U.S. Policy on Libyan Chemical Weapons Proliferation

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U.S. Policy on Libyan Chemical Weapons Proliferation

Introduction

A legacy of aggression exists between the United States and Libya which pervades every facet of U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the non-proliferation arena. The absolute distrust of Revolutionary Leader Colonel Mu'ammar Abu Minyar al-Qadhafi and his government expressed by U.S. officials has prompted the United States to play the role of policing non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, the so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), in Libya. As Libya is a party to the Pelindaba Treaty for the establishment of the African nuclear-weapon-free zone (ANWFZ), it is bound to a commitment of nuclear non-proliferation. However, this treaty places no restrictions on the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. In 1988, the United States Central Intelligence Agency revealed evidence that Libya has produced chemical weapons at the Rabta facility and, in 1996, had made plans for similar production at a clandestine facility near Tarhunah.1

Assuming that the production of chemical weapons in Libya is contrary to the goals of the non-proliferation regime supported by the United States, U.S. foreign policy must be bound to take a harsh stand against Libyan proliferation. However, obligations to U.S. security assurances expressed in Protocol I of the Pelindaba Treaty, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and, most recently, the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) proscribe the U.S. use of nuclear weapons on Libya.

The U.S. may use the principle of international law known as the "doctrine of belligerent reprisals," which overrides any security assurances to wh...

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...rt (Leklem 1998:1).

The BWC entered into force in 1975, the NPT in 1970, and the CWC in 1997.

NBC/M is the term which the National Defense University (NDU) employs to denote nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and missiles to deliver them. This construct recognizes the ultimate importance of delivery systems with respect to the viability of any weapons program.

Klare notes that the United States faced little international and domestic criticism for its nuclear threats. Disturbingly, few critics noted that the US threat of nuclear force was contrary to international law and that it violated the aforementioned agreements.

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, April 1996, p.27 (Brook 1997:1)

The Federation of American Scientists was formerly known as the Federation of Atomic Scientists and was founded as such.

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