Current doctrine and existing SOF teachings provide a useful framework to evaluate Operation Gothic Serpent. When evaluated against current doctrine, Operation Gothic Serpent was an inappropriate integration of SOF which resulted in a strategic failure. This paper will provide a brief summary of Operation Gothic Serpent to provide context for analysis and examine why this case fits the parameters of a special operation. It will then analyze the strategic impact of the operation. Within the context of strategic impact, it will show how SOF were inappropriately integrated into the overall mission, leading – despite an overwhelming tactical military victory – to the failure of Operation Gothic Serpent to achieve its strategic political objectives. Operation Gothic Serpent was preceded by several humanitarian relief missions: United Nations Resolution 751 (United Nations Operation in Somalia – UNOSOM I), April 1992; Operation Provide Relief, August 1992; Operation Restore Hope, December 1992; and UN Resolution 794 (UNOSOM II), March 1993. These operations – while initially very successful and garnering much good will among the Somali people – descended into chaos and mistrust, culminating in more frequent and audacious attacks against UN (and especially American) …show more content…
Expecting a quick raid, they left night vision devices and water behind. There was no plan for medivac outside of the convoy, which degraded the combat power of the convoy. These factors combined to place unnecessary risk on US Forces. Simply put, US SOF owns the night. Simply adding night vision devices to the packing list would have greatly aided the exfiltration. Water is always a combat multiplier. And the fast-rope accident caused the convoy to split up in order to medivac the injured Ranger; critical injuries appeared not to be planned for, which added to the confusion on the ground. Proper planning would have mitigated these
The troops were being sent in because warlords were allowing their people to starve to death. The world had sent food, and the warlords hoarded it. The world had decided to stop this. Today's mission was to invade the Habr Gidr clan that was in Mogadishu Somalia. The clan was led by Mohamed Farrah Aidid, but that day's targets were two of his lieutenants. They were to be arrested and imprisoned with other clan members that had already been captured.
...in technology and tactics have made Special Forces units more reliable. For example, the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan and the incident with the Somali pirates of the coast of Somalia show the capabilities of today’s Special Forces. The author asserts that, in the future the United States will shift away from major combat operations. These large engagements have proven to be costly in lives and treasure. For that reason, she infers that the US Military will choose the “go small, go long” model for future engagements in the Middle East. Special operation forces are uniquely suited for this model. Their conspicuous nature and low cost make them politically and strategically ideal. The author also suggests that future large scale operations may look like the conflicts in Libya and Somalia rather than the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
September 11, 2001, Osama Bin Laden decided to “wake the sleeping giant.” The US immediately sent SOF units and CIA officers to recon the area and meet with the Northern Alliance. The primary battle leading up to this operation was Tora Bora, which was absent of conventional forces. Up until this point, the war on terror was predominantly a Special Operations fight along with Air Force for overhead support.3 SOF and the Northern Alliance had already displaced Taliban forces out of many towns and villages in northern Afghanistan to gain control of key terrain. Key towns in northern Afghanistan including Taloqan, Konduz, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif took only three weeks to clear.4 The SOF units were making huge impacts across the country calling in air strikes. At the same time the SOF units were diligently...
The Authors of The Ugly American, William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, wrote a fictional story, with fictional characters about a fictional country. The only thing that was not fictional was the message that they were trying to convey about what was wrong with America’s foreign policy. It is not a coincidence that their message directly correlates to the Special Operations (SO) Imperatives. I will discuss specific characters in The Ugly American and how their actions did or didn’t mirror those of certain SO Imperatives. Also, I will show that the actions of the characters that mirrored the SO Imperatives were able to achieve positive results.
In this paper, I will provide a Battle Analysis and outline the events leading up to and surrounding the Battle of 73 Eastings (refers to a north-south grid line). In addition, I will describe how the United States Army’s (USA) 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment (ACR) defeated forces from the Iraqi Republican Guard (IRG) using speed, technology and superior combat power. Although some consider the Battle of 73 Eastings extremely successful, some consider it a failure due to the large amount of Iraqi forces that retreated towards Bagdad. Lastly, I will analyze how each side used their intelligence assets and what they could have used to change the outcome.
Yet as we journey from the dark to the light in Aeschylus, we cannot leave the dark behind – the darkness breeds the light.
The Ugly American was written in 1958 and was meant to be an indictment on the U.S. government’s failures in foreign policy. The book provides valuable lessons that we can learn from today as special operators. I will use several stories and characters in this book and my own personal stories to explore if the Special Operatives (SO) Imperatives were applied and analyze if we as Special Operations Forces (SOF) are applying them well today. We, as SOF, should never be afraid of learning new principals or examining principals from the past to see if they are applicable. The Ugly American is a good example of a work from the past, even though it is fiction, which we can learn from today.
This investigation evaluates the Carter Doctrine and the impact it had on 9/11. In order to successfully investigate the Carter Doctrine and its impact, one would have to evaluate its role in events leading to the tragedy of 9/11. The Carter Doctrine will be analyzed from the different perspectives such as different countries in the Middle East specifically the countries the terrorists of 9/11 were from. Those terrorists and those they worked will be analyzed for their philosophies on the US’s participation in the Persian Gulf. However, this particular investigation will not investigate the different forms of government of the Persian Gulf and the US.
Veteran defense analyst and AEI resident fellow Thomas Donnelly wants to know the answers to the questions behind Operation: Iraqi Freedom. He states that “More than a year after President George W. Bush declared ‘mission accomplished’ in the invasion of Iraq, a fuller victory is yet to be won. This is in part, because a fuller understanding of the war itself remains elusive.” This elusiveness is the biggest mystery of the war and because of it four key observations have emerged. Also these observations emerge after an examination of the conventional invasion of Iraq, the resulting counterinsurgency campaign and their broader significance for the global war on terrorism.
At that time in the early 1990’s, the U.S. was the only superpower country left in the world. The Soviet Union collapsed after the Cold War and the left the U.S. at the top. With the U.S. being the only superpower left, it meant that they were the only ones who could try to keep peace between other countries and hopefully end violence in the world. At the time, Somalia was a complete disaster and still is to this day. They have no structural government and warlords rule parts of the country.
American policy was conflicted on multiple fronts. There was a high-perceived threat, but the means devised to cope with it fell short o...
Successful Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations entail a thorough understanding of the character of war in question and the perspectives, objectives, strengths, and weaknesses of the enemy. This essay identifies David Galula’s two Laws of Counterinsurgency that most reflect US COIN strategy in Afghanistan. It will compare Galula’s theory of Counterinsurgency to the two basic COIN theories of “Hearts and Minds” and “Cost/Benefit”. Finally, a basic COIN theory will be identified that most resembles Galula’s theory.
Thinking historically while conducting counterinsurgency in the 21st century poses questions regarding how to develop political and strategic plans. This bibliographic essay will examine the political and military aspect of fighting counterinsurgent warfare by 20th century theorists Galula’s, “Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice” and Trinquier’s, “Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice”. Strategy in fighting guerilla wars will be discussed by comparing conflicts in battles and ideologies from the past to current day. Moreover, ways to avoid the one size fits all war mentality when combating modern day insurgents will be recommended.
Peter D. Feaver proposes ambitiously a new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship. Here, a principal is the government and agent is a military man, capable of carrying out the duty. ...
“The trouble is that a praise worthy quest for precision can descend into a flattering of tidy minds at the cost of a realistic grasp of the complexity and interconnectedness that is the story of strategic history.” Colin Gray warns in the opening sentences of the chapter “Irregular Warfare and Terrorism” in his book Another Bloody Century of the dangers of oversimplifying the categories of warfare. To look at warfare as either regular or irregular without being absolutely clear on the definitions of each and the context in which the terms are used is fruitless. Regular forces have been known to use irregular type tactics, just as irregular forces have used conventional warfare to reach their political goals. It is imperative, then, that the U.S. military forces are trained to fight wars falling on a spectrum of warfare and educated to distinguish the type of war they face.