Rolling Thunder Failure

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Before Operation Rolling Thunder could truly begin, it was already destined for failure. The bombing campaign, which lasted from March 1965 to October 1968, lacked any clear direction from the start. Differences in what civilian officials and political leaders called for resulted in a military operation with no stated objective. Several key leaders played a role in the failure of Rolling Thunder. On the civilian side of the house, President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security John McNaughton, and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Ambassador to South Vietnam Maxwell Taylor all played pivotal roles in the self-destruction of Rolling Thunder. The military …show more content…

Civilian authorities continued to push for a strategic persuasion aimed at coercing the North to cease its support of the Viet Cong, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed a shift to air interdiction, the attack of supplies and men to prevent reinforcement. There was an understanding by the Joint Chiefs that North Vietnam lacked any true industrial infrastructure or ability produce war goods, which led them to doubt the impact of Rolling Thunder, but Johnson further hampered their ability to wage war. Fearing expansion of the war to China or the U.S.S.R., Johnson limited the bombing to only a few targets at a time and started with the least important first. In an attempt to interdict enemy supplies, Rolling Thunder bombed weapons, trucks, and oil. However, the President did not allow the bombing or mining of ports, a key part of air interdiction. Furthermore, several critical rail lines were off limits as well, allowing the North Vietnamese to continue sending supplies south. The reasoning behind these limitations was to prevent the death of civilians, North Vietnamese leadership, along with Chinese and Russians in North Vietnam. Chief of Staff of the Army, General Earle Wheeler, informed Westmoreland that he and McNamara were working with Washington to relax restrictions. Wheeler reasoned that once the bombing began, it would be easier to lower restriction and ramp up the campaign. On the contrary, it took …show more content…

Due to the prevalence of anti-aircraft missiles in the North, B-52s only attacked targets in South Vietnam during Rolling Thunder. Even here, their role was limited. The B-52 fell under Strategic Air Command (SAC) and was part of the nuclear deterrence triad. Every B-52 in the Southeast Asian Theater was one less bomber performing nuclear deterrence. This harmed American credibility when it came to nuclear capabilities and increased the reluctance of SAC to give their aircraft to an outside theater commander. Furthermore, in the event of a strategic crisis, it would take far too long to transfer these aircraft back into SAC command, further reducing the impact B-52s made on Rolling Thunder. To offset the lack of strategic bombers, small, single-engine aircraft had to pick up the majority of the heavy lifting. At the peak of Rolling Thunder, 200 Air Force fighters stationed across Thailand and throughout South Vietnam attack the North along with Navy fighter wings from two aircraft carriers in the South China Sea. A further 400 Air Force fighters bombed targets in South Vietnam. In total, more than five times as many bombs hit targets in the South than in the North. More bombs were dropped during Rolling Thunder than the campaigns against Japan and Germany in World War II. By 1968, the Air Force flew 12,000 sorties in a month. When Rolling Thunder came to a disappointing end in October 1968, the

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