Which side are you on?

The journal article "Which side are you on? Bias, credibility and mediation" written by Andrew Kydd (2003) queried the significance of mediator’s impartiality. In the field of international relations, merely the study by Kydd (2003) has directly attributed mediator effectiveness to the provision of private information. The study is based on a game theo-retical model of mediation and draws on the theory of ‘cheap talk’ , which has its origin in economic science. There are two key findings of the study. Firstly, the study analytically pinpoints that mediators with accession to private information can, under certain condi-tions, help decrease the probability of war. Secondly, the author analyzes the effects of third-party bias. The analysis comes to the vague conclusion that “only a mediator who is effectively ‘on your side’ will be believed” (Kydd 2003: 598). For scientists a certain de-gree of bias is not merely acceptable but is in fact obligatory for some roles that media-tors play. Moreover, it points up this result for a role, information provision, that a number of scholars have claimed correctly belong to neutral weaker mediators rather than po-werful, and possibly even biased, mediators. (cf. ibid.: 608).

With regard to the scope of Kydd’s model, I have to mention that the model makes no particular assumption about whether the two conflicting sides are recently at peace and trying to prevent a war or are negotiating the end of a continuing conflict. The main assumption behind the model is that the success of bargaining causes a decrease in the expected level of cost for both sides from fighting compared to what would have happened if the negotiations had been unsuccessful. The author assumes two main is-sues concerning med...

... middle of paper ...

...oint and this emerged as crucial for truth telling in the trust-building context. An interior ideal point creates the possibility that the mediator can be seen in a sense as biased toward both sides. This means that the mediator shares with both of them a preference that they not be exploited. (cf. Kydd 2006: 457)

In conclusion while taking Kydd’s model from 2003 into consideration, it is possible to argue that the neutral mediators, which have not supported any of the adversaries in direct manner, involve themselves for the reason that they want to end the conflict. Humanitarian, altruistic and political (reputation and image) issues may be key reasons for this interest. In this context, Kydd states that the neutral mediators suffer costs if war maintains. Nevertheless, they have no particular preferences over the result of the dis-pute. (cf. Svensson 2009: 448)