Descartes Identity Theory

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Identity Theory vs. Dualism: The Nature of the Mind
In this paper, I will argue that the materialistic approach of the identity theory to the mind/body problem gives a better account of the nature of the mind than René Descartes’ theory of dualism. These two theories take opposite stands when trying to explain the nature of the mind: dualism holds that the mind and the body are different entities; the body/brain being of physical nature, whereas the mind being non-physical. In contrast, the identity theory says that the mind and the brain are the same, and that the terminology that we use to describe them refer to the same thing (Sober, 204). In this essay, I will outline Descartes’ argument of indivisibility and indubitable existence, and
Although we might not fully understand the linear relationship between what we call mental states to its physical-state-equivalent, it does not follow that they are not the same.
Descartes’ use of Leibniz’s law
Descartes’ arguments for dualism rely on Leibniz’s law, which says that if ‘a’ and ‘b’ are identical, then they must have all the same properties (Sober, 206). What this means, is that Descartes only needs to show that the mind and the body do not share one single property, to be able to conclude that they are different things. He does this in both the argument of indubitable existence and the argument of indivisibility.
Indivisibility argument
In this argument, Descartes’ uses Leibniz’s law to show that the mind lacks the ability of being divided, which the body possesses, and thus is different from the body. The idea here concerns the ability to occupy space in the physical world. Descartes’ points out that a surgeon can divide the brain into pieces but nobody can’t do that to the mind, since the mind is not placed in space, thus cannot be divided. But how do we know that the mind is not indeed able to be divided? According to Elliot Sober, this argument begs the question since we cannot accept that the premise is true unless you already accept the conclusion that the body and the mind are different
He argues that a person can entertain the thought of not having a body, but not the thought of not having a mind. Take for example those people who claim to be able to perform astral projection, whether this is possible or not does not concern us, but rather the fact that such person is at least able to think of its ‘soul’ or internal essence separating from her/his body. In contrast, if you try to image yourself without a mind, you should not be able to have mental states, such as thinking, but you are thinking, which shows that you are in a mental state; thus, have a mind. Therefore, we can see that we can doubt having a body but we cannot doubt having a mind, and as per Leibniz’s law we can conclude that they are different since they do not share all the same properties. Although it seems that this argument succeeds at showing that the mind and body are different, Sober points out a weakness in the argument concerning propositional attitudes. He says that doubting is an attitude that we have towards propositions. Therefore, it does not follow that the object of the first proposition is different from the one of the second (Sober,

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