Kai Nielsen’s Support of Consequentialism and Rejection of Deontology

Kai Nielsen’s Support of Consequentialism and Rejection of Deontology

Kai Nielsen defended consequentialism and showed how it can still agree with commonsense, deontological convictions in his article “Traditional Morality and Utilitarianism.” His article focused on closing the gulf between consequentialism and deontology by showing how closely they can agree, and he further evaluated the systems and found that consequentialism as he sees it should be practiced is morally superior to traditional deontology. First, this essay will explain his argument that consequentialism squares with the commonsense convictions of deontology, and second, it will show how Nielsen arrived at the conclusion that consequentialism is a good moral system while deontology is faulty.

To show that consequentialism squares with the commonsense moral rules used by deontology or “moral absolutism,” Nielsen assumes, as many do, that outside of cases where one may has to choose the lesser of two evils, consequentialists generally make the same moral decisions as deontologists. He alluded to this general understanding when he wrote that “a consequentialist has very good utilitarian grounds for being so appalled” at acts like the “judicial execution” or “punishment, torture, and killing of the innocent,” but we should consider this assumption to be a premise in his argument so that the argument will be represented here with its full force.

Nielsen’s next major premise is that if a consequentialist is faced with a decision from which the overall value of the consequences is unclear, then consequentialism should yield to the relevant deontological rule. That is to say, if it is possible that violating a deontological rule to bring about greater good may l...

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...ust be the lesser of two evils).

A common objection to consequentialism, that agents are burdened with duties to help others at the expense of their own happiness, was not even addressed. This in itself seems to be one form of absolutism that riddles consequentialism in general. Nielsen made it clear that one should not be absolute about insisting on weighing consequences when they are barely known, but would he reject this notion as well? It is not clear that this absolutism, of always valuing the good of others over the agent’s own self, is separable from the concept of consequentialism; so it is not clear that consequentialism can escape absolutism as Nielsen concluded in the second argument recounted here.

Bibliography

Nielsen, Kai. “Traditional Morality and Utilitarianism.” Ethics: The Big Questions. Ed. James Sterba. Blackwell Publishers, 1998. 142-151.