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Aristotle's philosophy of nature
Aristotle's philosophy of nature
Aristotle's philosophy of nature
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Recommended: Aristotle's philosophy of nature
There is one thing which all existing things have in common. It is the something particular to each natural body which, imparts to it an independent existence, is cause of its existence, and it determines individuality. For example, when you talk of being healthy, there must be something which is the subject of health. Movement requires something which can be moved. Life is the function of something which is able to have life. Life, motion, or quality cannot exist apart from this something which, Aristotle calls this ousia, or primary being.
The Greek word ousia is translated as substance. A better translation can be described as fundamental or independent and a primary being. Aristotle calls air, water, and earth, ousia, primary beings because they do not belong to other beings as their attributes, but are independent beings respectively. Being can have a variety of meanings. For example, it can mean what a thing is and it can mean that a thing is this something. It is clear that primary being or ousia must refer to this something because when we say what a thing is we say it is man, we do not say that it is short or is of another quality.
It is obvious that the categories cannot constitute the real being of anything, in the sense of stating what that being is. Being short is not essential to our understanding what a man is. Similarly, to run or to bend over, doesn’t attach to the being of an object, for there is always something which runs or bends over. This something exists independently of running or bending over, and does not owe its existence to its running or bending. When looking to an individual, is to look at to an individual thing, for example, to this man or woman. A man is in one way or another more than running or bending over will ever be because when speaking about him we can say something specific about him or that is unique to him. We can only talk about running by referring to something which runs. In the same aspect, we can talk about a man without having to refer to his being to another subject. Therefore, Aristotle believes that which is primarily not in a qualified sense which is what is meant by ousia or primary being.
Aristotle came up with his theory of substance at the beginning of his book Categories, where category is best defined as a most common kind of thing.
In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of Aristotle’s argument from Physics Book 2, chapter 8, 199a9. Aristotle in this chapter tries to make an analogy between nature and action to establish that both, nature and action, have an end.
he comes to term with three certainties: the existence of the mind as the thing that thinks,
Whereas objects in our world might be more or less equal to each other, the Equal is perfect and stable, existing with other perfect and stable entities in a world of 'being' rather than in our world of 'becoming' where everything is imperfect and changeable. Plato called all imperfect and changeable entities 'particulars' to differentiate them from the Forms -- the unalterable and perfect 'universals'.
ABSTRACT: At issue is the reliability of Heidegger’s contention that Greek thinking, especially Plato’s, was constricted by an unthought "pre-ontology." "The meaning of being" supposedly guiding and controlling Greek ontology is "Being = presence." This made "the question of the meaning of ousia itself" inaccessible to the Greeks. Heidegger’s Plato’s Sophist is his most extensive treatment of a single dialogue. To test his own reliability, he proposes "to demonstrate, by the success of an actual interpretation of [the Gigantomachia], that this sense of Being [as presence] in fact guided [Plato’s] ontological questioning . . .". I will show Heidegger’s strategy in connecting what he takes to be Plato’s naive pre-ontology — Being = Presence — to the ontology of the Gigantomachia — Being = Power. I will show that Heidegger blatantly misreads the text to make the connection: he completely misses the distinction between bodies and bodiless things. The text makes sense, I will show, if and only if its explicit ontology — Being = Power — is its implicit pre-ontology. Plato wrote his text not to discuss, but to exemplify, Heidegger’s ontology-preontology distinction. He wrote the Gigantomachia for Heidegger, but Heidegger missed it.
This paper is an initial attempt to develop a dynamic conception of being which is not anarchic. It does this by returning to Aristotle in order to begin the process of reinterpreting the meaning of ousia, the concept according to which western ontology has been determined. Such a reinterpretation opens up the possibility of understanding the dynamic nature of ontological identity and the principles according to which this identity is established. The development of the notions of energeia, dynamis and entelecheia in the middle books of Aristotle’s Metaphysics will be discussed in order to suggest that there is a dynamic ontological framework at work in Aristotle’s later writing. This framework lends insight into the dynamic structure of being itself, a structure which does justice as much to the concern for continuity through change as it does to the moment of difference. The name for this conception of identity which affirms both continuity and novelty is "legacy." This paper attempts to apprehend the meaning of being as legacy.
2. Each human body part has a function, so the whole human must likewise have a function. This premise appears parallel to Aristotle?s argument that many goods serve higher goods within a hierarchy (1094a10). Aristotle is invoking the concept a hierarchy to consider functions of body parts. Each part has a function that serves a larger part with a different function, and so it seems that the largest unit, the human body itself, must have a function.
Accordingly, all that is needed for an individual to possess and maintain his personal identity are certain mental capacitates for having conscious experiences, the examples of thoughts and sensation are given, and the ability to perform intentional actions. It this portion of the theory, a departure from the traditional Aristotelian view of substances is made. The original viewpoint of Aristotelian forms can apply only to inanimate objects, which have no personal identity, in this dualist theory, if the arguments illustrating that two people can be the same person, even if the is no continuity between the physical matter of each body are correct. Consequently, for two substances to be considered the same, in this reformed view, they
(5) The Greek words on and ousia are both translated as real, real being or reality.
Aristotle believes that before the concept of time there were three kinds of substances, two of them being physical and one being the unmovable. The three substances can be described as one being the “sensible eternal”, the second being the “sensible perishable” and the third substance being the immovable. To further this theory the sensible perishable can be seen as matter, the sensible eternal as potential, and the immovable can be seen as that which is Metaphysical and belongs to another science. According to Aristotle, the immovable is God. It is the immovable that sets the sensible perishable into motion and therefore turns the potential into the actual.
Aristotle's Theory of the Soul in the De Anima centres on the kinds of souls possessed by different kinds of living things, distinguished by their different operations. He holds that the soul is the form, or essence of any living thing; that it is not a distinct substance from the body that it is in; that it is the possession of soul (of a specific kind) that makes an organism an organism at all, and thus that the notion of a body without a soul, or of a soul in the wrong kind of body, is simply unintelligible. Aristotle uses his familiar matter/form distinction to answer the question “What is soul?” he says that there are three sorts of substance which are matter, form and the compound of the matter and form. Aristotle is interested in compounds that are alive. These - plants and animals - are the things that have souls. Their souls are what make them living things. Aristotle also argues that the mind is immaterial, able to exist without the body, and immortal by “Saying that something has a soul just means that it is alive”
Among these components and powers there is no generation and demolition—henceforth, no change. The measure of, say, earth on the planet stays consistent, and earth never shows signs of change subjectively. Each of the four elements and the two motive forces, then, are Parmenidean Reals. Be that as it may, there is likewise, on this view, the lower level of reality. The world of tactile experience, the world we observe and hear around us, has a place with this level of reality. This world comes to fruition as an aftereffect of the blending and isolating of the four components as indicated by the strengths of adoration and strife. Despite the fact that there is change, generation, and pulverization in this world, it is not an infringement of the Eleatic requests, Empedocles accepted, on the grounds that these progressions were not occurring on the level of the most genuine things. Empedocles explained how the different mixtures of his elements gave to different substances. He even how differing mixtures can sometimes yield different degrees of the exact same type of substance. For example, the elemental recipe for blood could be varied to create different types of blood, which as a result, would correspond to produce different levels of intelligence in the blood’s
Aristotle argued in favor of a divine being (Encarta, “Aristotle,” p.2). He described this the Prime Mover: “who is responsible of the unity and purposefulness of nature.
Consideration of life as a whole – “One swallow does not make a spring” (Aristotle, 1976)
Aristotle refuted Plato’s idea of the forms. He felt that the forms caused neither movement nor change, nor helped to understand what is real and what is knowable. Aristotle presents the concept of substance in his work “The Categories”. He states that substance is the fusion of matter and form. Matter is that out of which the substance arises and form is that into which the matter develops. In building a table, the wood, nails, etc., are the matter. The idea of a table is the form, and the construction is the fusion, and the end result is the substance.
Finally, the theory of Ideas reaches new height in the Sophists. The theory of Ideas in this work is a new concept because he redefines and extends it. The Sophist presents that there are hierarchy of Ideas and the whole complex of Ideas in defining the meaning of Sophistry. There are five categories of the sophist: motion and rest, sameness, difference, being, and non-being. Plato uses logos to define the meaning of each of the categories in which the being is dynamic and there is relationship among them which unity is important.