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procedural democracy and its critique
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INTRODUCTION
In his book, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework, author David Estlund proposes a method of democratic decision making that he calls “epistemic proceduralism.” In preparing to write this critique, I attempted to gain at least a brief but clear understanding of Estlund’s entire framework. Whilst for time and space reasons, I could not delve into all of the available materials, I did happily find that much of this book, including the chapter I will reference primarily in this paper, is very in-depth and well thought-out by Estlund.
The main premise of his argument is thus: democratic decisions must use intellectual, epistemic methods of arriving at any conclusion in order to be held as legitimate. By the very process of using epistemic methods, the decisions made are more likely to be the correct ones for the situation at hand.
In the following pages I will attempt to explain Estlund’s thesis and position for epistemic proceduralism. I will discuss the main ideas of his argument. I will then present a detailed critique of Estlund’s rational, and finally, I will offer a counter-argument that I believe will supersede the flaws in Estlund’s theory.
ESTLUND’S ARGUMENT
To begin with, let us break down Estlund’s phrase into its literal meaning. “Epistemic,” as we by now know, is the study of knowledge in and of itself. As for “proceduralism,” we can intuitively discern that it is the process of progressing toward something.
Ergo, at its most basic meaning, epistemic proceduralism concerns the use of knowledge to effectively employ a democratic method of decision making. In order to be a useful and legitimate method of democracy, the results of any procedure must inherently be “better than random.” That is ...
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...oceed fairly and there would be no need for any methodology at all. As we all know, though, this world is far from perfect, and democracy in its current state is far from being perfected.
While Estlund puts forth a convincing argument for the practice of epistemic proceduralism, nevertheless I hope I have shown it is not a fool-proof plan for fair justice. Instead, I believe that an adapted form of “correctness” theory should be followed, and we should strive to arrive at the best answer possible, to any question. On paper, the process of getting from A to B may be strung out, reasoned, explain, and justified. In real life, though, I say that it doesn’t much matter how we get from A to B, as long as B is the right place in the end.
Works Cited
Estlund, David M. Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2008. Print.
“ … we… need an alternative to winner-take-all majoritarianism… with Nikolas’s help… I call [this] the ‘principle of taking turns.’ [It] does better than simple majority rule… it accommodates the values of self-government, fairness, deliberation, compromise, and consensus that lie at the heart of the democratic ideal” (para.
(1) Kelly, Thomas (2005). “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.” Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Eds. Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pg.1 – 36.
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