Philosopher Karl Popper, an inductive skeptic, is criticized by his objection to confirmation. Rather than using the term confirmation to describe a theory that has continued to be proven correctly, Popper created his own term. Popper says that corroboration is a term used to describe theories that have been tested and not yet falsified. According to Peter Godfrey-Smith (G-S), “Popper can say why we should prefer to use a theory that has not been falsified over a theory that has been falsified” (Smith 68). The problem with Popper lies when he is presented with two theories, neither of which has been falsified. This is when Popper has difficulty choosing one theory over another. This situation can be better understood by looking at the bridge problem. I will argue that Popper is unable to solve the bridge problem using corroboration because the term is synonymous with confirmation. There are two theories (T1: Theory One) and (T2: Theory Two) that have different implications for how to build a bridge. These two theories are similar because they both have not been falsified however they differ because one has been tested and the other has not. The theories are stated explicitly below. T1: Theory that has been tested many times and has never been falsified T2: Theory that has never been tested and has never been falsified Next we can formally reconstruct the argument in modus ponens form as follows: (P1) If T1 is corroborated, then T1 is rational (P2) T1 is corroborated (C) T1 is rational Before I say what is wrong with the argument, I want to explain the bridge objection. In “Theory and Reality,” G-S presents the bridge problem, which is a response to Popper made by inductivist’s. I chose to explain this... ... middle of paper ... ...t his term corroboration is synonymous to confirmation. In conclusion, I have argued that Popper is unable to solve the volleyball problem using corroboration because the term is synonymous with corroboration and Popper denies confirmation. Granted, there must be more to what Popper thinks of corroboration, we have no reason from the readings to see why the two terms corroboration and confirmation differ. Until Popper says more about corroboration we are entitled to treat the term as equivalent in meaning to confirmation Work Cited Blackmon, James. “Lecture #13: “Confirmation.” Philosophy 30. UC DAVIS. Davis, 5 Nov 2013. Blackmon, James. “Lecture #17: “Popper’s Bridge.” Philosophy 30. UC DAVIS. Davis, 26 Nov 2013. Godfrey-Smith, Peter. Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago, 2003. Print.
Bering Land Bridge- during it’s time of existence the bridge was a major factor in migration from Asia to North America; made travel easier because it was on land instead of having to travel by boat
The Bailey Island Bridge is located in Harpswell, Maine on Route 24. Before the making of the bridge, the fishermen that lived on Bailey’s Island wanted a bridge that connected their island to Orr’s Island. The town of Harpsweell made and voted on their decisions in the weekly town meetings (“Bailey”). The project was stalled because of some of the mainlanders in the town, but it was brought back up for discussion in 1912. They first agreed on a “road” which would connect the two islands and would be constructed with timber. This was to cost $3,000. The cost quickly reached $25,000 at a later town meting because they decided to build the bridge with stone and concrete instead. Once the legislature decided to pass a bill stating that it would fun state’s highway and bridge projects, they decided to move forward with the project (Hansen, 36).
Despite the efforts of skeptics, there are no counter-examples that are sufficient in proving that the Closure Principle is invalid. This is Jonathan Vogel’s main argument in his paper, Are There Counterexamples to the Closure Principle? Vogel presents an interesting argument against counterexamples like Fred Dretske’s “Zebra Case”. He introduces a set of conditions required for such counterexamples to work, and in doing so, demonstrates why the Zebra Case is not even a genuine counterexample to the Closure Principle. In fact, Vogel’s own examples do a much better job of what the Zebra Case intended to accomplish, and even those fail. Interestingly, what accounts for the failure of both Vogel’s and Dretske’s counterexamples are what Vogel takes to be the main features of the very counterexamples that he presents. Those three main conditions have to do with non-arbitrariness, statistical probability, and abnormality. Vogel demonstrates why these counterexamples are insufficient against the Closure Principle through how these conditions are required to make a case against the principle, and how the skeptic line of questions are insufficient in dealing with the principle directly. What is most notable are the conditions put forth that constitute, what Vogel believes, are the best counterexamples against the Closure Principle. He brilliantly reveals how the epistemic weight of those features hold lightly against the Closure Principle, and heavily against the skeptic’s argument. It is this operation of Vogel’s three conditions that will be explored at length for the purpose of establishing several facts. The first is that Vogel’s three conditions adequately take away the plausibility of Dretske’s Zebra Case, and prove the validity of ...
The Jericho Covered Bridge in Kingsville, Maryland was built in 1865 and restored in 1982. The bridge is 100 feet long and cased in cedar planks and timber beams. Legend has it that after the Civil War many lynchings occurred on the bridge. Passersby were supposedly captured on the bridge and hung from the upper rafters. The bridge is very close to my house and I have driven over it several times. The storyteller, age 19, also lives a couple minutes away from the bridge. He has lived in Kingsville, Maryland his entire life. He recalled a dramatic story he had heard from his older brother involving the haunted bridge.
When I was a small child, I remember my parents crossing the James River on the ferry in Surry County while taking my brother and me to Jamestown. At the time, I thought it was thrilling to ride the ferry. It was fun to stand out at the bow and watch as we went over the river to the other side where the boats are docked at Jamestown. We fed the birds on the front deck, and I also remember going up into the top of the ferry where they had a seated area that allowed someone to get out of the wind and still be able to see out. As an adult, I no longer have this glowing admiration for the ferry services in Surry. It never fails that when I am approaching the dock; the ferry is pulling away. Thereafter, it will be at least a thirty-minute wait for the next ferry to arrive. As well as, the actual ride across which could be an additional thirty minutes depending on which ferry pulls into the dock. One ferry is extremely slower than the other is. I will go to great lengths to avoid the ferry services to cross the James River to Williamsburg and will rather drive around Newport News than to use the ferry. My husband and I moved to Surry County two years ago, and it would be nice to be able to travel safely to Williamsburg without the added time it takes to cross the James River on the ferry. There has been talk over the years about replacing the ferry services with a bridge; however, those notions are always disregarded. The residents of Surry County would be better served if a bridge were put in place of the ferry at Scotland Wharf.
A paradox stems from a statement that apparently contradicts itself yet might still be true. In most cases logical paradoxes are essentially known to be invalid but are used anyways to promote critical thinking. The Raven’s paradox is an example of a paradox that essentially goes against what most logical paradoxes stand for in that it tries to make a valid claim through inductive logic. Carl Hempel is known for his famous accepting of this paradox with minor adjustments by the use of the contraposition rule. In this paper, however, I argue that Hempel’s solution to the Raven’s paradox is actually unsuccessful because he fails to take into account a possible red herring that serves as evidence against his solution. Irvin John Good is responsible for the formulation of the red herring argument as he tries to prove that the observation of a black raven can potentially negate the Raven’s paradox as valid. In addition to Good’s claim, Karl Popper and his view of falsificationism also functions as evidence to reject Hempel’s solution. Using Popper’s view as a basis, Israel Scheffler and Nelson Goodman formulate the concept of selective confirmation to reject the contraposition rule used by Hempel. Based off of all of the rejections that Hempel’s solution has it can clearly be seen that the Raven’s paradox has flaws that principally lead it to it being invalid.
Joseph B. Strauss, a famous designer of movable spans became interested in building a bridge at the Golden Gate so he submitted a proposal. His design was a hybrid structure that included a suspension span of 2,640 feet long along with a cantilevered truss span of 685 ft. on each end. However, his design was rejected by the public because they thought such a bridge would ruin the beauty of the area. Therefore, Strauss had to work with Othmar Ammann, Charles Derleth Jr., and Leon Moisseiff, consulting engineers, who together created a new design. They created a suspension bridge with a length of 4,000 ft. Their new design was approved by the U.S. War Department in 1930 and construction proceeded.
The unificationist account of explanation and the notion of ad hoc-ness as posited by Popper are very similar concepts, but there is a nuance between the two that is worth explaining. Although both notions seem to show why we choose certain explanatory theories over others, they differ in that the model of unification shows us what type of theory we should accept, while Popper’s notion of ad hoc-ness shows us what type of theory to reject. Together, these concepts help us better understand the explanatory model of unification which leads us to a better understanding of why we are inclined to accept certain scientific theories over others. In this paper, I will attempt to show that falsifying theories based on Popper’s ad hoc-ness criteria strengthens the idea of unification by giving people a more specific way of eliminating competing scientific theories in search of the most unified one. First, I will briefly describe the unificationist account of explanation, then I will explain the idea of ad hoc-ness as laid out by Popper, and finally I will show how ad hoc-ness can be used to strengthen the account of unification by means of increasing its objectivity and by providing simpler explanations.
American Philosophical Quarterly 21, no. 3 (1984): 227-36.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig; G. E. M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (eds. and trans.). Philosophical Investigations. 4th edition, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Print.
I will start off by agreeing with Clifford that we should have sufficient evidence before making an assumption. But I don’t believe that just because we don’t have sufficient evidence it’s automatically wrong. I think that we have to look at the foundations first. And we have to look at the foundations that we know and if they’re where some reasons to doubt, then I will have to doubt the principles. And I think that knowledge does not depend upon things of whose existence I don’t have knowledge yet. So how can we say that if there isn’t enough evidence to support a claim, why is it considered wrong? I find it illogical because just because there still isn’t enough evidence, doesn’t mean its wrong, its just not considered right or wrong. We don’t have enough proof to make it erroneous. And we can’t assume anything until there are enough indications to make it otherwise.
In addition to logical consistency, testability is an important piece when evaluating a theory. According to Akers & Sellers (2013), “a theory must be testable by objective, repeatable evidence” (p.5); thus, if the theory is not testable then it has no scientific value. There are several reasons why a theory might not be testable; such as its concepts may not be observable or reportable events and tautology. Tautology refers to a statement or hypothesis that is tr...
...h not justifiable enough to be relied. Even though the inductive reasoning has been a success in the determination of events and instances that have occurred in the past, philosophers still argue about its appropriateness, in the modern society (Earman, 2006, p.36). The problem of induction has been analyzed through various philosophical studies with the aim of finding a justifiable answer to the dilemma. The uncertainty of inductive reason forms the basis of myriad questions that engulf the justification of the approach. According to some philosophers, it is possible that some unknown phenomenon might occur, leading to justification with a known phenomenon. As aforementioned, falsification and irrationalism are some of the solutions to the induction problem. It is, therefore, imperative for individuals to falsify the beliefs through hypothesis and empirical testing.
Some of the objections, such as the ones made by Edmund Gettier, claim that three conditions are not nearly enough to justify a true belief, and that at the very least a fourth must be added. Gettier presents a very valid criticism of the JTB theory of knowledge, and his counter examples highlight flaws in the JTB theory that make it an inadequate theory of knowledge. Gettier claims takes an issue with the third part of the JTB theory, which states that proposition P must be true. Gettier makes the interesting observation that person S may very well be justified in believing in proposition P even if P is false