Amid the snow-covered hills in the tiny village of Chipyong-Ni, Korea, a battle ridden 23rd Regimental Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division made a decisive stand from February 13-15, 1951 that would lead to the first operational win against a much stronger and larger force. In what some considered being the Gettysburg of the Korean War, the Battle of Chipyong-Ni was a bitterly contested engagement between the X Corp, 23rd Regimental Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, under the command of COL. Paul Freeman the North Korean People’s Army and the Chinese Communist Forces’ (CCF). This analysis will demonstrate that COL Paul Freemans’ ability to properly use mission command ultimately led to the first operational defeat of the enemy since the Korean War had started.
According to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, mission command philosophy is, “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable discipline initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.” Commanders execute mission command throughout all phases of the operations process. ADP 5-0 states that, “Commanders drive the operations process.” The six steps that allow Commanders to drive the operations process are: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. I will discuss four of these steps used by COL Freeman’s analyze his ability to properly execute mission command in this Battle.
COL Freeman’s first step in the operations process was to understand the operational environment and the problem he was facing. The mission of the 23rd RCT at Chipyong-ni was to dominate the road intersection at the center of the village and occupy the high ground ringing t...
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...he desired end state, describe the end state to one’s subordinates, direct forces throughout the battlefield, lead one’s unit to victory, and continuously assess and direct the situation. COL Freemans’ successfully executed these steps during the operations process which resulted in his successful execution of mission command.
Works Cited
U.S. Department of the Army. ADP 5-0 The Operations Process (May 2012).
U.S. Department of the Army. FM 5-0 The Operations Process (March 2011).
U.S. Department of the Army. ADP 6-0 Mission Command (May 2012).
"Mission Command." StudyMode.com. 07, 2013. Accessed 07, 2013.http://www.studymode.com/essays/Mission-Command-1835554.html http://www.koreanwar2.org/kwp2/cmh/chipyong-ni_staff_ride.pdf “Leadership in Battle: The Siege at Chipyong-Ni”.Army Magazine, 2002
http://www3.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/CCRN-6CCS5J
COL Freeman beloved by his men, finally left the RCT at noon on 15FEB1951 with tears forming in his eyes. He was devoted to his Soldiers and his ability to assess the situation and ultimately secured a successful mission in Chipyong-Ni. He would issue orders with a “handshake, a grin, and provided words of encouragement before dangerous missions.” Chipyong-Ni was that type of mission. He didn’t like the situation, but issued the order as if he thought of the idea. He set the climate that extended down to the lowest Private in the RCT, to be proud and be victorious.
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...d me with our staff and Soldiers we have been given the opportunity to lead. The time and effort spent will be well worth it. Possessing a shared understanding of the operational environment will aid in our planning process when conducting operations throughout our theater of operation. In every operation we execute we know that we will accept prudent risks, identification and mitigation of those risks will determine our ability to accomplish our mission. Incorporating the principles of mission command by building cohesive teams through mutual trust, fostering an environment of shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk will make me an effective adviser to the commander, aid the staff during the operations process, and provide an example for Soldiers to emulate. My involvement in all aspects of mission command is critical to the success of our organization.
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