Are Spinozistic Ideas Cartesian Judgements? Abstract Some commentators of Spinoza maintain that Spinozistic ideas are judgements. I shall call this view the common interpretation, since it is popular to interpret Spinoza as reacting against Descartes’s theory of ideas and accordingly consider Spinozistic ideas not as Cartesian ideas, but as Cartesian judgements. The clearest difference between Descartes and Spinoza here is that whereas Descartes thought that ideas are passive, Spinoza thought
The Cartesian Doubt Experiment and Mathematics ABSTRACT: The view that Descartes called mathematical propositions into doubt as he impugned all beliefs concerning common-sense ontology by assuming that all beliefs derive from perception seems to rest on the presupposition that the Cartesian problem of doubt concerning mathematics is an instance of the problem of doubt concerning existence of substances. I argue that the problem is not 'whether I am counting actual objects or empty images,' but
Cartesian Dualism and the Union of Mind and Body ABSTRACT: Cartesian dualism and the union of mind and body are often understood as conceptions that contradict each other. Diachronic interpretations maintain that Descartes was first a dualist (in the Meditations) and later on developed his stance on the union of mind and body (Passions). Some authors find here a problem without solution. Nevertheless, in the last two decades, some interpretations have been developed intending to give a positive
Anne Conway’s Critique of Cartesian Dualism ABSTRACT: I describe and analyze Anne Conway’s critique of Cartesian dualism. After a brief biographical introduction to Conway, I sketch some of the influences on her philosophy. I then describe her non-Cartesian view of substance. According to Conway, there is only one substance in created reality. This substance contains both matter and spirit. A purely material or spiritual substance is, she argues, an impossibility. Next, I discuss several of
In Alan Gewirth’s The Cartesian Circle Reconsidered, he expands on an argument he made in a previous paper in regards to a possible logical fallacy in Descartes Meditations on First Philosophy. This fallacy is called the Cartesian Circle in reference to Descartes apparently circular reasoning that he can have clear and distinct ideas because of God’s existence, but that the proof of God’s existence and is itself based on clear and distinct ideas. Gewirth’s response to critics of Descartes is that
of establishing a foundation for the existence of truth, falsity, corporeal things and eventually the establishment of the sciences. When viewed in this light, Descartes is accused of drawing himself into a ‘Cartesian circle,’ ultimately forcing this cosmological proof of God to defy Cartesian method, thus precipitating the failure of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth meditations. This approach to the meditations, in the order with which they are presented, allows me to state that a proof of the
distinct from the external world of things because Dasein is essentially Being-in-the-world. Heidegger challenges the Cartesian legacy in epistemology in two ways. First, there is the modern tendency toward subjectivism and individualism that started with Descartes' discovery of the 'cogito.' Second, there is the technological orientation of the modern world that originated in the Cartesian understanding of the mathematical and external physical world. Descartes stands at the beginning of modern philosophy
philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. However, the claim of boundless freedom within the writings of Descartes seems even more remarkable in light of the fact that he proposed the philosophical method within the theological strictures of Catholicism. With Cartesian study primarily focused on the significance of human consciousness and the sum res cogitans, rarely does one find exclusive attention devoted to the paramount importance of the free will in Descartes’ overall project. This essay investigates the
How Private Must an Objectionably Private Language Be? ABSTRACT: Some philosophers, taking their cue from Philosophical Investigations (PI) 243-315, suppose that a private language is objectionable only when its terms refer to Cartesian mental events. Others (notably Kripke) have focused on PI 201 and the surrounding remarks about rule following, and have explicated the notion of an objectionable private language as (roughly) that of a language used by just one isolated individual unsupported
Philosophical Works and The Meaning of Reality I would put the texts in the following order: William James - Some Problems of Philosophy Rene Descartes - Meditations on First Philosophy Non-Cartesian Soums Luckmann & Berger -- The Social Construction of Reality George Orwell -- 1984 Hannah Arendt -- Eichmann in Jerusalem Lem -- The Futurological Congress Ong -- Orality & Literacy Jean-Paul Sartre -- Nausea Abram -- The Spells of the Sensuous Along with a cohesiveness of thought