A Case Analysis of Human Factors in The Crash of UPS 1354
Robert P. Drummond
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-Worldwide
October 19, 2016
Summary
In the early hours of 14 August 2013, An Airbus A300 Cargo plane operated by the United Parcel Service experienced a Controlled Flight into Terrain less than one-mile South of its destination, the runway at Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport (NTSB, 2016). The aircraft was operating under normal parameters, with one exception; the landing would be performed without the normal full complement of navigational aids (Fox News, 2014). The crew of the airliner was unable to adequately guide the craft onto the runway with the modified equipment, and unfortunately both the Pilot in Command and the First Officer were killed. This case analysis seeks to find way in which the human factors of the accident could have been mitigated.
The Problem
Inadequate flight crew and ground crew coordination lead to the failure of flight 1354 to make it safely back on deck. Despite numerous indicators that the landing would be out of the norm for the otherwise experienced crew (Fox News, 2014), which should have led to a heightened state of awareness, actions were not taken
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and Shanda Fanning. This accident was completely avoidable and came as a direct result of breakdown in the flight planning and briefing process as well as poor communication between the flight crew and ground crew. Multiple instances of the FAA’s CRM Behavioral Markers were disregarded or not taken seriously enough such as requesting further weather information, or a more accurate description of cloud cover over the landing area and a clarification of the NOTAM regarding runway closure.(FAA,
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A summary of the case details (provide the circumstances surrounding the case, who, what, when, how)
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