the knowledge argument

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Recommended: “epiphenomenal qualia”, Frank Jackson

In the “Knowledge Argument” also Frank Jackson proposed known as Mary’s room, in his article called Epiphenomenal Qualia, Jackson argues against physicalism and the view that the universe, including all that is conscious/mental is fully physical. While Jackson no longer consents to it, it is still known as one of the most significant arguments in the philosophy of mind. In this paper, I will explain the argument, assess the argument for validity and soundness, explain what problem it presents for physicalism, the basic structure for Lewis’s reply, and if Lewis’s reply is convincing.
The Knowledge Argument is made to be valid. If an argument is valid then that means the structure guarantees that, if the premises are true, then the conclusion must also be true. The Knowledge Argument isn’t sound because if it was sound then that would mean physicalism is false; but phyiscalism is not false, therefore the Knowledge Argument is valid. I believe that that physicalism is true and that everything that could/does exist is either physical or depends on the physical. Since I believe the knowledge argument states that physicalism is true, the argument is valid. The Knowledge Argument can be simply put as one that may know all the objective and physical facts about conscious experiences, but still doesn’t fully know human conscious experiences, so physicalism is false. Frank Jackson has two cases concerning physicalism: The Mary case and the Fred case. The Fred case is a case where a man named Fred sees two colors; his conscious developed his own use for two words red and red. “In any case he explains to us that it would be quite wrong to think that because ‘red’ appears in both ‘red (1)’ and ‘red (2)’ that they two colors are shades of the...

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...ary’s change after she leaves the black and white room. The Ability Hypothesis simply states that knowing what an experience is like is the same as knowing how to imagine having an experience. I agree with Lewis because there are no facts to back up knowing how to do a certain action because you actually have to experience something yourself in order to know how to do something.
In conclusion, the Knowledge Argument is shown to be a valid argument, but not sound. I explained all the premises that went along with the Knowledge Argument and what problem affects physicalism. I also examined and displayed Lewis’s reply to the Knowledge Argument, and whether Lewis’s is convincing or not. Overall, I believe that almost everything in this universe is physical. The Knowledge Argument will always be known as one of the most significant arguments in the philosophy of mind.

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