Analysis Of Immanuel Kant's Categorical Imperative

Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals explores themes of morality and its application to rational beings. Rationality, to Kant, includes a necessary commitment to morality, wherein failing to be moral is simultaneously a failure to be rational. Within this work, Kant proposes a concept that he entitles the “Categorical Imperative”. The Categorical Imperative is essential in the exploration of morality in the rational being, and, as with morality, is dependent solely on reason alone. The Categorical Imperative, as illustrated by Kant, is an unconditional law of morality that must be obeyed in all circumstances, separate from condition or character. As such, the Categorical Imperative serves a supreme principle of morality in

These formulations effectively restate the Categorical Imperative, so that any maxim approved by one formulation should also e approved by the others. The first of these formulations states that one should “[A]ct as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature” (4.421). In order to determine whether or not a maxim passes this evaluation, it must not exude contradiction. For example, the maxim of “it is permissible to cheat” would make cheating impossible as its very definition implies a deception that would dissipate the moment it was allowed, as one would always work under the assumption that those around her may be acting with dishonesty. A maxim of “do no cheat”, however, breeds no contradiction. Kant’s second formulation of the Categorical Imperative proposes that one should “[A]ct so that you use humanity, as much as in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means”

One may concede that if a person lies to another on the premise of a selfish goal where they are the only person who receives benefits, such as a person who borrows money without the intent of returning it, as in Kant’s example in section 4:22, they are effectively treating that other person strictly as a means to some other end, and therefore defying the second formulation which dictates that others should not be viewed purely as a means to other ends. However, as with the first formulation, there is the possibility for lying to admit of degrees and take the form of an imperfect duty. If one supposes that lying to another could be beneficial, as in a case where a small, permissible lie may boost one’s confidence and therefore chances of success, or similarly when promising insincerely may cause someone to go out and gain valuable life experience they would not have gained otherwise, the lie has the potential to prevent harm, but to actually breed positive consequences. In such a case, lying could again be seen as an imperfect duty, unlike the perfect duty insisted by Kant, and should not only avoid blame, but be celebrated as it is helping another