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Strengths and weaknesses of time management
Effective communication in the military
Strengths and weaknesses of time management
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Candidate Petterson delivered his five paragraph order hesitantly. SNC did not establish a fortified command presence; in that his demeanor was displayed as nervous. The information covered in his order lacked details such as what the enemy’s activity consisted of as well as what all they possessed; ammo, rations ect. SNC was sure to add pertinent information such as a brief description of the terrain so that the team was aware of topographical features upon progressing to the objective. This information was useful, however was poor use of the fire team’s time that could have been utilized elsewhere in the mission. SNC also poorly utilized a great deal of time briefing his order. Prior to receiving contact SNC had difficulty controlling the
Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits anyone knowingly or willfully offering, paying or soliciting or receiving remuneration, directly or indirectly; in cash or kind; in exchange for; patient referrals or furnishing or arranging a good or service for a Federal healthcare program including Medicare or Medicaid. Stark would also apply to Hanlester as well but Stark was not enacted until after the Hanlester case. Stark is strict liability, does not require the knowingly/willfully element, and is not prosecuted criminally.
The 23rd RCT received the mission to defend Chipyong-Ni in an attempt to bait the CCF to attack with a large force that could be defeated, but the RCT was at 70% strength following the battle at Twin Tunnels (some units were at 60%). The RCT received intelligence reports of multiple CCF Divisions marching towards Chipyong-Ni. COL Freeman requested the RCT be allowed to pull back 15 miles to prevent encirclement and was approved by MG Almond, but was overturned by LTG Ridgway. LTG Ridgway, the newly assigned Eighth Army Commander, did not allow retreat and always wanted to make contact with the enemy. He relieved his G-3 on the spot for giving him retreat contingency plans.
COL Prescott’s role in the Battle of Bunker Hill, or more correctly know as the Battle of Breed’s Hill, is a great example of how to properly execute mission command. An overview from The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour (Moncure) reveals a number of operation and strategic objectives that the American militia had to consider. In this instance, COL Prescott takes charge of 1200 men with instructions to defend against incoming British forces that were seeking to occupy the surrounding hills during the Siege of Boston campaign. COL Prescott utilized a variety of steps in the operations process that contributed to his expert utilization of mission command over his forces. Through various sources from published works by experts on the subject, COL Prescott’s mission command demonstrates its effectiveness in his understanding of the situation against the British, his visualization to create an end state for t...
General Lee did not establish clear commander’s intent when issuing orders to his cavalry commander. After entering Pennsylvania, General Lee gave the cavalry commander wide latitude in his orders to screen the main column, and did not establish a clear intent. General Lee’s cavalry began a skirmish with the Union Army while traveling beyond their lines of communication. Outlined in ADRP 6-0 the commander must provide a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation1. General Lee’s cavalry was absent from the first days of the battle because he did not use clear and concise communication. General Lee’s poor use of mission command deprived him of his cavalry, an important asset.
Throughout the battle, you see numerous Army Values and Warrior Ethos being used. “I will never leave a fallen comrade”, was the etho used the most, to reach the separated platoon. The battle also shows that not all tactical orders are effective, but as a leader you must never second guess yourself.
This whole battalion was at a disadvantage before they left the states, given the mission of replacing the 48th Infantry brigade in south Baghdad. Unlike the usual five to six months that a unit would typically get to conduct recons and gather intel on the AO that they would be occupying, 1st battalion was to gather all they could in 6 weeks. LTC Kunk was chosen by Col Ebel to head the fight in the population centers for the reason that he thought he would be engaging and capable of communicating others. This proved to be the first major problem in the chain of command that would hinder the efficiency of operations. While at JRTC preparing for the deployment 1st platoon, Bravo company made a tactical error resulting in the capture of 9 soldiers. Even with this information Kunk had developed a plan with no input from any of his company commanders, and he wouldn't accept any kind of input or use the assets that he had at his disposal. LTC had little to no bearing communicating with his subordinates, destroying the confidence in his commanders and ruining his communication lines. If th...
...od plan from the get go. The soldiers were not conducting counterinsurgency at the beginning of their deployment, which is why they got hit pretty badly. It does not fall into any of the LDRSHIP values but just fulfilling the KNOW part of leadership is good. His best leadership trait shown in the book doesn’t come from the seven Army values it comes from the warrior ethos. I will never quit. No matter how much pressure that platoon put on him he still did not quit on them. He kept pushing them back and got them in line. One of his worst traits of leadership was his selfless service. He was not a present leader. He did not go out on patrols with the guys. I think that really hindered him from getting the platoon back on track sooner. If he showed them he was willing to go through the same stuff they were then maybe they would have respected him more from the get go.
COL Freeman took pride in communicating with his battalion commanders . This was extremely beneficial when it came to the day of 14 February 1951. On this day, COL Freeman called all his commanders in and briefed them on the mission ahead and gave them the warning that he believed the enemy would attack them at the weakest moment, at night. Included in his brief was information about the Chinese would attack their perimeter in overwhelming numbers as soon as night fell. The intelligence was beneficial for commanders so they could plan accordingly for the events of the evening . The Soldiers were even aware of the activities planned . One Soldier wrote “I have been told to keep my carbine on semi-automatic” which shows he knew the order and was awaiting to see the enemy to begin the engagement. The Soldiers knew the mission was to stand their ground and not waiver. When morning would come the air strikes would begin pushing back the Chinese and giving them time to
Candidate Bohac briefed a detailed, thorough 5-paragraph order. However, SNC did not develop an initial plan for execution prior to delivering his order. SNC consistently used filler words and cleared his throat during his brief, detracting from the confidence and effectiveness of the brief. SNC did not address security even after asked by another candidate if security was necessary. Upon execution of the problem, Candidate Bohac began to regain his confidence. He placed himself at the point of friction by being the second member to enter the sewer, enabling him to observe the situation on the far side and continue to command and control his fire team. Candidate Bohac was clearly in charge throughout the execution, giving clear, confident,
According to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, mission command philosophy is, “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable discipline initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.” Commanders execute mission command throughout all phases of the operations process. ADP 5-0 states that, “Commanders drive the operations process.” The six steps that allow Commanders to drive the operations process are: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. I will discuss four of these steps used by COL Freeman’s analyze his ability to properly execute mission command in this Battle.
However as the division commander, he failed to establish trust with his brigade commanders and build cohesive teams amongst his four brigades who took heavy losses in men and officers the day prior. Pettigrew had two men new to brigade command; Colonel Marshall took over Pettigrew’s own brigade and Colonel Birkett Fry took over for the wounded General Archer. General Davis and Colonel Brockenbrough were still in charge of their brigades, but were known to be inexperienced and poor leaders respectively. Pettigrew was aware of the shortcomings of Davis and Brockenbrough but did little to affect their deficiencies. For Davis, Pettigrew took “great pains before the assault to see that the division moved out properly.” This pestering did not make Davis more confident in his role and did not serve to strengthen the relationship or build trust between Pettigrew and his new brigade
The book Black Hearts by Jim Frederick is an in-depth narrative about the 1st platoon, Bravo Company 1-502nd Infantry 101st Airborne Division deployed to Iraq in 2005. The leadership failures documented in this book range all the way from the general officer level down to the lowest private. LT general Ricardo Sanchez failed to understand the climate his command group was entering as they were deployed into Iraq. From then on the entire leadership failures continued to compound upon each other with improper time to plan. It is customary to have a six month lead time to have a proper battle hand off when preparing to take over an AO from another unit. To compound this problem, the entire time the 502nd was in pre-deployment training, they were preparing for the rigors of urban combat. In reality, they were given six weeks to recon their new area of responsibility and were going to a countryside crafted by the heavens for guerilla warfare. As Colonel Ebel said in the book, “It is not going to be an easy road. They are not even sure of what they have in the area. It just feels bad. We can expect a real fight.”
The next day at 1 a.m, the telegram arrived and general Johnston. On the other side, McDowell started to move, he was told that Johnston will not be able to get to Beauregard because Patterson would prevent that from happening. General Tyler decided to attack even though his instructions were not to attack. He took a squadron and two light companies with him to attack. While this was happening two officer became worried about the turn of events that were taking place as they watched over. The two officers were Major J.G Barnard and Captain J.B Fry, these officer sent a messenger to Tyler to remind of what McDowell’s advice. McDowell had advised Tyler not to engage against the confederate army.
DSS was designed to place administrative assistance in small western school districts in 1997. There were three founding members whose goal was to help school districts that had limited staff to deal with certain administrative issues such as labor agreements and procurement systems. The company has grown to remain a viable business it must expand its book of business. The company had focused its attention on increasing small school districts as potential clients. But know they want to develop products that would encompass both the small and large school district. As the company tried to expand their business they found that their corporate structure needed to change to better address the needs of its clients. With change sometimes brings
Erik Peterson faced a number of challenging situations with Jeff Hardy, a high level employee with CelluComm, the parent company of GMCT. At first we see an awkward relationship with Jeff Hardy whom Peterson had been assigned to work under by Ric Jenkins, partly due to the lack of concrete relationship guidelines between the two (Sami, 2013). Hardy had very little operational experience, and Peterson felt that he was unable to receive constructive guidance from Hardy. As a subordinate to Hardy, Peterson should have instead attempted to resolve this problem early on as it was a critical relationship within the GMCT Company. Consulting Hardy by letting him know of his concerns would have been a more efficient and respectful manner in handling the situation. This relationship building would also have been integral in facing the Peterson-Hardy communication issues with respect to the local municipalities and fire department. Operant Learning Theory (Johns & Saks, 2014, p.54) suggests that as a result of this negative consequence Peterson should be able to improve his interpersonal skills specifically with superiors within the organization moving forward. As a subordinate to Hardy, Peterson should have instead attempted to resolve this problem early on as it was a critical relationship within the GMCT Company.