PMCs emerge in a history course as an inevitable result of the changing in world structure and technology development. This critical review examines Anna Leander’s article on the paradox of implementing private military companies (PMCs) in Africa. The central issue is how security can be influenced by the using of PMCs. Building on Leander’s argument, this review argues that PMC is a double-edged sword that can be used to provide security as well as to stir insecurity. The blurred public and private lines and ambiguous regulations of PMCs cannot be neglect thus the use of PMC forces need stronger regulation and a better system of cooperation with other national or international actors. The review will first analyze the reasons for using PMCs as a way to support security in Africa mainly based on Leander’s views and partly on Singer’s points. Then the review will analyze factors contributing to the negative side of PMCs, especially in Darfur’s case and in Iraq’s case.
Leander recognizes the paradoxical situation faces by employing private military companies’ forces to solve the security problems in Africa. As a matter of fact, the line between public and private security orders in weak African states has already been blurred (Leander, 2005, p.606). Private forces are inevitable actors in those African states, thus on the one hand, it is argued that encouraging PMCs in Africa is able to restore the order. In the special case of weak African states, the poor conditions and frequent conflicts call for such a “force multiplier” as the PMCs.
Leader concludes four reasons that PMCs should be considered to organize the chaos in Africa. First, PMCs are external forces to break the cycles of violence in Africa (Leander, 2005, p.607). T...
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...ch PMCs played important role in many major combat, while PMCs fill the gap between U.S army and locals and maintain the reconstruction projects after war, democracy issues also need to be considered. The hiring of PMCs is mostly directly through government and military forces, which means citizens can be easily excluded from the decision process when their money are spent on buying military services, possibly, to invade another country.
Therefore, to conclude, the emergence of PMCs as crucial roles in Africa is an inevitable course. The wars do not find PMCs, but PMCs find wars and sell themselves. They will be frequent actors in the combat which can maintain and improve the local security. While on the contrary, to build a mature and secure system for PMCs, a lot more unstable factors need to be taken into consideration by international and national actors.
In the early 1990s, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone, led by former military agents invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia. The RUF initially said they were leading a political movement. Their main goals were to promote liberation, democracy, and freedom. They said they wanted justice and equality for all civilians living in Sierra Leone. In spite of what the RUF said they were doing, they were forceful and left trails of murder in their path. When civilians lacked support for the “political revolution”, the RUF started a decade long war that ravaged the country as a whole. The RUF developed a sense of structured, militarized violence. It created a climate of opportunities for average civilians to obtain cheap weapons. With the greater access to weapons for civilians and the RUF, the politics became more militarized also. As the war waged on, poverty rose and people began to resort to looting of national resources. Laws diminished and seemed to lack any strength against the brute force of the RUF and their civilian followers (Denov, 2010).
In this section, I will provide a brief history of U.S. military involvement on the African continent, starting with the Barbary Wars and working up through the current date. This historical documentation will highlight the change in the role the United States has played in Africa [post 9-11???]. Prior to 9-11, the United States’ interactions were mainly [capture summary here]. Since [?], however, the continent has faced a marked increase in violent extremism and terrorism leading the United States to partner with many African nations in counterterrorism initiatives. These, and other initiatives, mean an increasing number U.S. service members are deploying to Africa to take part in training, humanitarian issues and military operations. These military activities are run by United States African Command, a recently created combatant command.
In a recent verbal bout with my History of the Military Art professor, I contended that the true might of a nation may be inversely proportional to the size of its military during peacetime. My thinking, though perhaps idealistic, was that the maintenance of a large military during relative international tranquility is an overt admission of weakness and increases the likelihood of unnecessarily employing that force—it is contextually irrelevant. Instead, I proposed that a strong and stable economy is the best metric of national prowess, for such an economy can resource many opportunities as they arise. On the contrary, a robust standing military has a much narrower utility. To be sure, this author is not one that intentionally seeks to take an interdisciplinary approach to academia, but the connection seems relevant given the nature of this assignment. Whereas a nation may accomplish a strategic goal through military force, a leader may accomplish a task relying upon coercive power; whereas a nation may transform and develop the world through its economic strength and versatility, a versatile leader may transform others through the employment of one or many leader development principles—both theoretically based and experientially acquired. This piece serves to describe acquired PL499 course concepts and their relevance to my project team and the West Point Leader Development System (WPLDS). Only through a...
Orogun, P. (2004). "Blood diamonds" and Africa's armed conflicts in the post—cold war era. World Affairs, 166(3), 151-161. doi:10.3200/WAFS.166.3.151-161
Military involvement in the country’s politics has become a common feature of modern states. This history of military-government relationship traces its roots back to hundreds of years during the wars of freedom and independence. In some countries, the military is heavily involved in political affairs while others keep politics out of the military. The differences in this relationship among states arise from underlying historical factors of the modern states. This paper considers two states, Germany and Nigeria where military is heavily involved in politics owing to a long history of political warfare fuelled by ethnic pressures and economic challenges. These states are used as a reference point for military involvement in politics and the conditions under which this happens. These examples show that historical and recent conditions make the relationship between government and military very different in African and European context. In the former, weak governments are unable to control military power, while on the later, even in countries with strong military, the political leadership put limits on military power.
Emizet, Kisangani N. F. . (2000). Explaining the Rise and Fall of Military Regimes: Civil-Military Relations in the Congo. Armed Forces & Society. 26 (2), p203-227.
Theory. The term ‘civil-military relations’ is often used to describe the relationship between civil society and its associated military force, moreover the fundamental basis upon which the civilian authority exercises control over its military organization. It is generally accepted that ‘civilian control of the military is preferable to military control of the state’ and although there are states that do not conform to this norm, they tend to be less developed countries that have succumb to military interven...
Although ending more than a decade ago, remnants of the Second Congo war remain in the Democratic Republic of Congo and little to no improvements have been made. Today, there are over 70 armed militias, some of whose origin began before the first war, competing for resources and territory while bringing terror to communities with little government intervention. While, there have been attempts to bring the country up onto its feet, economic competition for resources and companies illegally making deals with rebel groups, loose borders, decentralized untrained militias, and most of all manipulative governments, are continuously fueling the encouragement of war. Not only does this impact the DRC, but also its neighbors
Principally composed of weak or unstable governments; external and internal predators maximize self-interests to the detriment of the people of the continent. These forces provide breeding grounds for entities with ends inimical to the United States, our Allies and our partners; and in the worst case, provide safe havens to enable violent extremists to thrive and target our Homeland and global interests. More recently, some states have taken advantage of these instabilities to sow the seeds of interstate tensions that could cross borders and lead to tremendous loss of life. Security, stability, rule of law, and international aid will provide governments the tools to counter outside aggression and instability.? Keeping defense of the homeland as our priority; aiding the countering of aggressions and external negative actors will provide regional governments the room to build viable institutions while military assistance and cooperation enhance unified efforts.?The entire theatre requires a robust investment of time, energy and resolve; with short, medium and long term goals to guide us to our desired end state: USEASTCOM assisting the transition of African problems into African
The first distinction is between states that fail because of a lack of relevant capacities and those that fail to promote the interests of all their inhabitants through political choice, often with the intention of benefiting the incumbent regime and its supporters at the expense of another group within the state. Robert Mugabe’s ongoing manipulation of ZANU—PF and state power in Zimbabwe is a paradigmatic example of a regime, choosing to deny basic rights to certain segments of its population in an attempt to bolster regime security. The dynamics in this case are somewhat different from instances where a regime may well want to restore order to part of its territory but lacks the relevant capacities to do so. These dynamics are apparent in, for instance, the Ugandan control of formal and/or informal markets. In this view, weak or failing state institutions provide an environment from which such warlords and ‘spoilers’ can profit. The third set of contingent factors concerns the political economy of state failure, especially the adoption by governments of ‘bad’ macroeconomic policies resulting in fiscal deficits and balance of payments crises, and the paradoxical effects of structural adjustment policies encouraged by a variety of international donors. As Nicolas van de Walle has argued, both of these factors encouraged a ‘hollowing out’ of the state which, in turn, increased ‘the chances that minor political incidents and disputes could cause the descent into failure.’ Such political economies did not, however, automatically produce failed states. Hence, although Zaire/the DRC
Our country operates under a complex civ-mil relation between two different sides of the government: a civilian sector and a military sector. While Dr. Peter Feaver argues the civilian sector should gain more control over the military, an extreme push to that idea may be detrimental to our government. It is important for the military personnel to enjoy some degree of freedom from the civilian counterparts when in an operation, but a complete disregard of the politicians and their expectations and directions may also be critical to the functioning of our government. It is, therefore, crucial to determine and shape the proper balance between two sides of the government rather than empowering one side too much.
Threats to the implementation of private military companies are public opinion and lack of budget for military spending. The challenge of public opinion can be founded in the way in which private military contractors are portrayed in the media and the high profile criminal investigations that have happened in the United States concerning the actions of a small minority of contractors. Similar to the current image of the Canadian Armed Forces, the actions of a small number of members can significantly impact the overall public opinion of a group. Even though the majority of military contractors have not been charged or found guilty of any crime, events such as the Nisur Square shooting will be used to weaken the argument for private
The two factors interlinks and deplete Africa’s natural resources through exploitation and destruction. The legacy of colonialism plays an important role in the explanation of the emergence of corruption and conflict within Africa seen throughout this essay. This essay will start by looking into the question of poverty. What is it actually? I will then move on to look at corruption, more specifically what it is, how it came emerged in Africa through neo-patrimonialism; Presidentialism and Cliental-ism. Then exploring how this can help answer Maathai’s question. A case study of Sierra Leone is used to look at examples of how corruption can contribute to poverty. The second half of the essay will focus on conflict. Again I will begin with two theories of conflict, Col-lier and Hoeffler’s greed and grievance theory and Jackson’s explanation to explore why conflict occurs. Then an exploration of the case of Somalia is used to show, through exam-ples how conflict can
In pursuit of effectiveness, the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) has set itself a decent vision of “a professional prompt and decisive force.” The debate is whether the BDF can attain the level of military effectiveness espoused in its model vision. A capability appearing lethally effective in parade will not translate into an effective military or a cure for national security. Strategists such as Allen Millet, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth Watman, define military effectiveness as a process by which armed forces transform resources into fighting power. A fully effective military is one deriving maximum combat power from available resources physically and politically. Defense acquisition or procurement, as it’s otherwise known, plays a central role in military effectiveness. Linda S. Brant and Francis W A’ Hearn describe it as “a process whereby the military avail itself capabilities through expenditure of national treasure.” The BDF is not disposed to transform its resources proficiently enough to realize its envisioned effectiveness. Specifically, attainment of their vision is undermined by a mismatch between its missions and capabilities, deficient policies and a defense management framework and procurement system too duplicitous to attend the real needs and peculiarities of its military. The BDF’s vision of a light highly mobile force resonates well with missions dominated by action against non-state actors; poachers, border security, and peace enforcements operations. However, this has not been matched with the requisite capabilities (they tended to be heavy weapon platforms suited for interstate conflicts). Additionally, the BDF’s rapid development meant there wasn’t a corresponding growth in defense policies and strategies t...
In modern military theory, the highest level is the strategic level, in which activities at the strategic level focus directly on policy objectives, both during peace and warfare. In the study of modern military strategy, there is a distinction between military strategy and national strategy, in which the former is the use of military objective to secure political objectives and the latter coordinates and concentrates all the elements of national...