Too Great a Challenge: The Mismatch of U.S. Intelligence Capabilities and Mission Prior to Pearl Harbor

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The U.S. was under-prepared for the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor due to the nascent intelligence community's inability to determine the time and place of the attack. The question of preventing the attack is beyond the scope of an intelligence agency, such an action is the product of policy. That being said, the intelligence community provided the President with insufficient information to mitigate U.S. losses on the eve of the U.S. entry into World War II. This result was not wholly the responsibility of the underfunded and under-supported intelligence and military assets working in the field. The treatment of U.S. intelligence assets during the interwar period set them up for failure when the test came, and the inability for Washington to recognize these deficiencies, even as the threat of attack become increasingly clear, is ultimately at fault for Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short's insufficient defense posture. It is unrealistic and dangerous to assume the possibility of omniscience on the part of any intelligence service and doubly foolish to rely on an intelligence apparatus that is clearly under-resourced for the challenges it is expected to confront. The narrative of an intelligence failure at cause for Pearl Harbor is tempting, as it conveniently scapegoats little known groups to the benefit of the nation's myopic defense policy makers. It is also understandable, the attack was unexpected by the American public and gave the Japanese the initiative. The attack was a massive blow to America's pride, especially when it came from an “inferior race,” like the Japanese, who were regarded as “cultivated and mannerly” to the point of being essentially harmless before the war.1 While this assumption did not inhibi...

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