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Determinism discussion
Debate on freedom and determinism
Essays on determinism
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The dilemma of determinism is an issue that has led to widespread debate over whether or not people have free will. The dilemma of determinism follows as such; (A) if determinism is true, we are not responsible, since our choices are determined by factors we can’t control, (B) Indeterminism is true, we are not responsible, since every choice happens by chance, (C) But either determinism or indeterminism is true, (D) Therefore, we are not morally responsible for what we do. Simply, the dilemma states that we cannot be free and therefore are not responsible for our choices. This dilemma has been approached by some people called compatibilists who believe that we can be responsible for our choices even though the choice was determined in advance. …show more content…
The principle of alternate possibilities is the idea that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. The main purpose of Frankfurt’s argument is to prove that this principle of alternate possibility is false by finding a counter example that proves a person can be morally responsible even if they can’t change the predetermined outcome. To do this, Frankfurt uses a set of thought arguments that approach different scenarios in which a person is placed in a situation where there are a set of conditions for a certain choice to be made, so that it is impossible for the person to choose to do different. However, these conditions do not in any way affect the choice that the person …show more content…
In this argument, there is a man named Black who wants Jones 4 to perform a certain action. If Jones 4 decides for himself to perform the action, then Black will do nothing; but if Jones 4 chooses not to perform the action, then Black will take measures to ensure that Jones 4 does complete the action. Frankfurt leaves the “measures” up to imagination for anyone with theory’s concerning what “could have done otherwise” means. Frankfurt states that no matter how “could have done otherwise” is defined, this example of Jones 4 is a successful counterexample to the principle of alternate possibilities. Therefore, even if casual determinism is true, there is no reason to believe that people cannot still be morally responsible for their behavior. Frankfurt even goes on to say that he believes that premise (A) should instead be phrased as such: a person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it only because he could not have done otherwise. This revision takes into account the invalid assumption that coercion makes moral responsibility
Frankfurt’s “Black and Jones” example is an appropriate explanation for how the Principle of Alternative Possibilities works. Black put a gun on Jones’ head and tells him to do action A. According to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, this will play out in three ways. If Jones was not a reasonable man and was “gung-ho”, not caring about any consequences or cost, then he is not to be morally responsible for that action. If Jones was afraid of what Black will do with the gun and decides to change his decision from doing any other action to action A, then he is only morally responsible for the decision that he made earlier and not for the action. If Jones isn’t affected by Black’s actions, but he considers those actions in planning to make his next move yet still follows his original decision, then he is morally responsible for all actions and decisions.(Frankfurt; Watson, 169-170) What Frankfurt is considering to be a counter-example to the Principle of Alternate Possibil...
Since laws put certain restrictions on a human’s free will, it should not stop humans from doing what he or she wants to do. He also expresses how society and nature should not determine one’s own free will, because it can never be taken away from humans. This, roughly speaking, is the principle of transfer of nonresponsibility. Now, an argument can be generated to show that causal determinism rules out moral responsibility.
There is much debate over the issue of whether we have complete freedom of the will or if our will caused by something other than our own choosing. There are three positions adopted by philosophers regarding this dispute: determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism. Determinists believe that freedom of the will does not exist. Since actions are events that have some predetermined cause, no actions can be chosen and thus there is no will to choose. The compatibilist argues that you can have both freedom of the will and determinism. If the causes which led to our actions were different, then we could have acted in another way which is compatible with freedom of the will. Libertarians believe that freedom of the will does exist.
It is a problem due to the assumptions that we already know the conditions presented to us in any given situation. The trend she focuses on is known as the Deep Self View. The idea of the deep self view stems from three writers, Harry Frankfurt, Gary Watson and Charles Taylor. Frankfurt believes that there is a difference between freedom of action and freedom of the will. Freedom of action is the idea that someone can do whatever they want. Freedom of the will is if someone has the will to do whatever they want. To explain it better he introduces the concept of first order desires and second order desires. First- order desires are the desires to have or do many things, second order desires are desires about what we want and the desires to put them in action. Philosopher Gary Watson’s, view is like Frankfurt’s but in his terms “an agent is responsible for an action if the desires expressed by that action are of a particular kind.” (Wolf 247) Watson introduces the differences between free action and unfree action, is that these actions must be analyzed through its sources. Taylor on the other-hand claims that responsibility depends on how we criticize, reflect and revise our selves. Their views relate in which they all agree “…that the key to responsibility lies in the fact that responsible agents are those for whom it is not just the case that their actions are within the control of their wills, but also the case that their wills are within the control of their selves in some deeper sense.” (Wolf 248). This conclusion leads her into the discussion of the deep-self view. The deep-self view explains who we are inside based on our desires, the deep-self is influenced by what we choose to desire and what we desire. This influences our thoughts and decisions which leads into our moral responsibility. She later goes on to explain the inefficiencies to the deep-self
In respect to the arguments of Ayer and Holbach, the dilemma of determinism and its compatibility with that of free will are found to be in question. Holbach makes a strong case for hard determinism in his System of Nature, in which he defines determinism to be a doctrine that everything and most importantly human actions are caused, and it follows that we are not free and therefore haven’t any moral responsibility in regard to our actions. For Ayer, a compatibilist believing that free will is compatible with determinism, it is the reconciliation and dissolution of the problem of determinism and moral responsibility with free willing that is argued. Ayer believes that this problem can be dissolved by the clarification of language usage and the clarification of what freedom is in relationship to those things that oppose freedom or restrain it. In either case, what is at stake is the free will of an agent, and whether or not that agent is morally responsible. What is to be seen from a discussion of these arguments is the applicability and validity of these two philosophies to situations where one must make a choice, and whether or not that person is acting freely and is thus responsible given his current situation. In this vein, the case of Socrates’ imprisonment and whether or not he acted freely in respect to his decision to leave or stay in prison can be evaluated by the discussion of the arguments presented in respect to the nature of free will in its reconciliation with determinism in the compatibilist vein and its absence in the causality of hard determinism.
middle of paper ... ... Essentially, the only fault being addressed is the conflicting action, as a conflict no longer occurs. Objections remain based on the inclusion of moral agents exclusively and the promotion of an individual’s goals, while introducing the additional problem of self-interest that accompanies prominent autonomy. The theory remains at fault, as it cannot be adequately amended by a single change.
...pulated. Brainwashing is analogous to forces beyond our control. Frankfurt’s theory still holds, since we do not concern the origin of Sam’s second order desire. When he has a free will, it implies that he acts freely by selling out his company. In fact, Frankfurt seems to weaken the theory of determinism. If some external forces causally determine Sam’s the second order desire, then Sam cannot have desired otherwise. That is to say, he cannot have two versions of second order desire, neither of which allows him to have freedom of will or freedom of action. That is, Frankfurt’s theory leads to a totally different conclusion when Frankfurtean compatibilism does not agree with determinism.
For centuries philosophers have debated over the presence of free will. As a result of these often-heated arguments, many factions have evolved, the two most prominent being the schools of Libertarianism and of Determinism. Within these two schools of thought lies another debate, that of compatibilism, or whether or not the two believes can co-exist. In his essay, Has the Self “Free Will”?, C.A. Campbell, a staunch non-compatiblist and libertarian, attempts to explain the Libertarian argument.
As a result, this essay will prove that one is held morally responsible for any act that was performed or chosen by them, which qualifies as a human act. The Libertarian view consists of one’s actions not being determined; however, have free will, which is a precondition for moral responsibility. Basically put, human acts are not determined by precedent causes. Libertarianism is one of the views under incompatibilism along with Hard Determinism. The opposite of these views is Compatibilism.
Free will is the ability for a person to make their own decisions without the constraints of necessity and fate, in other words, their actions are not determined. Determinism is the view that the initial conditions of the universe and all possible worlds are the same, including the laws of nature, causing all events to play out the same. Events are determined by the initial conditions. Two prominent positions advocated concerning the relation between free will and determinism are compatibilism and incompatibilism. In this essay I shall argue that compatibilism is true. Firstly, I shall explain what compatibilism is and consider possible objections and responses to the theory. I shall then examine incompatibilism and evaluate its strengths and weaknesses and argue that compatibilism is a stronger argument and, as a result, show why it is also true.
Soft determinism attempts to make the disagreeing data of determinism and freedom compatible. The theory of soft determinism rests on three fundamental claims: (1) the deterministic concept that human behaviour is causally determined; (2) that there is freedom in voluntary behaviour, so long as there is no physical impediment or constraint upon the action; and (3) that the cause of the voluntary behaviour (which is possible in the absence of impediments or constraints) is an internal state of the agent of the action. According to soft determinism, therefore, we are responsible for our actions on o...
Besides in the case of constraint, (A) the agent could have done otherwise. Then, by extension, it would also be equal to say that (B) if the agent had chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise. As Chisholm describes, this later statement is clearly in a accordance with determinism as, even if by an exaggerated chain of causal events, it can be seen that if he had decided to do otherwise, he would have done so. Under this conclusion, if (B) is in agreement with determinism, and (A) and (B) are of equal value, (A) would also be deterministic in nature. Accordingly, it would then be possible to find that (A) is both consistent with determinism and moral responsibility, and that these two theories must also be equal with one another. Additionally, under very specific circumstances it could be possible to find (B) to be true while (A) to be false, such as in the case of a man who, unbeknownst to him, is locked in a certain room with no way out. However, the man in this case is certainly content in the aforementioned room with no intention of leaving. If he had wanted to leave he is of the belief that he would be able to do so, proving (B) true. This is despite the fact that he would not have done this, as he is not able to, showing (A) to be false. Therefore we can see the need for an additional statement (C), he could have
The problem of free will and determinism is a mystery about what human beings are able to do. The best way to describe it is to think of the alternatives taken into consideration when someone is deciding what to do, as being parts of various “alternative features” (Van-Inwagen). Robert Kane argues for a new version of libertarianism with an indeterminist element. He believes that deeper freedom is not an illusion. Derk Pereboom takes an agnostic approach about causal determinism and sees himself as a hard incompatibilist. I will argue against Kane and for Pereboom, because I believe that Kane struggles to present an argument that is compatible with the latest scientific views of the world.
I believe this for two reasons, the first being that his arguments seem to be fundamentally rooted in science and human intuition. His view is based on genes, environment, and how we are conditioned to judge based on results. The second reason I is simple, his views fit perfectly into a deterministic world. At first glance Frankfurt’s argument rejecting the ability to do otherwise using the Jones and Black case is seemingly plausible, however, this argument is faulty proven by one major objection. The objection stating that Jones had the ability to decide otherwise also known as the “flicker of freedom.” This objection renders Frankfurt’s entire argument illegitimate. As I said before the whole argument takes us in a circle without any real closure. I and many others conclude that the Jones and Black case does not in fact succeed in establishing that an agent does not need the ATDO in order to have free will.
Freedom, or the concept of free will seems to be an elusive theory, yet many of us believe in it implicitly. On the opposite end of the spectrum of philosophical theories regarding freedom is determinism, which poses a direct threat to human free will. If outside forces of which I have no control over influence everything I do throughout my life, I cannot say I am a free agent and the author of my own actions. Since I have neither the power to change the laws of nature, nor to change the past, I am unable to attribute freedom of choice to myself. However, understanding the meaning of free will is necessary in order to decide whether or not it exists (Orloff, 2002).