Philosophy Of Rights Essay

706 Words2 Pages

The philosophy of rights has been a perennial subject of discussion not only because it is embedded in the intellectual tradition and political practices of many countries but also because it exhibits deep divisions of opinion on fundamental matters. Even a cursory survey of the literature on rights since, say, the time of the Second World War would turn up a number of perplexing questions to which widely divergent answers have been given: What are rights? Are rights morally fundamental? Are there any natural rights? Do human rights exist? Are all the things listed in the UN's Universal Declaration (of 1948) truly rights? What are moral rights? Legal rights? Are basic moral rights compatible with utilitarianism? How are rights to be justified? What is the value of rights? Can infants have rights, can fetuses have them, or future generations, or animals? And so on. The existence of deep philosophical disagreement need not be an occasion for alarm or despair; it could, instead, point the way to a fruitful method of proceeding. Thus, a theory of the character and value of rights might be expected at the very minimum to identify certain crucial issues— where philosophers are divided—and then to sketch out the main grounds of the positions taken. What we would be looking for is the crux, the hinge on which the issue turns, so that it might be resolved one way or the other. A theory arises on a body of problems; it has a context and ultimately reflects a limited aim. Theories of rights should be regarded, then, as partial explications or characterizations rooted in an attempt to resolve some particular crucial issue or other. It is tempting, but misleading, to regard the ensuing theories as concerned with the nature of rights; it is muc... ... middle of paper ... ...pute about what rights we have in the absence of a theory of what makes attributions of rights valid. We may be led to the issue also by a philosophical interest in understanding how and why a collection of rights fits together. The job of the kind of theory I am after is to provide a general organizing idea or principle that makes sense of talk of rights and explains how and why certain attributions of rights can be declared valid and others cannot. Since propositions of rights are a pervasive and contested feature of our political practice, the question of what they should be taken to mean is a central problem for political theory. Whether we hold them to be self-evident truths, or nonsense, or fictions, or something else, we cannot avoid taking some view of their sense if we are to give an adequate account or critique of our political principles and institutions.

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