Powered by Rafferty 1 1 Emily Rafferty Phil 230 Prof. L 3 May 2014 The Duhem-Quine Thesis and Falsification According to most scientists and philosophers of science, acceptable theories are those in which pass empirical tests. Controlled experience is what provides the basis for deciphering between acceptable and unacceptable theories. It is often thought that such ‘crucial experiments’ exist in which two rival hypotheses about some matter can be accepted or falsified with certainty. Pierre Duhem argued that falsification is ambiguous and no such crucial experiments exist because one cannot be sure whether error lies within the entire theory itself or within the background assumptions. W.V. Quine concurred with Duhem’s judgment, thus formulating the Duhem-Quine thesis in which states that it is impossible to test a hypothesis in isolation, because the empirical test of the hypothesis requires at least one or more background assumptions or auxiliary assumptions. In this paper I will argue that the Duhem-Quine thesis casts doubt on the logic of falsification and thus the decisive character of the crucial experiment. The outcome of an experiment is not predicted on the basis of a single hypothesis because auxiliary assumptions are involved as well. If the outcome of an experiment is not that in which was predicted, it is possible that the hypothesis is sound and the error lies in one or more of the auxiliaries. With this consideration, the logically decisive character of the crucial experiment is destroyed because of the uncertainty of exactly where the error lies. The outcome is supposed to support one Rafferty 2 2 hypothesis by completely falsifying its rival;... ... middle of paper ... ...ting that no hypothesis can be tested in isolation because of its background assumptions. The issue of recognizing whether error lies in one of the auxiliaries or within the entire theory is a problem that scientists will continue to face. I have argued that this problem casts doubt on the logic of falsification and the crucial experiment because the outcome of an experiment is not predicted on the basis of a single hypothesis since auxiliary assumptions are involved as well. To overcome this, a scientist can make adjustments to the experiment without completely abandoning his theory. To correctly estimate the agreement of a physical theory with evidence, it is not enough to be a skillful experimenter. One must also be an impartial and faithful judge in determining an anomaly in his theory and making the decision to accept non-supporting evidence.
Within the target site of the experiment, researchers wanted to answer their hypothesis; hypothesis was that increased police
Despite the efforts of skeptics, there are no counter-examples that are sufficient in proving that the Closure Principle is invalid. This is Jonathan Vogel’s main argument in his paper, Are There Counterexamples to the Closure Principle? Vogel presents an interesting argument against counterexamples like Fred Dretske’s “Zebra Case”. He introduces a set of conditions required for such counterexamples to work, and in doing so, demonstrates why the Zebra Case is not even a genuine counterexample to the Closure Principle. In fact, Vogel’s own examples do a much better job of what the Zebra Case intended to accomplish, and even those fail. Interestingly, what accounts for the failure of both Vogel’s and Dretske’s counterexamples are what Vogel takes to be the main features of the very counterexamples that he presents. Those three main conditions have to do with non-arbitrariness, statistical probability, and abnormality. Vogel demonstrates why these counterexamples are insufficient against the Closure Principle through how these conditions are required to make a case against the principle, and how the skeptic line of questions are insufficient in dealing with the principle directly. What is most notable are the conditions put forth that constitute, what Vogel believes, are the best counterexamples against the Closure Principle. He brilliantly reveals how the epistemic weight of those features hold lightly against the Closure Principle, and heavily against the skeptic’s argument. It is this operation of Vogel’s three conditions that will be explored at length for the purpose of establishing several facts. The first is that Vogel’s three conditions adequately take away the plausibility of Dretske’s Zebra Case, and prove the validity of ...
One of a few problems that hypothetico-deductivists would find in Chalmers statement is contained in the phrase, “Scientific theories in some rigorous way from the facts of experience acquired by the observation and experiment.’’ Theories are never produced strictly, Popper would say, but firstly crafted through the thought and feeling of a scientist in their given field. This then discards the idea that theories are the result of facts and it then forwards the idea that a theory will be manipulated by individual people as they are no more than a personal concept with reason. Furthermore if theories were derived meticulously from the facts the implication would then be made that the theory is virtually perfect. Yet these theories that are disproven all the time through falsifying this then demonstrates that these theories are not just part of a scientists thoughts but also that falsification is a more precise form of proof and justification than that of induction.
2. The researcher does not want or need to generalize the results to a population.
Going into details of the article, I realized that the necessary information needed to evaluate the experimental procedures were not included. However, when conducting an experiment, the independent and dependent variable are to be studied before giving a final conclusion.
48): A research hypothesis is a researcher’s prediction of the expected results of a study. Research hypotheses can be directional, in which the researcher states the exact “nature of the expected difference or relationship” between factors, or nondirectional, in which the researcher states that there will be some type of relationship between factors, but is not yet sure what that relationship will be. (McMillan, 2012, p. 48)
n hypothesis of the experiment is that the group containing four members will perform better than the group containing two members. This is the foundation from which we have conducted our experiment.
In addition to logical consistency, testability is an important piece when evaluating a theory. According to Akers & Sellers (2013), “a theory must be testable by objective, repeatable evidence” (p.5); thus, if the theory is not testable then it has no scientific value. There are several reasons why a theory might not be testable; such as its concepts may not be observable or reportable events and tautology. Tautology refers to a statement or hypothesis that is tr...
... a theory should be able to explain a wide variety of things, not just only what it was intended to explain.
According to Jimenez-Buedo (2011), it is difficult to make a valid reference that there is a causal relationship when conducting an experiment in a laboratory-style setting. Jimenez-Buedo (2011) also states that both internal and external validity are being inferred without adequate evidence to support the claims being made in many cases. Jimenez-Buedo (2011) also states that generalization of results in the case of external validity should not be taken lightly. In other words, it appears that she feels that neither internal nor external validity should be inferred in many cases associated with experiments that are done in a laboratory setting versus the real world. This appears to mean that in all circumstances Jimenez-Buedo (2011) favors conducting experiments that are as representative as possible of the real world in order to be able to validate the results and in order to infer a causal or generalizable relationship.
The study is usually described as an experiment with the independent variable being, the condition the participants are ...
different theories to prove events where reality has been distorted. While some are false, some
Moritz Schlick believed the all important attempts at establishing a theory of knowledge grow out of the doubt of the certainty of human knowledge. This problem originates in the wish for absolute certainty. A very important idea is the concept of "protocol statements", which are "...statements which express the facts with absolute simplicity, without any moulding, alteration, or addition, in whose elaboration every science consists, and which precede all knowing, every judgment regarding the world." (1) It makes no sense to speak of uncertain facts, only assertions and our knowledge can be uncertain. If we succeed therefore in expressing the raw facts in protocol statements without any contamination, these appear to be the absolutely indubitable starting points of all knowledge. They are again abandoned, but they constitute a firm basis "...to which all our cognitions owe whatever validity they may possess." (2) Math is stated indirectly into protocol statements which are resolved into definite protocol statements which one could formulate exactly, in principle, but with tremendous effort. Knowledge in life and science in some sense begins with confirmation of facts, and the protocol statements stand at the beginning of science. In the event that protocol statements would be distinguished by definite logical properties, structure, position in the system of science, and one would be confronted with the task of actually specifying these properties. We fin...
Their hypothesis was that “the number of other people present
...entity beyond a reasonable doubt, then neither could a second test on an even smaller sample.”