Never Better To Have Been

5117 Words11 Pages

Not “Never Better to Have Been”: The Position of Moderate Anti-Natalism I. Introduction Some philosophers hold that it is morally wrong to procreate (either sometimes or always); call such view anti-natalism. Among these philosophers, David Benatar (2006) has advanced a famous anti-natalist theory by arguing that while there is a symmetry between presence of pain and presence of pleasure: (1) The presence of pain is bad; and (2) The presence of pleasure is good. (30) There is no symmetry between absence of pain and absence of pleasure: (3) The absence of pain is good even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone; but (4) The absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation. (30) This is what’s usually …show more content…

So, its real meaning here is “I prefer non-existence over existence”. This is in some sense begging the question and it is not always true: although some of us may still prefer the absence of pain over the presence of pain on the basis that it means never coming into existence, some of us, especially considering the pleasure we have enjoyed or will enjoy, may well hesitate to state so (and those who hesitate to state so might even include people who have experienced or will experience considerable pain). To put it in another way, considerations of the presence of pleasure have a role in people’s evaluation of pain, and more specifically, in connection with our intuition in the procreation asymmetry, if the life of a potential person (that is, a person who could exist but does not currently exist) would be foreseeably worth living, the presence of (prospective) pleasure may undermine the preferability of the absence of pain because otherwise this potential person would never be able to experience the pleasure. One important rationale behind this undermining effect of the presence of (prospective) pleasure is that if there’s only one way (i.e. coming into existence) to acquire some pleasure, and if the pain caused by coming into existence is not miserably unacceptable (e.g. dying of genetic disease in early childhood), then the pain may be considered a sort of necessary evil and no longer act as a moral reason against bringing this potential person into existence – thus, the potential person’s preference for the absence of pain is

Open Document