Bosnian Nationalism

785 Words2 Pages

From the time of Josip Tito’s death in 1980, to the rise of Slobodan Milosevic in 1989 tides were changing in Yugoslavia and Bosnia. The brotherhood and uniting that Tito fought so hard for was quickly being dissolved by hate and disarray. For fraction of time the bits of Yugoslavia looked to be in favor of new multi-party systems; however, as Milosevic came to power he pushed autonomy and rejected the multi-party agenda. Milosevic’s rise to power along with the regions destabilization leading into the Bosnian War and Milosevic’s role in spreading Bosnian Serb Nationalism, are three main factors that lead to the Bosnian War and genocide. On the back of communist leader Ivan Stambolic, Slobadan Milosevic rose to second in charge of the Serbian …show more content…

Milosevic’s true intentions much like Hitler’s in Germany were to use some ethnicity as a scapegoat, offer no real solution to a failed economy, and then gain political power (Posa p.70). Unfortunately, his plan worked and his Ideology quickly become the focal point for the justification of the Bosnian Muslim genocide. As Bosnia declared independence in 1992 backed by the United States and European Community recognizing Bosnia’s independence Serb Nationalism was launched in Bosnia. With the support of Milosevic and the Yugoslav Army (largely Serb makeup), Bosnian Serb forces began their offensive on the capital of Sarajevo and many of the outlining Muslim towns such as Zvornik, Foca, and Visegrad (History.com Staff). This was the beginning of the offensive of Bosnian Serb Nationalism because it was using mainly Serbian forces to remove another ethnic group from “their” …show more content…

Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia made the first pushes for independence in the early 1990’s. However, as these countries were formed with diverse ethnic demographics and no clear political aims for each ethnic group, it was a mere free for all as ethnic groups throughout attempted to gather as large of a following for their own “cause” and slander the other ethnicities with propaganda in hopes of slowing their opponents’ growth. The campaigns destroyed the interethnic trust that Tito worked so hard to build for four decades to build. This coupled with the urban middle class being particularly hard hit by unemployment as noted by Mary Kaldor in her extensive research into the Bosnian Case (Kaldor. p.37) led to a harsh breeding ground for interethnic conflict. Furthermore, we see that when these conflicts do occur urban areas are especially vulnerable to conflict. In fact, the urbanized cities can be the less populated cities and still spark the conflicts (Varshney. p.371-373). Closing with this quote from the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, “while it can be [granted] that religion was not a central factor in the conflict, the argument that whatever role it did play was solely negative in nature is open to question (Johnston & Eastvold. 2004).” Perhaps someone without a grasp on the difference between ethnicity and religion could argue a whole paper on the notion that

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