Invasion Of The Bay Of Pigs Research Paper

The invasion of the Bay of Pigs in 1961 produced embarrassing failures that stemmed from assumptions that proved to be disastrous for both the Central Intelligence Agency & President Kennedy. During the planning process, both respective parties felt like they were speaking the same language. When in reality, misconceptions existed among both sides about the outcome of the invasion. For an invasion of this magnitude, further collaboration, oversight, and a thorough understanding of your enemy was needed. The CIA had already drawn up an overall plan for the invasion that was previously initiated by the former President, Dwight D. Eisenhower. Incoming President Kennedy had inherited these plans but failed to challenge the many false assumptions

Previous President, Dwight D. Eisenhower had privately allocated a budget of $13 million for the CIA to train and equip anti-Castro guerillas in Guatemala. Eisenhower asserted that no U.S. military be utilized in any of these plans to overthrow Castro. Several weeks after his inauguration, Kennedy received two intelligence briefs from both CIA director Allen Dulles and CIA Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell, on the agency’s plan to train the Cuban brigade of anti-Castro guerillas in Guatemala. The original invasion called for two air strikes against Cuban air bases. A 1,400 man invasion force would disembark under cover of darkness and launch a surprise attack. Paratroopers dropped in advance of the invasion would disrupt transportation and repel Cuban forces. Simultaneously, a smaller force would land on the east coast of Cuba to create confusion. The main force would advance across the island to Matanzas and set up a defensive position. Massive propaganda and bombing would increase resistance to defections from Castro, causing him to be overthrown. (Shank, 1997) The United Revolutionary Front would then send leaders from South Florida and establish a provisional government. The success of the plan depended on the Cuban population joining the invaders. (JFK in History, Bay of Pigs) President Kennedy failed to consider any possible flaws from the CIA’s plan for the invasion. Kennedy only

The mere fact that Castro had recently succeeded in his military coup of Batista was enough to garner fair respect of his military prowess. Castro’s influence over his people was also undervalued. There was a dangerous reliance on the assumption that the Cuban people would welcome the opposing force and rally around to support them. Instead, the invasion strengthened Castro’s support in the island the people rallied around their leader, diminishing any hopes of Castro’s regime toppling. Misconceptions on Castro and his forces along with limited collaboration ultimately contributed to the invasion’s downfall. Had the inclusion of more analysts and different but relevant analytical minds been allowed to participate, there could’ve been more solutions or countermeasures to the events that had unfolded during the invasion. Although on the other hand, more collaboration doesn’t necessarily guarantee a more foolproof outcome. The possible downside of more minds to the table could’ve possibly blurred the focus of the plan. Sometimes a large amount of input from different points of analysis could bog down the overall decision-making progress. The outcome of the invasion might’ve been successful and Cuban missile crisis that directly followed might’ve been avoided altogether. There’s also the alternate outcome of the invasion not even happening. Had Kennedy analyzed the possibility of failure, the plan itself could’ve