Introduction The Battle of Hue is one of the longest battles within the realms of the Vietnam War. The United States sent two Army battalions and three under strength US Marine Corps battalions, which together with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) defeated ten North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Viet Cong (VC). The battle highlighted the challenges the U.S. Marines faced in an urban battlefield. The NVA and VC forces entered the city of Hue under the cover of darkness on January 30, 1968. Under a unified front, they seized most of the city except two strategic locations: ARVN 1st Division Headquarters and the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) compound. The ARVN conducted a counter offensive that resulted in minimum success. …show more content…
Building trust takes time and the commander must earn it. It is a product of Army values and leading consistently with the Army leadership principles. Commanders earn trust or lose it through daily actions; thus, soldiers need to see their commanders upholding professionalism, integrity, and setting examples . Upon arriving at Hue, COL Hughes encouraged his commanders to do what they felt was needed to remove the communist troops from the city. Giving such authority to his commanders was a great step of trust that ultimately led to taking the city of Hue from the enemy. During the battle, COL Hughes moved to areas under heavy fire to advice his commanders directly and motivate his Marines to push forward. He exhibited extraordinary professionalism as he maintain his presence as a true ground commander who fought side-by-side with his Marines. Initially, cloud cover was heavy and poor weather prevented close air support (CAS) and artillery support. With organic assets readily available, he personally directed fire support on enemy defenses slowly weakening Communist forces hold on the city. Clearly, COL Hughes was able to inspire trust to his subordinates whose end result was a cohesive team that fought a successful battle …show more content…
He assured his commanders that he would support every decision they felt was necessary in the field in order to defeat the Communist forces. This was a great first step in building trust between him and his subordinates. Such great trust ultimately inspired disciplined initiative on the part of the subordinate commanders. When they encountered the urban plains that were different from the jungles and open field they were used to, they had to quickly adapt new tactics that would be effective in urban fighting. U.S. forces were initially prohibited from using artillery and close air support. The initial rules of engagement (ROE) with the enemy was to contain damage of the city, thus the Marines were limited in the use of their heavy weaponry. Progress was slow due to the strict ROE. MAJ Thompson's estimate of the situation caused Col Hughes to argue for, and successfully obtain, an easement of the restrictive ROE. MAJ Thompson then employed 5- and 6-inch naval guns, 8-inch and 155mm artillery, and fixed-wing zunni rockets along the wall, as well as riot control (CS) gas on structures inside the Citadel
COL Prescott’s role in the Battle of Bunker Hill, or more correctly know as the Battle of Breed’s Hill, is a great example of how to properly execute mission command. An overview from The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour (Moncure) reveals a number of operation and strategic objectives that the American militia had to consider. In this instance, COL Prescott takes charge of 1200 men with instructions to defend against incoming British forces that were seeking to occupy the surrounding hills during the Siege of Boston campaign. COL Prescott utilized a variety of steps in the operations process that contributed to his expert utilization of mission command over his forces. Through various sources from published works by experts on the subject, COL Prescott’s mission command demonstrates its effectiveness in his understanding of the situation against the British, his visualization to create an end state for t...
The Vietnam War: A Concise International History is a strong book that portrays a vivid picture of both sides of the war. By getting access to new information and using valid sources, Lawrence’s study deserves credibility. After reading this book, a new light and understanding of the Vietnam war exists.
As the incoming brigade commander, LTC (P) Owens, I see the critical leadership problem facing the 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) is the inability or unwillingness of Colonel Cutler to lead and manage change effectively. In initial talks with Col Cutler and in reviewing the brigade’s historical unit status reports, the 4th ABCT performed as well as can be expected in Afghanistan, but as the onion was peeled back there are numerous organizational issues that were brought to the surface while I walked around and listened to the soldiers of the 4th ABCT, in addition to reviewing the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report. One of the most formidable tasks of a leader is to improve the organization while simultaneously accomplishing
...e effects of American technology while maximizing the remarkable light infantry skills of his own Soldiers. Only Honeycutt's drive and fortitude kept his battalion fighting despite heavy losses, sagging morale, bad press, and deafening pressure from his chain of command. His strength of will (with support from Conmy and Zais) overcame every adversity the terrain, weather, enemy, and fate could heap on him and helped him see the battle through to a successful conclusion (E-History, 2012).
In order to receive a victory in the Battle of the Bulge, General Patton used Mission Command Analysis in order to understand how he can be successful for this mission. The first thing of understanding t...
The actions taken by Moore and his command group from Company Commanders to NCO’s, saved the lives of numerous American soldiers. This battle shows the leadership and unit discipline were needed to survive and be combat effective in adverse situations. Throughout the battle you see numerous Army Values and Warrior Ethos being used. “I will never leave a fallen comrade”, was the etho used the most, to reach the separated platoon. The battle also shows that not all tactical orders are effective, but as leader you must never second guess yourself.
The Battle of Long Tan took place on the 18th of August 1966 in a rubber plantation in Phuoc Tuy Province, South Vietnam. The soldiers fought in very tough conditions; “the battle was like no other in that it occurred admits the trees and bushes of a rubber plantation,” (Parks, 2005). The plantation already gloomy was made darker by tropical downpour. Men were being killed by rifle and machine gun bullets, mortars and shrapnel from grenades fired into trees to blast splinters into the sheltering soldiers. The Australians were nearly surrounded, isolated and running out o...
"Overview of the Vietnam War." Digital History. Digital History, n.d. Web. 20 Mar. 2014. .
The Third System was the name applied to a string of coastal forts from the Florida Keys to Maine intended to defend the shores of the United States against hostile invaders (Our Georgia History). The parameter was built as a defensive response to the English attack on D.C. and Baltimore and Maryland at the time of the War of 1812. During 1861, Major Olmstead gained command of Fort Pulaski. His goal was to build two lines of defense on the outer coastal area of Georgia. Under his control, he established a series of batteries and forts along the parameter of the island. During 1861 and the first six weeks of 1862, thousands of pounds of gunpowder and ammunition were brought to the fort (Schiller). In addition, Olmstead was able to boost his artillery complement to 48 guns, including 12-inch mortars, two English Blakely rifles, and 10-inch columbiads (Schiller). The development of the rifle gun helped improve the defense of the fort. When General Lee made his rounds to Fort Pulaski, he insisted that Olmstead continue to build his inner coastal defenses in preparation of an attack from the federal forces. Olmstead took his advice and built sandbags around the barbette guns, to protect the gunners from fragmentation. He orders his army to dig ditches around the fields, to help trap rolling shells. Two months preparing for the attack from the Federal army has finally come. Colonel Olmstead took thirty minutes to position his men, he made sure the guns were manned and he issued ammunition.
The Vietnam War was one of the most prolonged wars in US history. Although there were no exact dates, it is believed that US involvement lasted for around 20 years. The US went into this war hoping they could stop the spread of communism and defeat the northern Vietnamese. The battles were like nothing they had seen before and it was very difficult for the soldiers to differentiate between the enemies and civilians. To make it even more difficult for the soldiers, their “information was based on faulty intelligence”. Võ Nguyên Giáp, a northern Vietnamese general, believed that the US and the southern Vietnamese had an unstable relationship. He hoped that through the Tet Offensive the US would believe they were no longer worth defending. Fighting was done using guerrilla warfare which blurred the lines of legitimate and illegitimate killings and this had effect of bringing peoples morales down. Support for the war had always been split but this battle caused even the government to reconsider their involvement. The Tet offensive changed the US's attitude towards the Vietnam war by leading to further anti-war protests, a credibility gap in America, and for President Johnson to negotiate peace and not seek reelection.
On the first day there was light contact throughout the day. Lieutenants Colonel Weldon F. Honeycutt commander of the 3-187 “Rakkasans” still had no idea what his battalion was facing. The next day the Rakkasans believed the enemy had occupied the hill with a platoon or company size element. They attempted to coordinate attack with the other companies with each company going a different direction up the hill in hopes to secure the hill. The terrain proved to be very difficult for the troops to move through beings the
... understood and emulated the tenets of mission command throughout the Battle of Bunker Hill, he was able to understand his orders and ensure that the orders he disseminated were concise and easily understood. He visualized where his weaknesses were on the hill and described to his engineers how to overcome their lack of soldiers and build a defensive position that could repel British forces. Throughout the entire battle COL Prescott would run the ramparts making assessments and adjustments to his lines and shouting orders to his soldiers. Facing an enemy he knew he could not defeat in a full fight COL Prescott accepted a high level of risk and moved to destroy as many British soldiers as he could before abandoning his post. While considered a loss by American forces, COL Prescott’s use of mission command attributes to later victories in the American Revolution.
Equally important was the fact the Combined Arms Operation Center (CAOC) did not participate in the planning process until the
From 1965 to 1973, the United States military sent over 536,000 combat troops into the jungles, villages, and swamps of Vietnam. Of these 536,000, over 58,000 men would never return. Despite air superiority, artillery, and the most technologically advanced armed forces in the world, the United States slumped to defeat by the hands of both their enemy and themselves. Unpreventably so, the United States of America was defeated in Vietnam due egregious errors in political and military judgment, lack of popular support and an extreme unpreparedness to fight the Vietcong and North Vietnamese in a guerilla war.
The political aspect is much broader than Americans would likely conceptually envision. The political realm of dau tranh essentially encompasses all aspects of civil society to ensure full integration with everyday life. Additionally, the effects on enemy moral and the enemy civilian population become a strategic center of gravity that can at times be more important to control than winning battles against enemy combatant forces. Author Douglas Pike, who is view as the quintessential expert of the Vietnam War, noted in one of his books just how important political dau tranh was to the North Vietnamese. Within this text he discusses how post-war analysis has showed that during the time frame of 1965 to 1973, the Americans did not lose a single important battle but still lost the war due to the effectiveness of their political dau tranh initiatives.