Let's call something a rigid designator if in every possible world it designates the same object, (Kripke 1980, 48) It is to say that the referent of rigid designator, speaking of a possible world or a counterfactual situation, is as same as its referent in the actual world. For example the term “President of the United States” is not a rigid term designating Omaba, because there is possible world in which the president of the United States is not Obama and hence the term doesn’t designate him (doesn’t refer to Omaba) in that world. But “Obama” designate Obama in every possible world, thus is a rigid designator. Notice, saying that in the world W the referent of “Obama” is Omaba, doesn’t mean that the residents of W use the term “Obama” to designate Obama. It just means that in describing W when we use “Obama”, we are referring to Obama. Krikpe also argues that proper names are rigid designators. For example, consider these two sentences: 1) Aristotle joined the Academy. 2) The teacher of Alexander the great joined the Academy. Intuitively, “Aristotle” in the first sentence refers to Aristotle but “the teacher of Alexander the great” doesn’t necessarily refer to Aristotle (for example in a world in which Plato is the teacher of Alexander the great). Also his arguments for rigidity of proper names, rests upon our linguistic intuition i.e. language users use proper names in modal contexts as if they are rigid: One of the intuitive theses I will maintain in these talks is that names are rigid designators. (Kripke 1980, 48) Or elsewhere: In these lectures, I will argue, intuitively, that proper names are rigid designators, (Kripke 1980, 49) Now let us talk a little about different theories about semantics of proper names. Th... ... middle of paper ... ...by (1)! Second, DQ also along with the very intuitive principle called principle of translation, results another paradox . Third, the following scenario shows that DQ, at least in the form presented earlier, can’t be true: consider a possible world in which Venus and many other celestial bodies are called “Phosphorus”. Also in this world I truly believe that Phosphorus (=Venus) is visible in the morning and I don’t know that it is also visible in the evening. Now suppose a man, pointing to Venus in the evening, wants me to agree or disagree with the sentence “Phosphorus is visible in the morning”. Since I don’t know that the term “Phosphorus” used in this sentence refers to Venus, I can’t agree with that and according to DQ I don’t believe that Phosphorus is visible in the morning. Therefore I both do and do not believe that Phosphorus is visible in the morning!
Tannen, Deborah. “Wears Jumpsuits. Sensible Shoes. Uses Husband’s Last Name.” The Meaning of Difference. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2000
In order to understand the concept of Moore’s Paradox, we must first assess and understand the behavior of logical and performative contradictions. Credited for devising and examining this paradox, George Edward Moore, a British philosopher who taught at the University of Cambridge and studied ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics describes the paradox in its omissive and commissive forms in which we will discuss thoroughly. I will then express my standpoint on which solution is the most optimal choice for Moore’s Paradox in order to analyze and explain why I believe my solution is superior to other solutions. I will also discuss any issues that arise
A paradox stems from a statement that apparently contradicts itself yet might still be true. In most cases logical paradoxes are essentially known to be invalid but are used anyways to promote critical thinking. The Raven’s paradox is an example of a paradox that essentially goes against what most logical paradoxes stand for in that it tries to make a valid claim through inductive logic. Carl Hempel is known for his famous accepting of this paradox with minor adjustments by the use of the contraposition rule. In this paper, however, I argue that Hempel’s solution to the Raven’s paradox is actually unsuccessful because he fails to take into account a possible red herring that serves as evidence against his solution. Irvin John Good is responsible for the formulation of the red herring argument as he tries to prove that the observation of a black raven can potentially negate the Raven’s paradox as valid. In addition to Good’s claim, Karl Popper and his view of falsificationism also functions as evidence to reject Hempel’s solution. Using Popper’s view as a basis, Israel Scheffler and Nelson Goodman formulate the concept of selective confirmation to reject the contraposition rule used by Hempel. Based off of all of the rejections that Hempel’s solution has it can clearly be seen that the Raven’s paradox has flaws that principally lead it to it being invalid.
Fromm, Erich. “The Nature of Symbolic Language.” Class Handout: English 101. Cerro Coso Community College, 2010. 121-26. Print.
It turns out that one of the most helpful areas for studying linguistic relativity is that of th...
In this paper I intend to analyze logically this proposition, trying to focus the question of contradiction.
... is a designer does not necessary mean that it has to be perfect (Paley 30).
In this paper I will present two differing views on the topic of the design argument. In particular, I will explain William Paley's view supporting the design argument and Bertrand Russell's view against the design argument. After a presentation of the differing views, I will then evaluate the arguments to show that William Paley has a stronger argument.
The. The "Aristotle". Home Page English 112 VCCS Litonline. Web. The Web.
Beyond this, pinning down a definition of formalism can be tough work. Just as what we mean by a “work of art” can vary greatly—a poem or painting, a classic symphony, a pre-Colombian vase—so, too, can what we mean by “form” or “formal elements” vary. We may talk about a meter or rhyme scheme, a br...
This essay is written to introduce the Russell’s Theory on Definite Description. The main content of this essay including: the definition of definite description, the puzzles concerning definite description, Russell’s Theory on Definite Description, how this theory solves the puzzles, Strawson’s objection to this theory, my evaluation on the convincingness of Strawson’s objection and my evaluation on the convincingness of Russell’s Theory of Definite Description.
...ter, Rolling Pin, Dinner Jacket, Vendetta, and Alaska. You can get some really great names by employing this technique, but it may take several tries. Try other reference books for variation.
...forms of address, weights and measures, signs and symbols. 3rd ed. New York: Penguin Group, 1995. Print.
Though some facets of this definition are perhaps vague, it is still more precise than McGrew's account. In theory, Bonjour suggests, this non-foundational ...
Some may ask why do we design? What actually makes our design work? When a designer can produce effortlessly the goal of design has been achieved. This is a universal principle and is not limited to neither digital media, handcraft nor with any other design method. Within today’s era, typography has come a long way in regards to its development and the technologies used for it. Aside from this things are still developing, however, some things will always remain the same. “Words in art are words. Letters in art are letters. Writing in art is writing” – Ad Reinhardt (1966) (Morley 2007: p6)