earning with Inferential Naivety[edit]
Research in rational inference in social-learning began with the work of Abhijit V. Banerjee[5], Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch[6]. In the basic setting of the model, rational agents end up herding. This characteristic is a feature of even more general settings and can be rationaled by the following argument: Given a finite action space and a finite and imperfect signal space, rational agents eventually "heard" as a consequence of "Information cascade", while ignoring their own signal, each person imitates others' behavior[7]:221. Though much of the basic logic regarding the proportion of private information and the proportion of information revealed by others' actions is well predicted by the model, it does have some core implications that seem unrealistic. Among its unrealistic statements is the claim that the agents have a level of sophistication that allows them to predict very unlikely behavior.
In simple cases of inferential naivety players are capable of realizing that the actions taken by previous movers reflect their own signals, however they fail to comprehend that these previous movers themselves infer with the same logic from even earlier actions. In a paper by Erik Eyster and Matthew Rabin, this process is described as follows:
Not realizing that the second mover’s action reflects beliefs that combine the first and second movers’ signals, the third mover’s inference from both predecessors leads her, in fact, to count the first mover’s signal twice. The (naive) fourth mover, in turn, unintentionally counts the first mover’s signal four times: once from the first action, once from the second action, and twice from the third action[7].:223
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...ders can converge to a erroneous statement with a positive probability. Nonetheless, there is one exception worth noting originating from the work of Eyster and Rabin[10], who adjust the model to permit each agent to exclusively observe only the immediate predecessor. In this variation of the model, the actions, and as a result, the outcomes, of naive herders exactly match those of rational agents. The reason why this exception is capable of realizing satisfactory results is that by limiting the observation horizon, naive herders are unable to double count previous actions, consequently, all signals are counted only once. Still, relaxing this assumption even by a margin of one, where naive herders can observe the last two moves, suffices to yet again create the conditions that ensure with a positive probability that these agents end up converging to a wrong belief.
Furthermore, the authors aim to unfold the scientific logic of their analysis of the effects of hidden biases so people will be “better able to achieve the alignment,” between their behavior and intentions (Banaji and Greenwald, 2013) preface
Social learning theory was first developed by Robert L. Burgess and Ronald L Akers in 1966 (Social Learning theory, 2016). In 1973, Akers wrote a book entitled Deviant Behaviour: A Social Learning Approach, which discussed Aker’s conception of the social learning theory. He developed social learning theory by extending Sutherland’s theory of differential association (Cochran & Sellers, 2017). Social learning theory is based on the principles of Pavlov’s operant and classical conditioning. Akers believes that crime is like any other social behavior because it is learned through social interaction (Social Learning theory, 2016). Social learning theory states that the probability of an individual committing a crime or engaging in criminal behaviour is increased when they differentially associate with others who commit criminal behavior (Cochran & Sellers, 2017). Social learning theory is classified as a general theory of crime, and has been used to explain many types of criminal behaviour (Social Learning theory, 2016). Furthermore, social learning theory is one of the most tested contemporary theories of crime. There are four fundamental components of social learning theory; differential association, definitions, differential reinforcement and imitation (Social Learning theory,
Bordo and Berger put us in the position to realize we actually do make assumption of thing based off prior knowledge. Both authors argues that we make learning assumption towards images taken away from its originality, but this is because we allow ourselves to do so. This is not something we take the time out and think about; as a result, when viewing an image people might stop and actually question themselves.
The argument behind symbolic interactionism is that cognition can, and usually does, interfere with human decision making based on practicality alone. And the results of the previously mentioned survey validate the understanding of the “generalized other” played out in the minds of those men deciding on purchasing a big, black Ford Raptor.
The process of demolition is reduced to the single task by the principle that knowledge is doubtable if what the knowledge is contingent upon is uncertain. Following the belief contained in the Aristotelian dictum that ‘nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses’, proving the uncertainty of knowledge gained from the senses is all that is necessary to prove that all the knowledge the meditator has about the world is uncertain. Tentatively beginning with cases in which he believes that he is misguided, such as optical illusions, he next resorts to more drastic measures, which he calls ‘hyperbolic doubt’. He imagines scenarios that would result in him being sensorially deceived such as hypothesizing that he...
Induction is an important cognitive ability in which inferences extend knowledge beyond the available information (Farrar, Raney, & Boyer, 1992). For instance, knowing an object belongs to a specific category can lead to beliefs that it shares additional properties with other category members. This can be crucial to learning and interacting with the world around us and can be considered one of the most basic functions of living creatures. Induction appears early in development (Sloutsky, Kloos, & Fisher, 2007). Preschool children have been shown to expect categories to promote induction and they use category membership to predict underlying similarities among objects – even when perceptual similarity would lead to a different prediction (Gelman, 1988). For example, a study conducted by Gelman and Markman with 3- and 4-year-olds, children were shown two objects, a tropical fish and a dolphin, and were taught a new fact about each that one breathes under water and the other pops up to breathe (Gelman, 1988). They were then shown a third object, a shark, and had to infer which of the facts about the first two objects would be applied to the new third object. However, the third object looked like the dolphin, but given the same category as the tropical fish.
The degrees of freedom (df) of an estimate is the number or function of sample size of information on which the estimate is based and are free to vary relating to the sample size (Jackson, 2012; Trochim & Donnelly, 2008).
Apply ONE theory of the causes of political conflicts to ONE real-world case of conflict to help explain why/how the conflict occurred.
An important question that must be asked is do we need to be completely rational always? Kahneman made clear how our System 1 can lead to bad decisions and poor planning. Yet it seems that our cognitive processes evolved in a way to protect us from aspects of reality. It is possible that our System 1 is protecting us from shattering anxiety and allows us to venture to new places. For example optimism bias allows us to take risks by shielding us from risk aversion. Kahneman’s work provides us with the valuable insight into our minds so that we can be aware of the faults and embrace its efficiency.
In order to make sense of the ambiguous and complicated world we live in we need a way in which to perceive phenomena. For any given event there could be numerous causes, and instinctively we choose the cause of most significance. These causes are generally ones that represents a humanlike agent. As these agents are not always easy to detect - we often assume there is a humanlike agent behind phenomena regardless of whether we can identify their presence. He notes that Wegner and Mar and Marcae propose we are inclined to see agency even in things such a geometric figures or 'abstract non living
In Stephen Jay Gould’s essay, “Some close encounters of a mental kind,” Gould discussed about how certainty can be both blessing and dangerous. According to Gould, certainty can be blessing because it can provide warmth, comfort and secure. However, it can also be a danger because it can trick our mind with false information of what we see and remember in our mind. Gould also talked about the three levels of possible error in direct visual observation: misperception, retention and retrieval. According to Gould, our human mind is the greatest miracle of nature and the wicked of all frauds and tricksters mixed. To support his argument and statements, he used an example of an experiment that Elizabeth Loftus, a professor from University of California Irvine, did to her students and a personal experience of his childhood trip to the Devils Tower. I agree with Gould that sight and memory do not provide certainty because what we remember is not always true, our mind can be tricky and trick us into believing what we see/hear is real due to the three potential error of visual observation. Certainty is unreliable and tricky.
Growing up in a very accepting and forward home, I always found myself to be free of most bias. Having been the target of some racial prejudice in the past, I always told myself that I would make sure nobody else had to feel the same way. While this may be a great way to think, it really only covers the fact that you will not have any explicit bias. What I have realized during the course of this class is that implicit bias often has a much stronger effect on us than we might think, and even the most conscious people can be affected.
In conclusion, informational social influence plays a large role in how and when people will give into conforming behavior. In both studies, the concept of informational social influence is used to test what the participants do; by adding that factors of putting the participants in an ambiguous situation, a crisis, or in a situation where they feel the need to look to someone with expertise to go forward. Both Williamson et al. (2013) and Milgram (1963) have proved how easy it is to give into influences and exhibit conforming behavior, even up to a possibly dangerous result.
The social learning theory extends this by taking into account that we may see other people being rewarded or punished, and adapt our own behaviour accordingly. However, social learning theory and behaviorism does not take into account that people have thoughts. It assumes that we have no free will over what we do and only respond according to what we have previously been exposed to. It also concerns itself solely with observable behaviors. Social learning theory can therefore be improved by attempting to explain where our thoughts come from, and how they affect our
Zastrow, C., & Kirst-Ashman, K. K. (2013). Understanding human behavior and the social environment. Australia: Brooks/Cole, Cengage Learning.