Feldman’s Four Formulations of Attitudinal Hedonism

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Fred Feldman distinguishes two categories of hedonism: sensory hedonism and attitudinal hedonism. Both categories of hedonism center around the notion that pleasure is what makes a life worth living (for the person living that life). In other words, if one obtains (receives or acquires) pleasure from life, then one’s life is going well. Additionally, the more pleasure a life contains, the better the life (the more prudential value it contains). Feldman, however, promptly classifies two interpretations of pleasure: pleasure as feeling (sensory pleasure) and pleasure as an attitude (the attitude of enjoyment). And, it is the latter conception of pleasure (pleasure as an attitude/mental state) that Feldman is interested in.
Sensory hedonism (SH), Feldman contends, embraces sensory pleasure (pleasure as a literal feeling). With SH, physical pleasure is the only necessity for a good life. A life which lacks sensory pleasure, on this view, lacks prudential value. Thus, for SH, the only metric for prudential value is sensory pleasures and sensory pains. But, Feldman does not wish to defend SH. Instead, Feldman is interested in advancing pleasure as an attitude and attitudinal hedonism. According to Feldman, “the presence of ‘enjoyment’” is what gives life value (267L). Pleasure, construed in this manner (enjoyment as an attitude), serves as the foundation for attitudinal hedonism.
After providing some rationale on why he believes sensory hedonism fails, Feldman then turns his attention to attitudinal hedonism. In fact, Feldman successively develops and critiques four flavors of attitudinal hedonism : Attitudinal Hedonism (AH), Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism (IAH), Veridical Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism (VIAH), and Desert-Adjusted In...

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... This passage hints of less pain when pain is taken in an object worthy of pain. Hence, if I understand Feldman correctly, this suggests that because of Ian’s unjust imprisonment (which is an object worthy of pain), he experiences less pain than Gary (who is justly imprisoned). As a consequence of being an object worthy of pain, this further implies that Ian has a better life than Gary. Thus, as the case of Ian and Gary demonstrates, DAIAH declares that the intrinsic attitudinal pain that an innocent person experiences when unjustly imprisoned is less bad then the intrinsic attitudinal pain experienced by a justly imprisoned criminal. Although Feldman seems ‘happy to accept’ the implications of DAIAH, my intuitions on the case of Ian and Gary do not agree with the conclusions of DAIAH -something about DAIAH is amiss in cases of veridical intrinsic attitudinal pains.

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