energy policy-making in the post-war decades. Although his study in useful for evaluating how scientists can be more successfully integrated into matters of nuclear weapons policy, it fails to consider the varying forms of the atomic scientists’ wartime movement and its relevance for considering their successes and failures in influencing post-war nuclear weapons policy.
When President Truman authorized the use of two nuclear weapons in 1945 against the Japanese in the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end World War II, the nature of international security was changed irreversibly. At that time, the United States had what was said to have a monopoly of atomic bombs. Soon thereafter, the Soviet Union began working on atomic weaponry. In 1949, it had already detonated it first atomic bomb and tensions began to heat up between the two countries. With the information that the Soviets had tested their first bomb, the United States began work on more powerful weapons1, and a fight for nuclear superiority had begun.
In early August 1945 atomic bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These two bombs quickly yielded the surrender of Japan and the end of American involvement in World War II. By 1946 the two bombs caused the death of perhaps as many as 240,000 Japanese citizens1. The popular, or traditional, view that dominated the 1950s and 60s – put forth by President Harry Truman and Secretary of War Henry Stimson – was that the dropping of the bomb was a diplomatic maneuver aimed at intimating and gaining the upper hand in relations with Russia. Today, fifty-four years after the two bombings, with the advantage of historical hindsight and the advantage of new evidence, a third view, free of obscuring bias and passion, can be presented. First, the dropping of the bomb was born out of complex infinite military, domestic and diplomatic pressures and concerns. Second, many potentially viable alternatives to dropping the bombs were not explored by Truman and other men in power, as they probably should have been. Lastly, because these alternatives were never explored, we can only conjecture over whether or not Truman’s decision was a morally just one, and if indeed it was necessary to use atomic energy to win the war.
In today’s society, many countries and even citizens of the United States question the U.S. government’s decision to get involved in nuclear warfare. These people deemed it unnecessary and stated that the U.S. is a hypocrite that preaches peace, but causes destruction and death. Before and during World War II the U.S. was presented with a difficult decision on whether or not to develop and use the atomic bomb. The U.S. decided to develop the atomic bomb based on the fear they had for the safety of the nation. In August 1939 nuclear physicists sent manuscripts to Albert Einstein in fear the Germany might use the new knowledge of fission on the uranium nucleus as way to construct weapons.
Gaining the credibility in a speech can be difficult at times and can test even the best speakers ability to keep the crowds attention and respect. One of the ways to keep credibility with a crowd is practicing and applying appeal to ethics. Which is defined as winning the favor of the audience by showing strong credibility in the speaker (Merriam-Webster). One of the best speeches that exemplifies the usage of appeal to ethics is Patrick Henry’s “Give Me Liberty Or Give Me Death” speech where he addresses an issue of war at the revolutionary convention. Henry through appeal to ethics developed his credibility and wanted the people listening at the convention to believe they can’t sit and do nothing instead they have to get their hands dirty and fight.
Eisenhower’s dynamic conservatism now known as Modern Republicanism labeled him as a nonpartisan leader, who was fiscally conservative in reducing federal spending and socially moderate in maintaining existing social and economic legislation of the New Deal. With the policy shift of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, foreign policy in dealing with Communism went from containing it, to rolling it back. The Strategic Air Command was established as a fleet of super bombers that were equipped with nukes that would allow for massive retaliation in the place of a large standing army or navy, and the threat of massive retaliation was used to get the Soviets to surrender, and issued the Mutual Assured Destruction, where both sides knew that neither nation would declare nuclear war because it would result in total annihilation ...
In his prominent 1961 Inaugural Address, John F. Kennedy extensively employs pathos, parallelism, antithesis, and varied syntax to captivate millions of people, particularly to persuade them to stand together and attempt to further human rights for the “betterment” of the world. Kennedy’s effective use of various rhetorical styles succeeds in persuading his audience –the world and the U.S. citizens—that his newly-seized position as the U.S. President will be worthwhile for all. Evident throughout his entire address, Kennedy employs a cogent pathos appeal to keep his audience intrigued. This can be demonstrated when Kennedy initially proclaims: “Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans.” who he urges to be “unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of.human rights to which this nation has always been committed.”
The Cold War historiography, specifically the issue of nuclear deterrence has provided historians the classic dialectic of an original thesis that is challenged by an antithesis. Both then emerge in the resolution of a new synthesis. Unfortunately, each evolution of a new synthesis is quickly demolished with each political crisis and technological advance during the Cold War narrative. The traditional/orthodox views were often challenged by the conventional wisdom with the creation of synthesis or post revisionism. There appears to be a multiple historiographical trends on nuclear deterrence over the Cold War; each were dependent and shaped upon international events and technological developments. I have identified four major trends: the orthodox, the revisionist, the post revisionist, st and the New Left. Each of these different historical approaches had its proponents and opponents, both in the military as well as the political and
Maddox, Robert. “The Biggest Decision: Why We Had to Drop the Atomic Bomb.” Taking Sides: Clashing View in United States History. Ed. Larry Madaras & James SoRelle. 15th ed. New York, NY. 2012. 280-288.