Searle's Argument Against Functionalism And Strong Artificial Intelligence

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John Searle is arguing against functionalism and strong artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence is the view that the mind is a computer program and the brain is just a digital computer.
Although Searle's argument helped me gain a better understanding of biological phenomena and artificial intelligence, I am not compelled into believing that his argument is sufficient enough to prove that "no computer program by itself is sufficient to give a system a mind" (page 682, conclusion #2, paragraph 7 "Can computers think? John Searle). Ill explain more after I summarize John Searle's "Can computers think?" Argument.
Searle's argument is directed at what he defines as "strong artificial intelligence" (AI). His argument counters the belief …show more content…

(page 680, paragraph 5, "Can computers think?" John Searle) The Chinese room argument suggests that these elements by themselves "have no connection with understanding". (page 680, paragraph 2, "Can computers think?" John Searle) In this way, Searle argues further that the formal principles of a computer will not be sufficient for understanding "since a human will be able to follow the formal principles without understanding anything." (page 679, paragraph 4, "Can computers think?" John Searle In short, formal symbols are not sufficient conditions for understanding. Moreover, he states that no reasons have been given to suppose that when someone understands English, he is operating with any formal program at all.
According to Searle, "a program cannot give a computer a "mind", "understanding" or "consciousness" (page 681, paragraph 3, "Can computers think? John Searle). Concluding, a computer can't be intelligent since the symbols it processes are meaningless, and it doesn’t matter how intelligent-seeming a computer behaves and which kind of programming makes it behave that way. The computers internal states and processes, being purely syntactic, lack semantics. It doesn’t have intentional states. (page 683, conclusion #4, paragraph 4, "Can computers think?" John

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