John Mccone In The Thirteen-Day Crisis

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Thirteen-Day Crisis
By: Brigitta Jakob

In October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a deathly game of nuclear brinkmanship. Within two weeks, the two superpowers armed with nuclear weapons challenged each other in what could have easily developed into an utmost catastrophe—both of them went to their highest military alert levels, where it was very likely that both countries would go to nuclear war. Even though it was rather evident that President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev had no slightest intention of starting a nuclear war and tried to prevent it, miscalculations and unexpected events could have emerged that theirs advisers might not have foreseen, hence things could have gone out of control. This paper will analyze the role of John McCone in the thirteen-day crisis, how the crisis impacted United States, Soviet Union, Cuba, and the world, and lastly whether the resolution achieved reflected United States triumph and its success in handling the crisis.
Several months before the crisis, the Director of central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.), John McCone, who was a paranoid anticommunist was one of the first government officials who discovered the massive military buildup ongoing in Cuba. Starting August 1962, he insistently advocated his hypothesis about Soviet actions in Cuba to the President advisors that the Soviets might take a risk and place nuclear missiles in Cuba. He reasoned that the placement of missiles in Cuba gave Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev a way to counter the growing American nuclear superiority and to protect the communist government in Cuba (I). He also thought that one potential political motive from the Soviet action was that if a missile was fired from Cuba and struck Was...

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... war between the two-superpower countries, the entire world could eventually avoid the deadly threat. From the beginning of the crisis, John McCone had held an important role of giving the President crucial information that could guide him into making the best decision in resolving the crisis. One major impact of the crisis was the realization by both United States and Soviet Union leaders that their decisions could eventually drag humanity into catastrophe, hence prompting them to take safety measures in preventing the future nuclear war from taking place. In the end, the settlement of the Cuban missile crisis was indeed United States major triumph and Kennedy’s policy of the nuclear brinkmanship provides a guidance on how to carefully manage future conflicts and best mediate conflicting interests of the countries involved without necessarily resorting to war.

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