David Galula's Two Laws Of Counterinsurgency

Successful Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations entail a thorough understanding of the character of war in question and the perspectives, objectives, strengths, and weaknesses of the enemy. This essay identifies David Galula’s two Laws of Counterinsurgency that most reflect US COIN strategy in Afghanistan. It will compare Galula’s theory of Counterinsurgency to the two basic COIN theories of “Hearts and Minds” and “Cost/Benefit”. Finally, a basic COIN theory will be identified that most resembles Galula’s theory.

David Galula’s First Law, “The Support of the Population Is as Necessary for the Counterinsurgent as for the Insurgent”, and Second Law, “Support Is gained Through an Active Minority” best symbolizes US COIN strategy in Afghanistan.

Galula’s Second Law identifies the strategic problem as finding the favorable minority and organizing them in order to mobilize the population against the insurgent minority. In gaining the support of the population, the counterinsurgent’s cause must be portrayed as being better than the insurgent’s cause. This assists in recruiting more of the population to the active minority and fighting the insurgent minority.

Security cooperation with the local population is a key factor in ongoing COIN activities. Galula’s First Law recognizes the problem in keeping an area clean of insurgents so COIN operations can occur elsewhere. To accomplish this, the population must be submissive to law and order previously undermined by the insurgent’s activities. Local police and military forces need to work with counterinsurgency forces to maintain law and order, but credit for any improvement should be given to the local forces.

Galula’s Frist and Second Laws support the ongoing US COIN strategy for Afghanistan. The laws provide the foundation for working with our partners, the United Nations, and the Afghan people in pursuing a better civilian strategy. Galula’s laws epitomize US COIN guidance to Secure and Serve the Population, Help Confront the Culture of Impurity, Identify Corrupt Officials, and Consult and Build

Galula identifies a COIN strategy designed to suppress insurgents already in control of the population. Solving modernization problems, restoring the hope of the people, and gaining support for their government are critical aspects to a successful COIN strategy.

The HAM (preferences) theory is oriented toward winning the local population over to the counterinsurgency’s side. Key features of the HAM theory include providing security and increasing the political rights of the population, improving standards of living, and reducing the corruption and abuse of government power. By accomplishing these critical HAM features, the US can pursue an effective civilian strategy that allows the local government to take advantage of improved security.

The Cost/Benefit (incentives/disincentives) theory analyzes increasing the standard of living through development in exchange for reducing local insurgency support. “COIN Contracting” spending and who benefits from it is imperative to insure money does not get into the wrong hands. Programs to reduce popular support for insurgents could actually assist them by providing necessary war resources at a reasonable