On Certainty In his essay “An Argument for Skepticism”, Peter Unger makes the case for the “universal form of the skeptical thesis”. He is arguing for the position that any type of knowledge is impossible for any person. His argument seems to be a simple one, derived from two very clear hypotheses, but that is not the case. This paper is an attempt to show that while philosophically interesting, Unger’s attack on knowledge is not nearly so damaging as he contends. I will argue that Unger
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