Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein
The connections between Ludwig Wittgenstein and Soren Kierkegaard as philosophers are not at all immediately obvious. On the surface, Wittgenstein deals with matters concerning the incorrect use of philosophical language and Kierkegaard focuses almost exclusively on answering the question 'how to become a Christian'. But this account belies deeper structural similarities between these men's important works. Thus, this paper suggests that their methods, rather than exclusively content, contain a strong parallel on which a natural and hopefully fruitful examination of their work can be based.
I claim that on at least four counts, Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein present clearly analogous form: indirect communication; examination of the 'limit of thought' as applied to their respective spheres of inquiry; and the relationship to nonsense or the absurd. I claim that a careful study of these categories with respect to the philosophers' major works will reveal sufficient similarity to have warranted our inquiry: hence a clear understanding of one philosophy should help to explain the other's. I will assume a reader has only cursory familiarity with Kierkegaard's ideas for the purposes this paper.
To begin, a brief outline of Kierkegaard's background and philosophy is germane. He was a Danish philosopher, literary figure, and ardent Christian living in the 19th century. As was mentioned above, his self-proclaimed intent was to examine what it means to be a Christian and how precisely to become one. Hence all of Kierkegaard's works (Either/Or; A Sickness Unto Death; Concluding Unscientific Postscript; Fear and Trembling being among the most notable) have a decidedly religious flavor to them. For his ada...
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...genstein had at least read some of Kierkegaard's work, but nothing to indicate he appreciated anything more than its religious content. Regardless of possible influence, these philosophers' works exhibit so many parallels that an understanding of one should greatly help in understanding another. Further, the emphasis by both on the limits and delineations of their respective fields serves to remind us to pay attention to them in our own work. And finally, they offer a new way of thinking about problems when faced with the inability to communicate directly that we can undoubtedly learn from.
Bibliography:
1. Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard by Charles L. Creegan
2. Authorship and Authenticity: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein by D.Z. Phillips
3. The Point Outside the World: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein on Nonsense, Paradox, and Religion by M. Jamie Ferreira
Peterson, Michael - Hasker, Reichenbach and Basinger. Philosophy of Religion - Selected Readings, Fourth Edition. 2010. Oxford University Press, NY.
Kierkegaard, Søren, Howard V. Hong, Edna H. Hong, and Søren Kierkegaard. Philosophical Fragments, Johannes Climacus. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1985. Print.
John Locke's, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), was first criticized by the philosopher and theologian, John Norris of Bemerton, in his "Cursory Reflections upon a Book Call'd, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding," and appended to his Christian Blessedness or Discourses upon the Beatitudes (1690). Norris's criticisms of Locke prompted three replies, which were only posthumously published. Locke has been viewed, historically, as the winner of this debate; however, new evidence has emerged which suggests that Norris's argument against the foundation of knowledge in sense-perception that the Essay advocated was a valid and worthy critique, which Locke did, in fact, take rather seriously. Charlotte Johnston's "Locke's Examination of Malebranche and John Norris" (1958), has been widely accepted as conclusively showing that Locke's replies were not philosophical, but rather personal in origin; her essay, however, overlooks critical facts that undermine her subjective analysis of Locke's stance in relation to Norris's criticisms of the Essay. This paper provides those facts, revealing the philosophical—not personal—impetus for Locke's replies.
“There are no truths,” states one. “Well, if so, then is your statement true?” asks another. This statement and following question go a long way in demonstrating the crucial problem that any investigator of Nietzsche’s conceptions of perspectivism and truth encounters. How can one who believes that one’s conception of truth depends on the perspective from which one writes (as Nietzsche seems to believe) also posit anything resembling a universal truth (as Nietzsche seems to present the will to power, eternal recurrence, and the Übermensch)? Given this idea that there is no truth outside of a perspective, a transcendent truth, how can a philosopher make any claims at all which are valid outside his personal perspective? This is the question that Maudemarie Clark declares Nietzsche commentators from Heidegger and Kaufmann to Derrida and even herself have been trying to answer. The sheer amount of material that has been written and continues to be written on this conundrum demonstrates that this question will not be satisfactorily resolved here, but I will try to show that a resolution can be found. And this resolution need not sacrifice Nietzsche’s idea of perspectivism for finding some “truth” in his philosophy, or vice versa. One, however, ought to look at Nietzsche’s philosophical “truths” not in a metaphysical manner but as, when taken collectively, the best way to live one’s life in the absence of an absolute truth.
Friedrich Nietzsche’s On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense represents a deconstruction of the modern epistemological project. Instead of seeking for truth, he suggests that the ultimate truth is that we have to live without such truth, and without a sense of longing for that truth. This revolutionary work of his is divided into two main sections. The first part deals with the question on what is truth? Here he discusses the implication of language to our acquisition of knowledge. The second part deals with the dual nature of man, i.e. the rational and the intuitive. He establishes that neither rational nor intuitive man is ever successful in their pursuit of knowledge due to our illusion of truth. Therefore, Nietzsche concludes that all we can claim to know are interpretations of truth and not truth itself.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig; G. E. M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (eds. and trans.). Philosophical Investigations. 4th edition, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Print.
Søren Keiekgaard was one of the greatest inspritational philosphers of his time and most of his inspirations came from The Holy Bible. He was born on May 5, 1813, in Copenhagen, Denmark, Søren Kierkegaard went on to pursue work as a philosopher, where he critiqued dominant Christian ideology and Hegelianism. He soon became the founder of Extenilism which “is the belief that the world has no intrinsic meaning or purpose and, consequently, that individuals alone bear the responsibility for their actions and decisions”. (Ref) His opinions differed from the mainstream thorolions of his time because his focus was more on the individual and there personal relationship with God, he didn’t think that God could be understood or found by logic. In his opinion, “God was greater than, not equicalent to, logic”. Therefore the only way to understand God, is through the leap for faith which is the opposite of reason. For it demands that one embrace the abusudity of the unexplaiable. Kierkegaard's faith is one that he refers to as authectic faith because it relies on one knowing that the it is impossible to explain and there is no reason for s...
A Christian apologetic method is a verbal defense of the biblical worldview. A proof is giving a reason for why we believe. This paper will address the philosophical question of God’s existence from the moral argument. The presuppositional apologetic method of Reformed thinkers Cornelius Van Til and John Frame will be the framework. Topics covered here could undoubtedly be developed in more depth, but that would be getting ahead, here is the big picture.
Kierkegaard was a Danish philosopher in the mid 1800s. He is known to be the father of existentialism and was at least 70 years ahead of his time. Kierkegaard set out to attack Kant’s rational ethics and make attacks on the Christianity of our day. He poses the question, how do we understand faith? He states that faith equals the absurd. In “Fear and Trembling”, he uses the story of Abraham and his son Isaac to show an example of faith as the absurd. The story of God asking Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac signifies a break in the theory that ethics and religion go hand in hand. He shows how the ethical and the religious can be completely different. “I by no means conclude that faith is something inferior but rather that it is the highest, also that it is dishonest of philosophy to give something else in its place and to disparage faith” (Fear and Trembling, 12).
understanding.) Which brings us to Kierkegaard. A lovely mind with an intense dislike for Hegel and his apparent existentialist system lacking ethics. All the focus on the creation of a possibility for lethargy, a large market emerges for indulgent difficulty. Kierkegaard is a funny man. A logical system triumphant against the impossibility of the existentialist dilemmas. Systems begin in reflection, there is perhaps thus never a true beginning, is the light of the big bang still visible? Favorite quotes: "A philosopher has gradually come to be so fantastic a being that scarcely the most extravagant fancy has ever invented anything so fabulous (pg. 200)." and "the ideal of a persistent striving is the only view of life that does not carry with it an inevitable disillusionment (pg. 203)." God for Kierkegaard is the only systematic thinker, and systems are silly silly in their finality of macrocosmic proportions because people cannot be God. Existing being a system for God but not for anything existing sounds almost as if good old Soren is not claiming that God is dead but perhaps that God does not exist? How does he reconcile this? Past existence perhaps is systematic in that it has drawn to a close but the present is no time for birth because it is immediately transcended into the past, and what is transcendent other than the past because what else can be transcended than the base in the present which leads to the "bad infinite" in my mind, outside the realm of logic and therefore of little importance other than that it is seemingly impossible.
1) Oxford Readings in Philosophy. The Concept of God. New York: Oxford University press 1987
Kerr, H. (1990). Readings in christian thought (2nd ed.). H. T. Kerr (Ed.). Nashville: Abingdon Press.
In Sigmund Freud’s, The Future of an Illusion, he studies religious foundations and the influence of religion on civilization and social principles. As he explores the psychological depths relating to religion, he also portrays a scientific and rational civilization. In turn, he reveals his hope for an ideal world where humans surpass their feelings of helplessness and insignificance to live in an improved civilization based on reason and the increase of knowledge. Through his analysis and ideas, Freud is able to incite feelings of doubt surrounding religious beliefs and their validity.
Elrod, John. Being and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975.
Wilber, Ken. The Marriage of Sense and Soul: Integrating Science and Religion. New York : Random House, 1998.