Consequences of the Cuban Missile Crisis

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The "Thirteen Days" of the Cuban Missile Crisis were, at that point, the closest the superpowers came to war. How severe this would have been is impossible to know. That this is the case was due in a large part to serendipity and the patience and understanding of the leaders. The lessons of this stand-off were not lost on either side. There were several key after-effects of this confrontation:

• The setting up of the Direct Communication Link (DCL)

• A dramatic decrease in tension between the two superpowers

• An almost as dramatic increase in tension in Sino-Soviet and Sino-US relations

• There were also domestic implications for both sides

Following the narrow avoidance of annihilation, the leaders of both countries agreed to establish a permanent teletype link between their two nations. During the crisis, Kennedy and Khrushchev were forced to communicate with each other through clumsy diplomatic channels. The rapid, minute-to-minute changes in posture and intent could not be articulated quickly enough to guarantee that there would be no misunderstanding. The need for more efficient communication between the superpowers to avoid the prospect of accidental war was cited in the Soviet request of 1954 for a direct link. There are numerous references in transcripts to leaders discovering seemingly vital information, by chance, from newspapers. On October 16, Secretary of State Rusk asked Kennedy, “You saw the [New York] Times story yesterday morning that high Soviet officials were saying, ‘We’ll trade Cuba for Berlin?’” This reliance on second hand print news had serious implications in a situation where events were changing rapidly and the effects of these events were unprecedented.

As a result, the two powers agreed to se...

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... of the first Executive Committee Meeting, October 16th 1962, 11:50AM-12:57PM, in in Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh (eds), The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader, 99.

Ronald E. Powaski, March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the Present, (Oxford: OUP, 1987), 106.

John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War, (Oxford: OUP, 1982), 206.

Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995), 98.

Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995), 96.

Ronald E. Powaski, March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the Present, (Oxford: OUP, 1987), 107.

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