The Idea of the Combatant Command structure was first emerged during World War II with the establishment of the different geographical theaters of operation that was composed of militant forces from different services. A single General or Admiral was appointed the single commander nominated by the President of the United States and was supported by a joint staff. With the implementation of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986, COCOM Commanders attained a nontransferable command authority over different service forces directly to the Secretary of Defense. Today there are 6 Geographic commanders consisting of the newest member the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). There has been a significant amount of criticism and arguments over the structuring and organization of the Combatant Commanders. Arguments have been made over personnel and budget restraints to peacetime efforts and the need for continued assistance. This Essay will analyze the COCOM structure using a SWOT analysis to look at both the internal and external points of the different commands and the overall effects the COCOM has on the world. This essay will finally offer and modification of the structure that would benefit the organization. The SWOT analysis is an acronym that stands for Strengths, Weakness, Opportunities, and Threats. The idea of this assessment was developed by a man name Albert Humphrey in 1960’s. His team of researchers at the Stanford Research Institute originally developed a long range corporate planning model called SOFT meaning Satisfactory, Opportunity, Fault,... ... middle of paper ... ...N Douglas M. “SOUTHCOM Posture Statement.” Washington, DC, 6 March 2012. Andrew Feickert, “The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, Novemnber 7, 2011, 60. Kniskern and Ducey, “SWOT and Structured Assessment Methodology,” 7. GEN James N. Mattis, “Statement: Commander U.S. Central Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” Washington, DC, 6 March 2012, 6. Stavridis, “EUCOM Posture Statement” 60. Ibid., 60 GEN Douglas M. “SOUTHCOM Posture Statement.” 24. Feickert, “The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands,” 64. U.S. Government Accountability Office. “Defense Management: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation,” GAO-10-801, July 2010, 25.
Mission command is the commander's use of authority and direction to empower adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. It helps subordinates exercise disciplined initiative when operating within their commander’s intent. To facilitate effective mission command, commanders must accomplish four consecutive stages of the operations process. They must thoroughly understand the problem, visualize a solution that achieves a desired end state, and then accurately describe this visualization in order to direct the organization. Commanders continually lead and assess their organizations and provide input and influence to their subordinates and staff.
The SPCC is targeted to commissioned officers in grades 0-5 (Lieutenant Colonel) or 0-6 (Colonel) who have been centrally selected to command TO&E (Troops, Organization & Equipment) Sustainment Units. This course provides training in modular force operations for newly selected command designees, enabling them to function effectively throughout their command tour. The focus is current and emerging sustainment doctrine and leadership topics for commanders. Training received during the SPCC at Fort Lee is intended to complement the Pre-Command Course (PCC) program of instruction (POI) at Fort Leavenworth, KS; making training consistent at both locations.
Brigade General Scales, Robert H. JR. Certain Victory. The U.S. Army in the Gulf War.
Powers, Rod. About.com, US Military. Military Orders: To Obey or Not to Obey? N.D. Web. 6 November 2011.
U.S. Joint Chief of Staff. Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Joint Chief of Staff, 2011.
The first failure experienced during the operations was that US Africa Command (AFRICOM) was an incomplete geographic combatant command (GCC). AFRICOM was established in 2008 as a new kind of geographic combatant command (GCC), one foc...
This essay will evaluate Eisenhower’s leadership of his command team using Gerras and Clark’s Effective Team Leadership element communication. Eisenhower improved his communication skills by establishing regular monthly meetings with field commanders and established one single Command Post. In addition, this essay will evaluate Eisenhower organizational command climate by using Jones’, Improving Accountability for Effective Command Climate article. Finally, Eisenhower improved his organization climate by directing a command climate assessment for each commanders, which led to restructuring of commands and units. This essay will determine if Eisenhower was or was not successful in improving communication and transforming organizational climate.
In 1943 the British and American Allies shared a common language and a common enemy, but they disagreed on the war’s grand strategy. (site) These strategic differences culminated in the Sicily Campaign, with Allied command and control exercise by Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, failed to employ the three essential attributes of mission command: commander’s intent, full understanding, and mutual trust among partners, as discussed in General Dempsey’s white paper. These failures in Mission Command also limited the Allies’ ability to effectively integrate the vital joint functions like Fires, Maneuver, and Protection. This essay will evaluate the Allies’ Command and Control and the other vital Joint Functions and expound on General Eisenhower
In late November 2001 Task Force 58 launched from ships off the coast of Pakistan to conduct the longest ranged amphibious assault in history with 403 Marines and Sailors, 4 fast-attack vehicles, and a variety of supporting equipment,. General James N. Mattis successfully accomplished this in large part to the effective execution of mission command. Commanders can utilize mission command as a philosophy or a warfighting function. Mission command as a philosophy is the use of commander's intent and mission orders to empower agile and adaptive leaders. It enables commanders to counter the uncertainty of operations by reducing the amount of certainty required to act in a given situation. Commanders build cohesive teams, provide a clear commander's intent and guidance, encourage the use of disciplined initiative, and use mission orders through the operations process to effectively use mission command as a philosophy. Commanders drive this operations process using mission command through six steps. First, they must understand the operational environment and the problem. Second, a commander must visualize his desired end state and operational approach. Third, he must describe that visualization to subordinates using time, space, purpose, and resources. Fourth, commanders must direct forces throughout preparation and execution. Finally, through each of the first four steps, commanders need to lead through purpose and motivation and assess through continuous monitoring and evaluation. General Mattis successfully utilized mission command as a philosophy by understanding, visualizing, leading, describing, and assessing through the operations process as the commander of Naval Task Force 58.
...mains would fail to exist. Critical to advancing U.S. national interests is the ability to “achieve decision”, which is done solely through the land domain. Finally, irregular warfare is the most likely method of future conflict faced by the U.S. and control and influence of populations within the land domain is the only way to achieve victory. Therefore, it is clear that the land domain continues to remain front and center to the pursuit of U.S. national interests. Due to the recognized vital importance of the of the land domain, I recommend that the Army Chief of Staff, Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Commander of US Special Operations Command synchronize and implement strategic communications to ensure political and budgetary decision-makers are fully aware of the critical role that the land domain continues to play with regard to our national interests.
The starting point of the strategic management is said to be the DESIGN SCHOOL with an emphasis on process. However this system is entirely based on the SWOT analysis. Swot stands for strength, weakness, Opportunities and Threats. Strength is a show...
...d me with our staff and Soldiers we have been given the opportunity to lead. The time and effort spent will be well worth it. Possessing a shared understanding of the operational environment will aid in our planning process when conducting operations throughout our theater of operation. In every operation we execute we know that we will accept prudent risks, identification and mitigation of those risks will determine our ability to accomplish our mission. Incorporating the principles of mission command by building cohesive teams through mutual trust, fostering an environment of shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk will make me an effective adviser to the commander, aid the staff during the operations process, and provide an example for Soldiers to emulate. My involvement in all aspects of mission command is critical to the success of our organization.
The U.S Army Cyber Branch was created in September 2014, as one of the first official steps in establishing a seventeen-series career field specialty, dedicated to managing the careers and professional development of officers. Army Secretary John McHugh and Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno approved the creation of the Cyber Branch in September 2014. The U.S. Army Cyber Commander capitalizes on existing U.S. Army cyber resources and improves operational readiness by organizing all cyber resources under a single command. The Network Enterprise Technology Command, the 9th Signal Command and the 1st Information Operations Command (Land) are subordinate units to the Army Cyber Command. Command
There was also confusion over unity of command. Admiral McDonald, commander of LANTCOM, made two errors in command and control. He did not assign one his subordinate commanders to act as the overall director of ground forces no matter what the service and he did not select the commander of XVIII Airborne Corps as the leader of Army forces. The lack of a single commander meant that coordination between the Marines and the Army was minimal. The lack of a designated ground force commander and the omission of XVIII airborne Corps muddied the commander’s intent. The services would have been ...
Department of the Army. (1992) FM 21-1 Legal Guide For Commanders. Washington D.C.: United States Army Publishing Authority.